

Annotated Bibliography

The Dutch Republic and Britain: The First Modern Economy, The Making of a World Economy, and the British Industrial Revolution, c. 1550-1850

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Acemglu, Daron and James Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* (2012), 529p.

In recent years there has been a flurry of books that try to explain in world-historical terms why some of the richest regions in the world in 1500 became “underdeveloped” while Western Europe became rich. The popular answer to this question in much of the world remains that Western Imperialism impoverished many parts of the world through economic exploitation and saddled it with institutions and policies that made economic growth difficult. By contrast, mainstream development and institutional economists, mainly in developed countries, have proposed social science theories that seek to explain why some societies become rich and others do not. One of the best-known scholarly recent social science treatises on this subject is Douglas C. North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (2009). In quite a different vein, Jared Diamond’s biological and geographical explanations, such as *Guns, Germs, and Steel* (1997) and *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (2005) have been a popular success. Perhaps inspired by Jared’s success, Acemglu and Robinson, economists who used sophisticated theoretical tools to explain the impact of colonial rule upon the contemporary problems of underdeveloped economies, wrote an interesting and enjoyable grand narrative aimed at the general reader but rooted in the scholarship of institutional economics.

Unlike some other grand narratives that seek to explain the wealth and poverty of states that emphasize culture, geography or resources, Acemglu and Robinson focus on political institutions. The authors use concrete world historical examples, ranging from the Mayans, the Roman Empire, and the Chinese, who failed to follow up their late medieval large-scale naval expeditions in the Indian Ocean, as well as more recent examples to, argue that the right sort of

political institutions are crucial for economic growth, or the lack thereof. Secondly, they insist that the institutions of underdeveloped economies are as they are because their political elites benefit from them. While many development economists and advocates tend to assume that the political elites in poor countries want to pursue policies that benefit most of their people, the authors point out that the elites of poor and failed countries are more likely to be what economists call 'rent seekers.' They pursue policies and maintain institutions that are in their own interests and are often contrary to the general economic development of their countries. They argue that rich and successful economies have institutions that are 'inclusive,' i.e. they have relatively strong and effective central governments that are open to talent, are participatory, promote education and technological innovation, are governed by a legal system that secures private property rights and the enforcement of contracts, and governs with the consent of the people in some fashion, while failed and poor societies are 'extractive,' designed to make only a small elite rich, are governed by a very small elite and do little to educate their people or to encourage education and technological innovation. Their key argument about economic growth appears to be that it is caused by innovation. While they concede that 'extractive' institutions can also deliver economic growth, it can only do so for a relatively brief period of time because it is incapable of sustaining the constant innovation that long-term growth demands. Thus, in terms of Europe's economic success, they argue that the chief reason for Britain's economic growth, which led to the first industrial revolution, was ultimately dependent upon its development of a strong and constitutional representative form of government as a consequence of the Revolution of 1688-89. Few modern British historians would so confidently ascribe the Industrial Revolution chiefly to its political institutions, although most cite this as one of the important factors. The book is a pleasure to read and can serve as a useful introduction to the debate about the role of political institutions and to the grand narratives that debate the 'Rise of the West' and the relative failure of "the rest" until recent times.

Allen, Robert C., *The British Industrial Revolution in a Global Perspective* (2009), 331p.

Allen's book is an excellent example of the persuasiveness of the new economic history. It is solidly rooted in statistical data and uses sophisticated methods of economic analysis but its analysis is presented in plain English. He argues that the first industrial revolution occurred in northwestern Europe because its high wages during the early modern period encouraged technological innovation. Although

high wages were initially a consequence of the demographic disaster of the Black Death, they were reinforced during the early modern period by the economic success of the region around the North Sea, first, in European trade and manufacturing, especially in wresting the textile industry from the Italians, and then in world trade. According to Allen, the first industrial revolution took place in Britain instead of the Low Countries primarily because of Britain's abundant and cheap coal resources, combined with the central government's ability to use mercantilist policies and naval power to reap the greatest benefits from an expanding European and world trade. Once it had taken the lead from the Dutch, and defeated the French, Britain used its comparative advantage to consolidate its dominant position through free trade until the late Victorian period when its technological innovations spread to its competitors. While he agrees that political, cultural and scientific factors were important in explaining why Britain experienced the first industrial revolution, his approach does not claim, as many interpretations have, that British, and later European and American, industrialization were a consequences of their supposed cultural and political superiority. Instead, he offers an economic explanation, which argues that the abundance of labor at low wages in Asia meant that there was little incentive to translate scientific discoveries into modern technologies that might have led to early industrialization in Asia.

The author argues that the main reason for "the rise of the West" was the decline of the East from about 1350. She describes the creation of a "world system" of international trade that developed in the three hundred years before 1350. She argues that the Asian world trade system before 1350 consisted of a rough equality in commercial, industrial and institutional development between the "Mideast Heartland," of central Asia, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt; the Indian subcontinent and the principalities around the straits of Malacca; and China. She argues that none of these regions dominated the other and finds that "similarities" between them "outweighed differences." Thus, to explain the rise of the West, we should not look for an argument that emphasizes Western attributes, but should instead examine the process that produced the relative decline of the East. She explains that the decline of the East was brought about by geopolitical factors, such as the destruction of the Mongolian states in Central Asia, Persia, Iraq and China during the second half of the fourteenth century. The resulting political chaos produced insecurity, which decimated the existing international trade system and led to the economic decline of the advanced economies of the East. Their decline was made deeper by the demographic collapse that resulted from the plague. This allowed the West to recreate the

international trade system on a new foundation so that the once more prosperous East became a subordinate peripheral zone to the West. While many economic historians have criticized her thesis, the book offers a useful description of the Asian trade system before the arrival of the Europeans in Asian waters.

Appleby, Joyce, *The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism* (2010), 499p.

While the term “capitalism” is used widely in popular writing, social and economic historians have been reluctant to use it as a social science concept because of its vagueness and its varied political and ideological meanings. Recently, perhaps because of the collapse of Marxism, there have been some efforts to resurrect the term in a less ideologically charged environment. Appleby has written a balanced account of capitalism’s creative and destructive powers. She defines capitalism as a system based on individual investments for the production of marketable goods. She sees innovation, risk, and the drive for profit as central. But, at its “cultural heart. . . is the individual’s capacity to control resources and initiate projects.” She understands, of course, that there was a good deal of individual initiative in many parts of the world in earlier history, but argues that it was in early modern Western Europe that capitalism became a dominant force. While she points to the Netherlands as an important forerunner in making capitalism a dynamic force in Europe, as a scholar on the history of early English economic thought, she especially credits England with constructing its early intellectual rationale and making capitalism’s success irreversible in the face of considerable opposition from traditional social and intellectual forces. Unlike Max Weber she does not see the intellectual origins of capitalism in a Protestant Ethic but accounts for its origins in the Enlightenment discourse in early modern Europe.

In the first five chapters she explains that capitalism’s success can be traced to four key factors in early modern Europe: The growth of long distance trade through the opening of sea routes to Asia and the Western Hemisphere by European merchants with government support, the increased productivity of agriculture organized on capitalist principles, an intellectual discussion about human nature among intellectuals and the progress of civilization that came from economic growth, the economic advantages that accrued to Western Europe from the plantation and slave economies of the Americas and the growth of trade with Asia, and the growth of manufacturing and technological innovation in northwestern Europe, especially in

England. In other words, the economic growth of northwestern Europe during the early modern period provided capitalism with prestige, accompanied with a persuasive intellectual justification, so that others wanted to emulate its advantages in their own fashion. The second part of the book deals with the history of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While she does not neglect the destructive forces of capitalism, including the fact that imperialism accompanied its march around the world, on the whole she explains that its success in raising the standard of living and opportunities for people around the world outweigh its darker sides, such as cyclical economic crisis and the exploitation of the weaker groups in society. Her study contains a good deal of social as well as economic history. The book is well written synthesis and is free of the economic jargon and ideological triumphalism that mars many popular works on this important subject. The book is a well-written synthesis and a product of a long scholarly career. It is an excellent introduction to a large and important subject for the general educated reader and a tribute to her distinguished and long academic career.

Ashton, T. S. *The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Pp. xiv, 139.

Ashton belongs to the first generation of professional economic historians writing in Britain who came to prominence after World War I. He along with J. H. Clapham, were the most important writers who challenged the dominant pessimistic interpretation, which argued that the standard of living of the working class deteriorated during the classic period of industrialization. Using new categories of documents, neoclassical economic theory, and some quantitative analysis, Ashton suggested that perhaps the material condition of the people during the industrial revolution had not been as bleak as had been argued. Ashton's short book, *The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830*, was first published in 1948 and was reissued in 1997, with an introduction by Pat Hudson. This brief and very readable account has been used by generations of students as their introduction to the study of the industrial revolution. It remains worth reading. In Accordance with most other interpretations of the British industrial revolution published before the 1980s, Ashton placed its origin and the most dramatic period of British industrialization firmly in the period ca. 1780-1850. He argued eloquently that the standard of living had improved for the common people during the first half of the 19th century and that it was industrialization that had offered the workers an opportunity for independence through the coming of democracy and the organization of trade unions. Ashton was a professional economic historian but he

was also interested in the use of economic history in contemporary political debates and played an important role in the conservative counter attack on the welfare state on both sides of the Atlantic after World War II. His heroes were the entrepreneurs, especially the Non-Conformists in the North of England, who reinvested their profits in their businesses and thus built a more prosperous Britain.

Auerbach, Jeffrey A. *The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. PP. viii, 279.

The Great Exhibition of 1851 in London's Hyde Park has long symbolized the success and maturity of the world's first industrial revolution. The 1850s ushered in the mid-Victorian era of English prosperity and economic pre-eminence. The exhibition was the first of many such international industrial exhibitions, which sought to highlight national and imperial economic, social and political achievements. Auerbach's study is authoritative, readable and contains many excellent illustrations, many in color, including paintings, drawings, photographs and cartoons, which are useful for teaching. While Prince Albert has often been assigned a prominent role in the origin and promotion of the Exhibition, Auerbach argues that the roots of the Exhibition should be traced to an effort to stimulate the economy, which had not fully recovered from the economic problems of the 1840s. By attracting exhibits from other countries, it was also hoped that the Exhibition would serve as a means to promote better design for British products. Although there was originally some apathy and even opposition to the project, the Exhibition turned out to be a huge success. After several decades of widespread cultural criticism of the social consequences of British industrialization, the Exhibition came to symbolize to many, both at home and abroad, that British industrialization was ushering in a new age of progress. The 'Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations,' as it was called, contained 100,000 exhibits from all over the world in the spectacular iron and steel Crystal Palace designed by Joseph Paxton. More than one-fifth of the English population, including many from the 'respectable' working classes, attended the Exhibition using Britain's new railroad network. The Exhibition not only featured the latest machinery and consumer products but prominently displaced goods from the British Empire. While this helped domesticate the British Empire for its citizens, it also was a proclamation of the success of Britain's championing of international free trade. As Auerbach's title suggests, the Exhibition was indeed "a nation on display."

Arblaster, Paul, *A History of the Low Countries* (2006), 312p.

This is one of only two recent introductory history surveys on the history of the Low Countries available in English. The first problem in writing a general history of the Low Countries is one of definition. Although Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are collectively known as the Low Countries, or more recently as the Benelux countries, they were never one entity. The closest they came to a common history was under Burgundian and then Hapsburg rule. But since the revolt of the Netherlands in the late 16th century, they have been divided politically and culturally. Most authors who attempted to write a general introductory history of the Low Countries have not included Luxembourg, even though the Duchy had a personal union with the Netherlands until 1890. Arblaster, whose field is the literature and language of the Low Countries and teaches at the Zuyd University in the Netherlands, characterizes the three states as “artificial countries.” One could respond that all nations are in fact “imagined communities.” Thus, he takes as his theme the appropriate notion of unity and diversity. Nonetheless, since we use a common term to describe all three, they must have some things in common. It is not language, since in addition to Dutch (a name invented by the English and perhaps a corruption of *neder-duytsch*, which is what High Germans called the language spoken in the delta region) and French. In addition, a number of strong dialects were spoken in the region. Perhaps the most important factor that the Low Countries have in common is that they are situated at the cross-roads of Western Europe. On the one hand, they were able to benefit from the demographic, cultural and economic exchange that was made possible by their location where the great Western European rivers—the Rhine, the Maas (better known by its French name, the Meuse often used in English), and the Scheldt)—empty into the North Sea, by their intermediate position between the Baltic and the Mediterranean, and their access to the new sea routes to Asia and the Americas. On the other hand, this connectedness meant that foreign states constantly sought to interfere in the affairs of the Low Countries, especially once they became rich.

The book is divided into six chapters of roughly equal length: "From Pagans to Crusaders, 57 BC to AD 1100," "Patterns of Power and Piety, 1100-1384," "The Low Countries United and Divided, 1384-1609," "From Delftware to Porcelain, 1609-1780," "The Rise and Fall of the Liberal Order, 1776-1914," and "World Wars and World Peace, 1914-2002." Combining

the Burgundian period with the revolt against Spain offers an interesting perspective. The violent creation of a Burgundian state, and the equally violent breakup of what had become Habsburg territory, with the de facto creation of the Dutch Republic by 1609, which separated the north from the south, reminds us that despite the prosperity achieved by the Low Countries in the early modern period, the region was not blessed by peace. Unlike in most treatments, in which the 17th century is treated as the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic, Arblaster's organization combination of the 17th and 18th centuries into one chapter allows us to gain a better understanding of the history of the southern, or Austrian, Netherlands during the early modern period. Developments from the 1970s to the present are treated in just a few pages. While the main narrative is political, he does not neglect economic, cultural, religious history and the important topics of immigration and emigration. The book is well written, often witty and provides a good introduction to the subject. It contains a handy chronology of major events, a list of dynasties and rulers, and a good list of suggested further reading in English.

Barbour, V., *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century* (1950, 1976), 125p.

This short study was one of the first scholarly descriptions of capitalism in Amsterdam during its Golden Age in English. While not a product of original archival research, it is a synthesis of the specialist literature of the time that is still worth reading as a good introduction to the subject. From the fall of the Antwerp market in 1685 until the mid 18th century, Amsterdam was Europe's entrepôt for many European and colonial goods. It was the center of Europe's shipping industry and its largest provider of financial services, insurance and capital. In her first chapter, the rise of the Amsterdam capital market, Barbour explains that its success was due to an influx of wealthy refugees from Antwerp and elsewhere, the disruption of old trade routes because of Holland's revolt against Spain and the religious wars in France. She also credits Holland's geographic position at the delta to Western Europe's great rivers, which facilitated her dominance in the Baltic trade of grain, naval stores and other bulk commodities, and her success in the North Sea fisheries. To the Baltic trade, Amsterdam added trade with the Mediterranean and with both Asia and the Western Hemisphere. She explains that Amsterdam did not originate but improved financial innovations that had been pioneered in Italy and Flanders. Its most famous institution was the Amsterdam Exchange Bank founded in 1609, which transferred funds upon its books between merchants all over Europe and in overseas trade. In

Amsterdam “money of account” replaced coinage, although its coinage remained widely used as a means of exchange in other countries. In Amsterdam profit almost always trumped patriotism and so Amsterdam’s merchants and financiers provided goods and funds to friend and foe alike. Most of the book consists of descriptions of how Amsterdam’s capitalist institutions worked. She explains the working of the Bank of Amsterdam, how capital was used to finance public infrastructure, the reclamation of land, and the financing of industries. She also explains speculative trading in commodities, the trading of company shares, and the process of making foreign loans and investments. On the whole Barbour stays away from analytical controversy and concentrates on providing a description of how capitalism worked in Amsterdam. While a great deal of research has been done on the topic since the book was first published, this remains a useful brief introduction where a beginning student can acquire an introduction to the topic.

Barringer, Tim, *Men at Work: Art and Labour in Victorian Britain*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005. Pp. 392, 33 color pls. 133 b. & w. ill.

If you consult the chief standard surveys of nineteenth century British Art, you will find relatively few paintings that display working class labor, especially industrial labor. Depictions of labor by the common people are more prominent in the graphic art of the period. In this lavishly illustrated volume, Barringer seeks to develop “a critical iconography of the working man.” His study focuses on the period 1851-1878. He sees this period of Victorian prosperity, dubbed the “age of equipoise” by earlier historians, as an “historical period of balance--perhaps better thought of as a hostile stalemate--between broader historical forces: the traditional privileges of men and the mounting demands of women; labor and capital; industry and agriculture; handmade and machine made manufacturing; city and country; provinces and metropolis; and imperial centre and colonial periphery.” This study only treats male labor and concentrates on images of physical labor in industry, the city and the countryside. Unlike Francis D. Klingender, the pioneer in the study of the art of the industrial revolution in Britain, who came to the subject with a Marxist inspired vision of class, Barringer’s view of class is much more complex and nuanced. He approaches his subject through five case studies rather than as a comprehensive survey. These include a study of Ford Madox Brown’s famous painting, *Work*, which articulates the prevailing hierarchy of male physical labor. In his chapter, “Harvest field in the Railway Age,” Barringer treats the work of George Vicat Cole and John Linnell in order to

discuss the middle and upper class nostalgic views of rural labor in a period of the rapid expansion of machine production. In his third chapter he treats the art of James Sharples, an interesting skilled artisan who was also an important artist. In his fourth chapter, he discusses the career of Godfrey Sykes. The latter was trained and taught at the important Sheffield School of Art. The School's purpose was both to reform design and to rescue the artisan. This is especially evident in his classical treatment of Sheffield trades in the frieze of the Mechanics Institute. In his final chapter, Barringer develops his concept of a "colonial Gothic art," which combined the Victorian love of the Gothic with an admiration of Indian craft skills, both of which shared an "anti-industrial...anti-imperial polemic ...whose essence was a re-interpretation of the meaning and value of labour." Barringer argues that this emphasis upon the reassertion of the moral value of work, a theme popularized by Thomas Carlyle and John Ruskin in literature, can best be appreciated in the artists and images of work in the period.

Bavel, Bas van, *Manors and Markets: Economy and Society in the Low Countries, 500-1600* (2010). 492p.

In an effort to explain why the economic growth of the West outpaced that of the richer areas of Asia, economic historians have long emphasized the period of the late 18th to the late 20th centuries. More recently, historians have argued that it was especially northwestern Europe that experienced faster economic growth while the rest of Europe lagged behind. The latter has become known as the Little Divergence and recent research suggests that faster economic growth in Europe had its roots in the medieval period, especially in regions of what are now Belgium and the Netherlands, especially along the coast and in the valley of the Meuse. In the coastal areas, significant economic growth took place first in the province of Flanders and then in Holland during the medieval and early modern periods. Historians argue that it was in northwestern Europe that sustainable economic growth, ideas, institutions, property rights, markets, and means of production that we call capitalism developed. Historians do not, however, agree on how northwestern Europe as a whole managed to achieve this social and economic breakthrough that ultimately produced the world's first industrial revolutions. On the one hand, specialists in the history of rural society find its origins in the ability of some to extract surplus wealth through the development of proto-industrial industries in rural areas or by convincing impoverished rural workers to work on large-scale capitalist farms or industries. On the other

hand, there is a school of economic historians, which focuses on the role of urbanization and international trade as the source of the region's economic growth. The recent important synthesis by Wim Blockmans, *Metropolen aan de Noordzee: De Geschiedenis van Nederland* (2010), which is unfortunately not yet available in English at the time of writing, epitomizes the urban view, while Max van Bavel's *Manors and Markets: Economy and Society in the Low Countries, 500-1600*, is a major contribution to the rural interpretation.

Van Bavel's study of nearly a thousand years of social and economic development in one of the most dynamic regions of Medieval Europe argues that the economic success of the Low Countries during the early modern period had its origin in medieval regional developments. This book serves as a prelude to a major study by Jan de Vries and A. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (1997), which argues that the early modern economy of the Dutch Republic was the first economy to attain sustained economic growth (see the annotation in this bibliography). Van Bavel argues that a mix of institutions and social relations in parts of the Low Countries, dating back to the period of the original land reclamations, can explain regional trajectories of economic growth and decline, social welfare and economic polarization. The publication of this important study produced an interesting discussion of van Bavel's thesis in the *Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History*, 8 (2011): 62-137, available at <http://www.tseg.nl/2011-2/> (click on volledge text). Bavel summarized his work as follows: "The Low Countries formed a patchwork of varied economic and social developments in the Middle Ages, with some regions displaying a remarkable dynamism. *Manors and Markets* charts the history of these vibrant economies and societies, and contrasts them with alternative paths of development, from the early medieval period to the beginning of the seventeenth century. It also offers an explanation for the differences in long-term development, differences which are most apparent at the regional level."

The book first introduces the various explanations offered in historiography for the patterns of social change and economic development in the preindustrial period and for the regional differences. Van Bavel employs a combination of new institutional economics and an analysis of the social distribution of power and property in order to explain regional social and economic differences. He argues that the relevant factors that created the differences operated at a regional level and show a strong path-dependency in the Low Countries. Path-dependency is a social science term, which means that the institutional and policy choices made by a society at a

particular period tend to have long term consequences even when conditions that prompted these institutions and policy change. He concludes that the regional socio-institutional structures that developed in parts of the Low Countries during the early and high Middle Ages exercised a determining influence on its later precocious development and resulted in distinctive paths of regional development.

In order to understand the origin of these regional developments, chapter two investigates the landscapes and soils, and discusses the interaction between land, water and men in the Low Countries. This interaction contributed to the wide diversity of landscapes found there. He identifies at least twenty-five distinctive regions in the medieval Low Countries. He explains how these regions were occupied and reclaimed after the post-Roman population decline and describes the ethnic composition and the growth of the population during the early Middle Ages. The population was concentrated in a few fertile and easily reclaimed regions during the early period, while other areas remained virtually empty. Some coastal regions, which formed a kind of frontier area, were occupied in the High Middle Ages, often requiring challenging hydrological feats. In all these regions, which formed the basis for further development, growing population pressure and increasing interference with nature caused ecological problems, but the associations and authorities were mostly able to limit the negative effects. Each of these regions received its specific social organization during the process of its development during the early and high Middle Ages.

Chapter three discusses the social distribution of power and property – which formed the core of this regional structure – and shows how this influenced or even determined long-term developments at the regional level. In the infertile regions, small-scale landowners remained well entrenched, but the fertile regions occupied in the Frankish period saw the build-up of large-scale properties by the king and religious institutions. These large properties were often organized into manors, defined here as large landholdings characterized by a non-contractual, coercive relationship between the lord and the occupants of the land, with the latter being tied to the land, although many varieties of arrangements existed. The chapter analyses the causes of the rise of manorial organization and its decline in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. In coastal regions like coastal Flanders or Holland, occupation and reclamation typically occurred somewhat later, from the high Middle Ages onwards. These regions did not see the spread of manorialism at all. Instead, they were characterized by a free population and ample scope for self-determination.

Ordinary peasants and townsmen organized themselves into villages, towns, guilds, commons, and other associations. Their genesis was helped by the dissolution of central power, and the rise of competing authorities like princes and lords.

Agriculture was shaped within these social and organizational structures. Chapter four shows how in the early Middle Ages manorial organization, in combination with increasing population numbers, formed the main motor behind the growing importance of cereal growing. The variety of food, including meat, dairy, game, fruits, and nuts gathered in the wild, increasingly gave way to the dominance of grain, except for some coastal regions, like Frisia and Flanders, where livestock farming retained its importance much longer. Population pressure and the rise of lordships and villages also stimulated the communal organization of farming. These developments increased output, but mostly had a negative effect on general living standards. Non-agricultural products also became more specialized and slowly shifted from being produced in individual households to manors and castles, where centralized production developed, linked to the power of lords and religious institutions. From the twelfth century onwards, industries shifted to the towns, as in Flanders, and further specialization and an increase in the scale of production led to the rise of wider markets for goods.

From the tenth century on the rise of markets in goods and the development of exchange markets in land, labor, and capital in the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries are the key topics discussed in the book. Van Bavel especially focuses on the institutional framework in which the markets were organized and emphasizes the slow pace and regional unevenness of the process. He shows that the emergence of a favorable institutional framework resulted in a crucial balance between social groups. The strong social positions exercised by towns, merchants, craftsmen, and even peasants and their associations produced a balance of power in some regions. Public authorities, if held in check by such counter-balances, could also contribute to the security of exchange and accessibility of markets. He explains how first in Flanders, and later especially in Holland, the markets provided a relatively high mobility for factors of production, integrated labor markets, allowed for cheap credit, and lowered transaction costs.

The rise of market exchange and increased competition were the main dynamic forces of the later Middle Ages and the motor behind social changes in the Low Countries. Chapter six explains how these forces effected regional power and property, resulting in a sharpening of the distinctions between regions. Some rural areas saw the rise of large tenant farmers and a

multitude of pauperized wage laborers, including coastal Flanders and the Guelders river area, while others saw the fragmentation of peasant holdings combined with proto-industrialization, as in inland Flanders. In the towns, which grew rapidly – in what was becoming the most urbanized part of Europe– similar differences can be observed, although they were less pronounced than in the countryside. Craftsmen and peasants sometimes succeeded in protecting small-scale production and their ways of self-determination, occasionally by extreme measures such as revolts, but gradually they lost out to the growing financial power of merchant-entrepreneurs and their Burgundian and Habsburg rulers. Moreover, growing population pressure undermined real wages, and poor relief efforts by public authorities were barely able to curb the negative impact of the growth and specialization of markets.

The combination of increasing population pressure and the growth of markets also transformed agriculture, but again in highly varying ways depending upon the socio-institutional organization of the region. Market specialization in agriculture increased greatly, but it took different forms. Some regions saw the rise of labor-intensive cash crops, and others that of extensive livestock farming. Only in the latter regions did some gains in agricultural labor productivity occur, albeit at huge social costs. There were greater gains in productivity in manufacturing industries, as a result of technological innovation, an increase in scale, and the growing use of wind-power, peat, and coal. While large towns, such as Bruges, Antwerp, and Brussels concentrated on the highly skilled fabrication of luxury products, first Holland and later the Meuse valley led the way in the large-scale production of ordinary goods. According to van Bavel, the latter region had already laid the foundations for the industrial revolution before 1600.

In the final chapter van Bavel reconstructs the patterns of economic growth and the shifts of the core economic core regions of the medieval Low Countries. He shows that the most economically developed area of economic growth shifted from the Guelders river area and the Meuse Valley in the early Middle Ages to Artois and southern Flanders in the high Middle Ages, and from Flanders and to Holland in the later medieval period. The chapter argues that neither climate, demography, nor politics were crucial in these shifts; instead, he attributes it to the kind of socio-institutional organization at the regional level. The resulting growth generally produced some economic growth for the Low Countries as whole. However, when intensive growth occurred in a core region during the period before 1600, it generally did not last long and often went hand in hand with social polarization, which did not result in higher standards of living for

the majority of the people. As a result, the social balance – which was crucial in the emergence of favorable institutions and the rise of these economic cores – was destroyed, and this explains the decline and the continuous alternation of economic cores. Van Bavel’s book is a major contribution to the economic and social history of the Low Countries from 500 to 1600 and it is likely to remain a standard work for some time.

Berg, Maxine, *Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth Century Britain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xvii, 373, 33 figs. 4 maps.

During the late twentieth century there was a growing interest in studying the role of consumer demand, expressed as a consumer revolution, as one of the key underlying causes of the industrial revolution. Berg begins her influential study of a consumer revolution in Britain with a discussion of how the idea of luxury, which had long been seen as morally suspect in Christian thought, began to be redefined in the 18th century as goods that brought convenience, enjoyment and even economic well-being for society. As the Scottish philosopher David Hume explained, “if we consult history, we shall find, that in most nations foreign trade has preceded any refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to domestic luxury... Thus men become acquainted with the *pleasures* of luxury, and the *profits* of commerce; and their *delicacy* and *industry* being once awakened, carry them on to further improvements in every branch of domestic as well as foreign trade.” Berg argues that Britain was especially successful in responding to the new commodity trade with Asia. First, Britain imported Asian luxuries. Then it created its own designs for Asian goods and had these made in Asia for the British and European market. Finally, it manufactured new luxury goods at home. However, instead of just imitating Asian luxury goods, Britain created its own versions, invented new ones, and used new materials. Other Europeans also manufactured the new luxury goods but it was the British who dominated the luxury trade by the early 19th century. We still recognize some of the famous products: Wedgwood and Dalton ceramics, Boulton candlesticks and cutlery, Paisley silks, and Chippendale furniture. Add to these the new colonial groceries of tobacco, coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar and spices. All these, according to Berg, and a myriad of other household goods, none of them necessities, underpinned the 18th century industrial revolution in Britain. By the late 18th century, Britain was the richest nation in Europe with the largest middle class that could afford such luxuries. Moreover, Britain had reared up in America a consumer society with a white population that had an even higher standard of living than in Britain with an insatiable demand for British ‘luxury’ goods. American independence did nothing to dim this demand.

Britain's defeat of Napoleonic France expanded demand for its goods on the Continent and in its growing formal and informal Empire. These goods were not the fabulous luxuries of Oriental or European royal aristocratic courts, but middle class luxuries that signaled the arrival of a consumer society that fueled the first industrial revolution and made Britain the 'workshop of the world.' Berg's book contains many excellent illustrations and a discussion of how these new luxuries were made that helps us visualize the British revolution.

Berg, Maxine, *The Age of Manufactures: Industry, Work and Innovation in Britain, 1700-1820*, 2nd ed., London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Pp. xiii, 337. 17pls, 18 figs, 19 tbls.

During the last third of the 20th century, the 'new economic history,' which uses sophisticated tools of economic and statistical analysis, challenged many of the long held assumptions about the nature of the industrial revolution. Its conclusions created a new orthodoxy among economic historians, which emphasizes that aggregate British economic growth was moderate during the classical period of industrialization and that many sectors and regions remained fairly traditional before 1850 (these views are especially associated with the work of N.F.R. Crafts, see below). After an extensive review of the new economic history's work on British industrialization, Berg concurs that the industrial revolution in Britain was a much longer process than traditional interpretations had suggested. Although she also agrees that aggregate rates of growth and technological change have indeed been slower than according in the classical interpretation, and what were called the new 'factories' were confined to particular regions and industries during this period, she insists that the overall result nonetheless remained revolutionary. Not only, she argues, did the dynamic regions and industries experience their own dramatic transformation in technology, the physical environment, the scale of enterprises, the social roles of owners and workers, demographic behavior and the place of the family and child and female labor, which were so widely noted by contemporaries, but these revolutionary changes encouraged new social and intellectual attitudes, patterns of trade, roles for the state, forms of politics, notions of class, and changes of social relations that eventually transformed more traditional industries and regions. Unlike most economic historians, however, who assume that the classical model of industrialization of steam driven large factories was a necessary stage through which manufacturing eventually had to pass toward a higher standard of living, her explanation is much less deterministic. Instead of relying primarily upon the economists' growth models and stage theories, "which have narrowed our account of historical processes to aggregate and macroeconomic analysis," Berg emphasizes the complex

relationships between social history, economic history and the history of technology to offer us an account of the “age of manufactures” which sees an intricate web of improvement and decline, large and small scale production, and machine and hand processes that created the new and revolutionary market society. She is especially good at explaining how many new products were actually made in relatively small shops during the 18th century but were nonetheless technologically innovative and expanded the scale and productivity of manufacturing. Berg’s work fully integrates scholarship on women and children in her work and she insists that one of the most revolutionary and controversial aspects of early industrialization was its extensive use of female and child labor in a way that had a profound effect upon both the economy and society. Finally, by emphasizing the importance of the international economy in Britain’s economic transformation, as well as Britain’s world wide political and military power, Berg places the British industrial revolution in a broad European and world-wide context of international trade and empire.

Berkel, Klaas van and Leonie de Goei, eds., *The International Relevance of Dutch History* in *The Low Countries Historical Review*, Vol. 125, Nos. 2 & 3, 2010. Available on line at <http://www.bmgn-lchr.nl/index.php/bmgn/issue/view/422>.

This special issue of the main journal of Dutch History, *BMNG The Low Countries Historical Review*, examines the relevance of Dutch historical debates within an international context. The aim is not to show whether Dutch history is unique but how Dutch historical work is relevant to the historical process in general, to highlight areas in which Dutch history illustrates larger historical themes, or offers a caution about an interpretation based on the study of other societies that has been generalized. The volume consists of twelve essays by important historians now working on Dutch history in the Netherlands. The essays provide an introduction to contemporary scholarship on Dutch history and its most prominent themes. Willem Frijhoff’s opening essay, “The Relevance of Dutch History, or: Much in Little,” suggests that there are few good histories of the Dutch nation in other languages and thus its national history is not well known outside the country. Even in Dutch, he argues, there are very few good surveys of the nation’s history. Instead, Dutch historians prefer to write thematic works and some of these are better known outside the country. He identifies these major themes for which the Dutch are well known and have made major contributions: water management; the development of a capitalist economy and bourgeois society in the early modern period; colonialism and international trade;

culture and intellectual life, especially the development of tolerance and secularism, particularly in the early modern era but also in recent decades; and the apparent Dutch national ambition “to show the world an exemplary route to modernity.” The latter may help explain why Dutch historians are better known for writing transnational rather than national histories. The following essays offer a good introduction to important themes in Dutch early modern history: Bas van Bavel, “The Medieval Origin of Capitalism in the Netherlands;” Klaas van Berkel, “The Dutch Republic, Laboratory of the Scientific Revolution;” Maarten Prak, “The Dutch Republic as a Bourgeois Society;” Wijnhand W. Mijnhardt, “Urbanization, Culture and the Origins of the European Enlightenment;” Wim van den Doel, “The Dutch Empire: An Essential Part of World History,“ “Civil Society or Democracy? A Dutch Paradox;”

Binfield, Kevin, *Writings of the Luddites*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. Pp. viii, 279.

The term ‘Luddism,’ often defined as opposition to technological progress, originated in England to describe a movement popularly associated with machine breaking between 1811-17. In fact, Luddism was often a peaceful movement, which sought political and economic solutions to the economic problems of artisans and skilled workers during a period of considerable social dislocation toward the end and immediately after the Napoleonic wars. The movement was especially vigorous in the Midlands, Yorkshire and the Northwest. It was never a national movement. Instead, each particular region had distinct economic problems for which redress was sought. In the Midlands, for example, the Luddites objected to the use of larger stocking manufacturing frames (manually-powered machines) provided by capitalist entrepreneurs than were allowed a 1663 statute regulating the trade. Luddism took its name from King Lud or General Lud, a mythical popular figure who protected the rights of workers analogous to the idea of Robin Hood. The latter, however, was an outlawed gentleman who escaped to the forest hoping for the return of the crusader, Richard I, while Lud was a worker and representative of a trade. Binfield’s book is a useful introduction to primary documents on Luddism and consists of edited and annotated Luddite documents from each of the main areas where Luddism was active. The documents consist of letters, petitions, economic arguments, and political explanations concerning the distressed situation of artisans caused by new machinery and production methods and pleas of how to improve the condition of the workers through the enforcement of existing laws, negotiated wages between employers and worker organization. Many of these documents bear the signatures of real workers and were designed to negotiate improved conditions for the workers. One of

the most common demands, for example, was that existing apprenticeship laws be enforced in the skilled trades. What made Luddism famous, however, was the fact that failing peaceful methods of redress, some Luddites were willing to use violence against machinery and factories to achieve their demands. Binfield's collection also contains many threatening letters, popular songs, posters and calls for violence against machines and methods of production that violated both regulatory statutes and the customs of particular trades. Binfield does not attempt to provide a tight definition of the movement or provide a unified theoretical framework. Instead, these documents give voice to a wide selection of workers who responded to specific local social and economic grievances in a variety of peaceful and sometimes threatening and more violent actions while often using the name King Ludd to represent the moral authority of their trade in their efforts to improve the conditions of their trade.

Blom, J.C.H. and E. Lamberts, *History of the Low Countries* (1999), 532p.

This is one of two relatively recent history surveys available in English that treats the Low Countries as a whole from Roman times to the present. It is an amended and translated version of a popular university text in Dutch. It is well written, accessible and contains many useful pictures and maps. The volume contains eight substantial chapters, each written by recognized authorities in their respective fields: two chapters by L. I. R. Milis, "A Long Beginning: The Low Countries through the Tenth century," and "Counts, Cities, and Clerics: the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries;" W. Blockmans, "The Formation of a Political Union, 1300-1600;" A. T. van Deursen, "The Dutch Republic, 1588-1780;" C. Bruneel, "The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands, 1585-1780;" J. Roegiers and N. C. F van Sas, "Revolution in the North and South, 1780-1830;" E. Lamberts, "Belgium since 1830;" and J. C. H. Blom, "The Netherlands since 1830." Finally there is an epilogue and conclusion that discusses the unity and diversity of the region by the editors. While the inhabitants of the Low Countries speak Dutch, French, Frisian, and German, and remain culturally and politically fragmented, they also have much in common. Geographically they occupy the delta of three great rivers that provide access to the North Sea, the Atlantic and thus the rest of the world. The northern limit of the Roman Empire, the Rhine, cuts straight through the region. The Maas (Meuse) became a core region of the Carolingians. The rise of the German and French kingdoms relegated the region to the periphery until the sea was no longer a barrier but became their highway. Their location helped make them a nation of traders, not just of their own products, but also of goods from France,

Germany and beyond. Already during the middle ages their precocious economic development made their region the most densely populated and urbanized European region. The Burgundians sought to unite the Low Countries during the late middle ages and the Hapsburg attempted to provide them with a central government during the 16th century. The latter effort provoked a rebellion in the South, which spread to the North. By 1585, the successful revolt in the North had created a Dutch Republic, while the South remained under Spanish and then Austrian Hapsburg tutelage. The border between what eventually became the Netherlands and Belgium was more or less established during the revolt against Spain. Much of this border also remained a cultural, linguistic and religious divide. Protestantism became dominant in the Dutch speaking Republic, with a large Catholic minority, while the South remained overwhelmingly Catholic with French as the language of the ruling classes and a majority of the common people during the early modern period.

While it had been the south that enjoyed the mostly highly developed agriculture, manufacturing industry and trade in the late medieval period, it was the North that fully united the Baltic and Mediterranean trades and profited immensely from the opening of the Atlantic and Asian trades. It was the North that became the world's economic leader during the 17th century and early 18th century. Buffeted by great powers and fragmented by different religious, cultural and political traditions, the Low Countries failed to create a unified state. During the late 18th century the North's economy, although it remained wealthy, stagnated, while the economy of the South advanced. During the 19th century, it was Belgium that first industrialized and became the economic leader for a time. After the Napoleonic wars, a United Kingdom of the Netherlands was created but Belgium revolted in 1830 and the Union was dissolved in 1839. More recently the Benelux countries, as they called themselves after WW II, served as pioneers of what is now known as the European Union. In world-historical terms, the importance of the Low Countries lies in their early creation of a bourgeois culture and an economic prosperity, which gave birth to what has been called "the first modern economy" and the first industrial revolution on the Continent. Their economic success was fundamental to the rise of northwestern Europe as the region of the world with the highest standard of living, which was crucial to England's early economic development and the first industrial revolution.

Blussé, Leonard, Willem Rummelink and Ivo Smits, eds., *Bridging the Divide: 400 Years of Dutch-Japanese Relations* (2000), 288p.

This volume, aimed at the general reader, is a result of a co-operative venture between Japanese and Dutch Scholars to commemorate four hundred years of Japanese-Dutch relations. Sixty-seven authors contributed to fifteen chapters that deal with a variety of topics, including the influence of Japan upon the Dutch and the impact of the Dutch on Japan; the history of their trade and political relations; the role of VOC personnel in transmitting European science, technology, medicine, and art to Japan; the influence of Japanese artistic objects on the Netherlands and Europe; and interesting Japanese and Dutch persons involved in the exchange.

From 1639 until 1854, Deshima, a small artificial island in Nagasaki Bay (about 100 by 450 feet) connected by a wooden bridge to Kyushu Island in southwestern Japan, was the sole location for trade between Europe and Japan and the only direct link between Europe and Japan during the latter's self-imposed isolation. The Dutch first arrived in Japan in 1600 on the ship *Liefde*, whose mission was to destroy Spanish and Portuguese settlements in Africa and Asia. The Portuguese had initiated European trade with Japan but the Japanese evicted them because of their missionary activities. They preferred to trade with the more pragmatic and business oriented Dutch who were primarily interested in trade and did not meddle in Japanese affairs. After a Christian Samurai rebellion in 1637-38, during which Dutch ships assisted the Japanese Shogun, the Portuguese were expelled from Japan. In 1641, the VOC, the Dutch East India Company, transferred its Japanese trade to the former Portuguese 'factory' of Deshima. The Dutch were closely watched and regulated but they were nonetheless treated akin to Japanese feudal Lords and annually sent a delegation to the Tokugawa court at Edo (modern Tokyo). One of the main items of trade that passed through Deshima was silk from China. This trade, known as the "country trade," in which the Dutch served as the traders and transporters of Asian goods, provided them with profits that gave them access to Japanese, gold, silver and porcelain. The latter enjoyed considerable demand in Europe and became one of the foundations of the Dutch ceramic industry, known as Delftware. The book is attractively produced with many historical illustrations, such as cartoons, drawings, paintings, and objects that greatly enhance its value for understanding and teaching the subject. It also includes many interesting and accessible stories that provide immediacy to the larger themes of the book, as well as an extensive bibliography of English and Dutch titles for further reading.

Boxer, C., *The Dutch Seaborne Empire* (1965), 363p. and *Jan Compagnie in War and Peace* (1979), 115p.

Charles R. Boxer spent his career writing about Dutch and colonial Portuguese history and laid a good deal of the groundwork in English in these fields. *The Dutch Seaborne Empire* is a classic in the field and remains a half-century later an excellent overview of the subject. One might expect from the title that most of the book is about the overseas empire, but in fact seven out of the ten chapters treat the political, social, cultural and economic history of the mother country. The Dutch Empire was more an empire of trade than a conventional empire. In so much as this empire had an administrative structure, it was governed by the directors of the VOC, the Dutch East India Company, and the less profitable West India Company. Their fortified trading bases, or 'factories,' stretched from Formosa, to India, Indonesia, South and West Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, Guiana and New Netherland. Boxer offers an interesting, though a bit old-fashioned, social and cultural history with lots of interesting anecdotes that enliven the text. The book also contains a good deal of useful political analysis, which credits the success of the Dutch Republic in the 17th century to a partnership between the commercial and financial ruling class with its workers. He argues that Dutch Calvinism was not as tolerant as often supposed, but that the trading companies focused on profits and thus did not wish to complicate their enterprise with efforts to convert the indigenous peoples. Moreover, the trading companies employed many foreigners with different religious persuasions, such as Scandinavians, Germans. Jewish merchants also played a major role in the Dutch trading system, especially in the Western Hemisphere. The book contains a good deal of very readable economic history and Boxer is careful to point out that the profits from the Baltic grain trade and the North Sea fisheries were greater than the profits earned from Asia or the Americas. Most of the book deals with the Golden Age, which he defines a bit too narrowly as the 17th century, since he exaggerates the decline of Dutch trade and industry during the first half of the 18th century. He argues that Dutch decline was not primarily due to the decline of its far flung world trade or wars with England, although the naval war of 1784 and the Napoleonic wars were very damaging, but should be traced to internal causes, such as a decline in population, a loss of entrepreneurial spirit among the rich who increasingly invested their capital in safe havens, and the decline of the mother

trades in the Baltic and the North Sea fisheries. The book is nicely illustrated with pictures and maps and contains a useful chronology.

The *Jan Compagnie* book is a translation of his brief 1977 Dutch work. It is an excellent short and wonderfully illustrated introduction to the history of the VOC. Boxer is especially good at providing interesting vignettes of social history, such as those, for example, illustrating the lives of soldiers and sailors and of prejudices toward people of mixed ancestry. He provides a good account of the company's decision-making process and the men who directed what has been called the first multinational corporation. The book includes a good deal of information on the Company's commercial policies and their political context. He explains its relationship with the English East India Company, discusses the VOC's gradual shift to private trade and the Company's decision to move away from its reliance on the spice trade while maintaining its expensive commitment to the control of Indonesia. The latter made its later years unprofitable.

Broadberry, Stephen and Kevin O'Rourke, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, vol. I, 1700-1870 (2010), 329p.

This volume, with its accompanying second volume on the period since 1870, is a state of the art demonstration of the value and limitations of the new economic history based on the quantitative data of national income accounting and sophisticated macroeconomic theories. It is the work of sixty contemporary economic historians. The work offers a pan-European framework and focuses on explaining economic growth by aggregating the impressive quantitative data assembled by several generations of economic historians and analyzing the data using modern economic theory and statistical analysis. The first volume covers the period that saw the world's first successful development of modern economic growth in Europe. This is organized in eleven thematic chapters. It begins with a chapter on how the new economic historians understand and explain the history of economic growth in Europe. Chapters follow this on such topics as demography and human capital formation, the State and institutions, trade and empire, and business cycles. Part II offers an analysis of the chief economic sectors, agriculture, industry, and services. Part III discusses living standards, urbanization and the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia during this period. The work is a monument to the success of the new economic history but also exhibits its shortcomings. It was designed to be a comprehensive guide to new scholarship on the economic history of modern Europe for university students but some of its

chapters offer material that requires advanced knowledge of the field. Nonetheless, it is a valuable resource as an introduction to the field and contains a wealth of statistical tables and graphs. While it focuses on the origin and development of modern economic growth, and especially on the industrial revolution in Britain, it embeds British developments within the larger European region. The final chapter offers an excellent introduction to the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia during the period using quantitative data and theoretical economic models. This new *Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe* differs fundamentally from its predecessor of the 1970s, the multivolume *Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (8 volumes). The latter books are still very much worth reading because they contain much more material on particular industries, discussions of comparative national economic policies, the effect of economic growth on comparative military power, and treatments of the welfare policies of the period.

Bruijn, J. R. and F. Gaastra, eds., *Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and their Shipping* (1993), 2008p.

Interest in the Dutch East India Company (VOC), its ships and its trade with Asia, has grown steadily over the past several decades. Objects recovered from shipwrecks, replicas of ships and exhibitions have attracted considerable attention, and several new monographs and general studies on the VOC have been published. This is a companion volume to a three-volume work of reference, *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1987), which is an invaluable reference resource on this topic. To celebrate its completion, the Centre for the History of European Expansion at Leiden University held a conference on the comparative study of European shipping in Asia between 1500 and 1800 with historians from the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Britain, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden. The result is *Ships, Sailors and Spices*. It consists of seven essays and is the first work to offer a comparative account of the various European East Companies' trading activities in Asia for the period. Each essay deals with one of the trading companies while Bruijn and Gaastra also include an overall interpretation and perspective. The essays focus on themes such as the organization of the companies, trade routes, passage times, the number of ships and their size, the ownerships of their ships, shipwrecks, the cost of shipping, the recruitment of crews, the incidence of disease, and rates of mortality. Much of the quantitative material was hitherto unknown, and this is the first such

international comparison. It shows quite clearly that the VOC occupied a dominant position in many aspects of the Asian trade.

Canny, Nicholas, ed. *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. I: The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. x, 533.

This is the first volume of a five volume multi-author work on the history of the British Empire. This volume contains twenty-one useful essays by major historians of the Empire on such topics as its origin, politics, economics, war, and particular regions. Nicholas Canny argues that the origins of the British Empire should be seen in the private interests of English merchants rather than the state, which only became involved in trying to control and direct colonial policy in the second half of the 17th century. While John Appleby's contribution argues that English merchant involvement in overseas expansion was a result of the disruption of trade networks in Europe, Canny emphasizes the role of militant Protestantism's efforts to expand English power in light of Catholic Spain's imperial expansion. Canny also emphasizes that, just as the English had planted colonies in Ireland to pacify the country, the Irish plantations served as a model for colonization in America and were designed to bring civilization to the wilderness and useful products to Europe. During the second half of the 17th century, as Michael Braddick shows, the English state began to see the colonies as a source of revenue, military resources, and profit for merchants and manufacturers. Thus, the state set out to aid English merchants in their efforts to compete with the Dutch, who dominated international trade and finance during the period. Nuala Zahedieh provides a useful outline of the development of English transoceanic commerce during the period and notes that by 1700 England's overseas trade already constituted 20% of total overseas commerce and had grown rapidly in the second half of the 17th century. She concludes that English "colonial expansion, was not a sufficient condition for economic development, as demonstrated in Spain and Portugal, but it was certainly an important positive stimulus, as recognized by contemporaries." Other essays in the volume treat such subjects as the English emphasis on the importance of establishing their rights over land and resources rather than over native peoples, the role of the emerging Empire in the context of European Continental power politics, English relations with the native peoples, the development of slavery in making the American colonies profitable, and the contemporary literature of empire. Although there is an excellent chapter by P. Marshall on the English in Asia, during this period

the Empire was primarily an Atlantic phenomenon during this period. The volume contains a useful chronology and each chapter includes a selected list of further reading on its topic.

Cohen, Deborah, *Household Goods: The British and their Possessions*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006. Pp. viii, 296, 152 ills.

During the late twentieth century, there was a growing interest in the history of household consumption as a crucial force in British industrialization. This interesting study of British consumer culture during the period 1830 to 1930 focuses on what she calls the peculiar British ‘infatuation’ with the decoration and material content of their homes. She begins by explaining that the puritanical religious enthusiasm of the middle classes during the late 18th and early 19th centuries gave way during the 1840s to assigning a moral value to personal possessions and associating beauty with godliness. The acquisition and display of tasteful household goods was now not only a pleasure but also a moral and even religious imperative. She chronicles how the ideal of the home as a place of virtue gradually was replaced by the notion of an artistic home filled with well-chosen goods and decorated with carpets, wallpaper and artful objects. She explains how new magazines and popular fashion writers kept the middle classes informed on changing fashions in household goods and decoration. She argues that for the Victorian consumer, the home became a stage for self-expression. In an interesting argument, she puts forth the notion that decorating the home was a preparation for later and more public forms of middle class female self-expression. Unlike many previous treatments of Victorian material culture, she does not focus on luxury and handcrafted goods but emphasizes the democratization of consumer goods made possible by the mass production of the industrial revolution. She also explains the development of new department stores, tasteful shopping arcades and streets in which consumers could acquire mass produced but prestigious household goods. The book has many excellent illustrations, which allow the reader to visualize the household goods and the enticements to purchase them during the period.

Chaudhuri, K. N., *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760* (1978), 628p.

This is the first comprehensive study of the English East India Company, the EIC, from 1660, when it began to operate as a joint-stock company, until the mid-18th century, when it began to be a major political force in India. During this period the EIC operated as a business enterprise whose purpose was to maximize profits for its shareholders. Its profits were derived by exporting

American specie, gold and silver, in order to acquire Asian products, many of which it traded in Asia in order to purchase goods for export to London where they were marketed to British consumers as well as re-exported to Europe and the Americas. Chaudhuri has written a business history of one of the world's earliest and largest international bureaucratic companies that operated in a still primarily pre-industrial world economy. His focus is on the decision making process of the company, which had the difficult problem of making decisions in a world in which it took at least eight months before its annual Asian fleet sailed and another ten to twelve months until the ships returned home to sell its cargo. Moreover, time was required before the sailing to make decisions on the composition of the fleet's cargoes and the loading of its ships. In addition to the problems of weather, they had to deal with many other uncertainties without being able to communicate quickly with their officials in Asia. Ships had to arrive in Asia in the autumn before the Asian monsoon season. Commodities had to be bought in Asia in competition with the other European trading companies and Asian merchants. Trading missions in Asia had to be organized so that ships could be assembled for the return voyage early in the next year. The Company's solution was to combine a centralized administration in London with a fairly decentralized operation in Asia, which gave their officials in Asia a good deal of autonomy in their decision making. One of the key conclusions of Chaudhuri's study is that the success of the Company during this period was in large measure due to the relative independence it gave its overseas officials to make important decisions in Asia and the increasing multilateralism of the EIC's trade.

This valuable study rests upon the well-preserved records of the EIC, including a great deal of correspondence. Chaudhuri created over 400 statistical tables and published 56 tables and 26 graphs in the book. Among these are aggregate and individual import and export tables for the Company's operations in the three Indian Presidencies, Bombay, Bengal and Madras, and South-East Asia and China. There are data summaries on the movement of goods and treasure, company costs and sales, indebtedness, loans to the British government, dividends and investments. There are useful separate chapters on such important commodities as pepper, coffee, tea, cotton textiles, and indigo. Chaudhuri included extensive discussions of the company's marketing, production, ties to Asian merchants, the operation of the company's 'factories,' or trading stations, consumers of its products, and its competitors. This impressive and pioneering study provides comprehensive balance sheets for the Company's performance for

the period. Two of Chaudhuri's most important conclusions are that American gold and silver were crucial to its Asian trading system and that the Company's trade and profits were beneficial both to Europe and Asia.

Clark, Henry C., *Commerce, Culture & Liberty: Readings on Capitalism Before Adam Smith* (2003), 680p.

This is an edited scholarly anthology of important writings on the development of capitalist ideas and culture in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries published before Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776). The latter is generally considered to be the foundation of the modern discipline of economics and a key statement on the moral value of capitalism. This nicely produced and inexpensive book was produced by the Liberty Fund Foundation in Indianapolis, which states that its purpose is "to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals." As the editor points out in his Foreword, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, students of economics "combined their analyses with moral and cultural considerations more often than is usually the case in today's more specialized intellectual environment." One could go further and say that almost all economic writing before economics became a professional discipline in the second half of the nineteenth century was quite explicit about its moral, cultural, political and ideological purpose and perspective. Among the topics discussed in these selected and edited writings are: the nature of exchange relations and their effects on a traditional and hierarchical social order, the role of commerce in fostering civility and sociability, the effects of commerce on the fabric of community life, the dangers to moral virtue posed by increasing prosperity, the impact of commerce on sex roles and the condition of women, and the complex interplay between commerce and civil or political liberty" (p. ix). This is a substantial volume that includes thirty-seven selections, ranging from about ten to thirty pages, with good brief introductions and scholarly references. The book also includes a useful glossary and index. The selections consist of mostly well known but also some interesting less-known authors. Some of the better-known authors include, Pieter de la Court, Josiah Child, Dudley North, John Law, Bernard Mandeville, Daniel Defoe, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Henry Fielding, Jean Jacques Rousseau, David Hume, and John Millar.

Reading the selections chronologically one learns that the meaning of the word 'commerce' was quite different in the early modern period than in today's common usage.

During the early modern period, and especially in the seventeenth century, ‘commerce’ was still often used to describe social relationships rather than just business transactions, although by the late eighteenth century its modern usage had become much more common. The editor’s use of ‘culture’ in the title does not refer to the formal works of art of the period but to the modern anthropological use of the term as social relations. One of the fundamental themes in these edited primary sources is the debate about the creation of a commercial society during the period that challenged more traditional social and cultural values, customs and mores. The debate about the social utility of luxury in the eighteenth century was an especially important indicator of the rise of individual acquisitiveness as a social value and relationship. The period also saw a fundamental discussion of the morality and utility of individual freedom. This volume is a good introduction to the larger question of whether individual freedom, or liberty, which in Western society became increasingly viewed as central to economic growth and the triumph of capitalism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, despite powerful socialist critiques, should remain fundamental to our understanding of the history of capitalism, in light of the economic success of Asia in recent times, which appears to have been forged with less regard to what we in the West would call individual liberty.

Cook, Harold J., *Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine and Science in the Dutch Golden Age* (2007), 562p.

This study by a leading authority on the history of medicine and science in early modern Europe, argues that Dutch commerce, rather than the Protestant Reformation, which has often been credited with inspiring the rise of science in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, played the key role in promoting the remarkable scientific discoveries of the period, and that the Dutch Republic was central to the intellectual movement that has been described as the scientific revolution. Historians have long argued that Europe’s development of a vigorous network of international trade brought a flood of new plants, products, goods, technology, medical treatments, and ideas to Europe that challenged the classical methods of science and medicine and its Aristotelian emphasis on rooting natural philosophy in its ultimate causes. The growth of international exchange especially produced a much greater emphasis on the empirical study of facts and a great deal of work in biological classification and medical experimentation rather than a search for universal explanatory theories. Cook, however, goes beyond this emphasis upon

the empirical by arguing that a growing materialism produced the new science of the period. He insists that it was the acquisitiveness of merchants and their customers that not only created the demand for new goods, but also encouraged the development of a broad-based intellectual curiosity that fueled and supported the scientific revolution. Moreover, the legal and business conventions of international commerce, which were most highly developed in Europe in the Dutch Republic during the period, served as an example for the empirical study of nature, the classification of plants and animals, and for anatomical and medical studies.

According to Cook it was empirical scientific work that produced a new materialism, which undermined the theological and intellectual certainties espoused by traditional natural law theologians, moralists and political philosophers. Cook argues that Descartes developed his materialism to the years he spent in the Dutch Republic through his study of medicine. Descartes asserted that the mind was a physical entity and thus moral philosophy was dependent on the physical reality of the body and its social environment. Dutch political and moral thinkers used the methods of empirical science to argue that the economic success of the Dutch Republic was evidence for the superiority of a republican form of government dominated by merchants and industrialists rather than aristocrats.

While Cook's book is important for offering a much greater emphasis upon empirical science for the creation of a new enlightenment political and moral philosophy, the real joy of the book is in his detailed discussions of what the Dutch learned from the rest of the world, especially in medicine, botany, and horticulture, and how they applied this not only in making themselves rich but to the promotion of science and the spread of curiosity and education among a broad segment of the population through such innovations as botanical gardens, anatomical theaters, curiosity cabinets, and richly illustrated atlases and books on the natural world.

Crafts, N.F.R. *British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. Pp. 193, 48 tpls.

This important quantitative study of British economic growth during the Industrial Revolution summarizes an important reinterpretation of the rate of British economic growth during the classic period of industrialization from 1760 to 1830. This book summarizes, in a fairly accessible form, Craft's argument, published previously in more than a dozen specialized articles in scholarly journals, that the long held view that the British Industrial Revolution was characterized by a "take-off" and a

subsequent and sustainable rate of economic growth during the period. His work was a direct challenge to the classic 1962 study, by W.A. Cole and Phyllis Deane, *British Economic Growth*, which had provided a statistical foundation for the traditional view that the British Industrial Revolution witnessed a dramatic and sustained acceleration of economic growth, which brought a fundamental break with an earlier traditional society characterized by low economic growth. Crafts based his work on the same statistical data as Dean and Cole but uses sophisticated statistical and theoretical economic techniques to come up with quite different conclusions. He argues that the macro-economic effects of the Industrial Revolution were limited before the 1830s and only became substantial after the 1830s, when many inventions of the earlier period, such as the railroads for example, became widely felt. Secondly, he argues that although the standard of living rose during the industrial revolution, the improvement was not as widely felt because of relatively modest economic growth. Third, he argues that technological innovation and productivity growth did not produce as much productivity as the amount of capital employed as has been argued. Moreover, technological innovation was largely limited to a few key industries. While technical innovations played a large role in the cotton, iron and machinery industries, and were fundamental to a large increase of exports, these dynamic industries were a small part of the economy and did not play a major role in accelerating economic growth in the economy as a whole. Thus, Crafts argues that a few dynamic industries, which saw dramatic technological innovation, were islands of rapid industrialization in a relatively slow growing British economy before 1830. By contrast, Crafts argues that there was relatively little innovation or increased productivity in the larger and more traditional parts of manufacturing and commerce during the period. As a result, according to Crafts, the economic growth that did take place during the period was more the result of increased capital accumulation and an increase of productivity in agriculture. Crafts places British industrial growth in a European comparative framework. He argues that Britain's success in foreign trade was based rather narrowly upon a few key industries before 1830 and that its high standard of living had been built up relatively slowly over a longer period and in many areas in which technological change and productivity growth had been relatively modest. Craft's work is heavily empirical. His conclusions rely upon aggregating data for the entire economy and upon such theoretical constructs such as "total factor productivity." Nonetheless, his work, as well as the econometric economic history of many others, produced a major challenge to the traditional explanation of the Industrial Revolution as a radical transformation of a traditional economy into a modern industrial one that took place especially between ca. 1760 and 1830. Crafts later restated his position showing even lower growth for the classic period of

British industrialization, see N.F.R. Crafts and C.K. Harley, "Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: A Restatement," *Economic History Review* 45 (1992): 703-30.

Davids, K. & J. A. Lucassen, *A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective* (1995), 539.

This volume of twelve essays is an interesting attempt to answer the question of what made the Dutch Republic such a distinctive entity during the seventeenth century and how it became just another European nation state by the nineteenth century. During the early 1990s the authors held a collective fellowship at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies and subsequently published this often cited collection of comparative historical essays, which seeks to identify the historical identity of the Netherlands. While the authors do not offer a clear answer to their question, the volume serves as a good introduction to some of the major questions raised by Dutch social and economic historians about their history, many of which continue to be of Dutch historiographical. Henk van Nierop compares the Dutch Revolt to the French Wars of Religion and concludes that by about 1560 the majority of the population of the Low Countries appears to have resigned themselves to the view that, while the old religion appeared to be dead, there was yet no clear alternative. William Speck compares the political system of the English and the Dutch in the late seventeenth century and suggests that there was much truth in William III's famous remark "that he was indeed the Stadholder-King, albeit a Stadholder in England and a king in the United Provinces." Speck finds many similarities between England's constitutional monarchy and the Dutch Republic while both differed more fundamentally from stronger continental monarchies. Marc Boone and Maarten Prak provide a good introduction to a strong tradition of rebellion in the Low Countries from the medieval period to the Patriot Revolution during the late eighteenth century, Margaret Spufford explains that the rate of literacy was considerably higher in the Netherlands than in other European commercial centers. Peter Spufford provides a good summary of how Europe's financial leadership moved from Renaissance Italy to Augsburg, Antwerp and Amsterdam. Wiebe Bergsma discusses religious pluralism and Michael North offers a discussion of Dutch art as an important economic commodity. Karle Davids explains the rise of technological leadership and its decline while Jan Lucassen treats the segmentation of the Dutch labor force among various guilds and localities. While most of these essays are not major original contributions to scholarship, they are almost all

well written, rooted in solid scholarship and serve as a handy introduction to major topics in Dutch social and economic history. The essay by Luiten van Zanden and Leo Noordegraaf does break new ground and is a good introduction to an important on-going research program that seeks to explain in a worldwide comparative perspective on why Dutch workers enjoyed the highest standard of living in the world during the early modern period. Van Zanden has done a great deal of work on this subject since this essay was published and perhaps the wealth of the Republic's workers and middle classes has become its most lasting legacy.

Daunton, M. J., *Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1700-1850*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xv, 620. 1 figs. 58 tbls.

Daunton described his goals for this book as follows: “the starting point of my survey is the performance of the economy, but the aim has been to integrate social and political history into the analysis in a way which will, I hope, make the more technical writings of economic historians accessible to a wider audience, while at the same time adopting a critical stance to the underlying assumptions of some of the recent work of economic historians.” In other words, Daunton's purpose was to humanize Britain's economic history again after several decades of work by the new economic historians who concentrated on statistics, economic theory and macro-economic growth analysis but left out much of the human drama. While this is not a short and easy book, it is a substantial one-volume survey that is readable, comprehensive and provides a balanced account of the economic history of the period and integrates it with social and political history. The book is organized into five sections: agriculture and rural society; industry and urban society; integrating the economy; poverty, prosperity and population; and public policy and the state. In terms of the origins of economic growth in Britain, Daunton supports the now standard view that the industrial revolution was a long and evolutionary process that began in Britain's advanced organic economy but required a switch to a mineral economy, chiefly coal and iron, to escape from the Malthusian trap of a growing population being limited by increased costs of natural resources. The heart of his explanation for Britain's economic growth lies in part three, ‘integrating the economy.’ For Daunton, it was the ‘middling sort,’ such as local and regional merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs, skilled craftsmen and workers who lowered transaction and production costs through regional and local specialization—Adam Smith's famous division of labor—that made economic growth possible. Daunton sees growth as fundamentally a product of domestic demand rather than being a result of export led expansion. He also argues that the role of the state, and its relatively enlightened public policy, was

crucial to the sustainability of Britain's economic growth. As his title suggests, progress did not mean prosperity for everyone in Britain by 1850. His discussion of the standard of living controversy argues that broad improvements in the standard of living did not take place until the second half of the nineteenth century. He explains that despite the social unrest of the Chartist period, Britain remained politically and socially stable because of economic growth and political and social reform. The upper classes were flexible enough to undertake a slow process of political reform that not only saw the adoption of free trade in an economy, which was for a time "the workshop of the world," but also agreed to the beginning of factory acts, government support for public improvements in living conditions, and the toleration for workers' organizations and trade unions. The book includes useful lists of further reading after each chapter as well as some maps and statistical tables. It is an excellent overview of the subject for serious students.

Davis, Ralph. *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1979. P. 135. 64 tpls.

The critical issue treated here is: did overseas trade play a crucial role in the origin of the industrial revolution during this period, as some have argued, or was growing domestic demand sufficient, as others have maintained? Ralph Davis' main scholarly interest was in the history of the English shipping industry and in quantifying Britain's foreign trade from the 17th to the early 19th centuries. While his empirical research has provided a great deal of statistical data on the volume and structure of Britain's foreign trade, the debate on the role of international trade in the origin of the industrial revolution remains unsettled. His two path-breaking articles on England's foreign trade during the late 17th century to the 1770s were published in 1954 and 1962 in the *Economic History Review*. These were followed by a major monograph, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, and a more general study, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies*. In 1973. His work has helped to place the role of Britain's foreign trade in the development of its industrial revolution in an international perspective. *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade* continues his analysis to the 1850s. It has been difficult to analyze Britain's foreign trade between 1660 and the mid-19th century because the custom duty records upon which this research is based used "official" rather than real values for imports and exports. This study's major contribution is that Davis has recalculated the "official" values into real values for the period 1784 to 1856, allowing the author to produce a more realistic estimate of the contribution of foreign trade to Britain's national income for the period. His work results

in the following overall conclusions: “Overseas trade did much to strengthen British economic life during the 18th century, and in doing so it helped to create the base without which the industrial ‘take-off’ might not have proceeded so fast or gone so far. Moreover, once home demand ceased to be sufficient to maintain the momentum of growth of the most advanced industries, around 1800, overseas trade did begin to play an absolutely vital direct part in their further expansion.” Davis especially points to the textile industries for having “provided the driving force behind the Industrial Revolution,” as well as the increase in agricultural productivity that initially sustained the surge in population growth.

Deane, Phyllis and W. A. Cole, *British Economic growth, 1688-1959: Trends and Structure*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 350. 92 tbls. 7 figs.

This pioneering statistical analysis of British economic growth provided a basic set of quantitative data for the economic history of the subject. While many particulars in the book were widely questioned from the date of its first publication in 1962, its broad overall conclusions were not successfully challenged until the 1970s and 1980s by a new generation of economic historians, such as N. F. R. Crafts (see above). The book remains an important historiographical document in the writings on the British Industrial Revolution. Already during the 1920s, J. H. Clapham, the greatest early 20th century British economic historian, had called for placing the history of the industrial revolution on a solid quantitative basis. Most of the writing on the subject before Clapham had been literary in form and had sought to promote various social and political agendas. Some sought to expose the social and economic problems of the working classes during the industrial revolution in order to promote schemes of state intervention in order to improve the condition of the working classes. Others focused on the role of the entrepreneur and the free market in explaining the origin of the industrial revolution in the belief that the continuation of free market policies offered the most effective solution to raising the standard of living of the entire population (Clapham belonged to this latter persuasion). From the end of World War II through the 1970s many economic historians came to believe that the use of economic theory and statistical analysis made them neutral social scientists who offered objective explanations of economic history. Despite their claims of objectivity, the more quantitative and theoretically informed economic history of the post-World War II period was also heavily influenced by contemporary concerns. Chief among these was the breakup of the colonial empires and a Cold War interest in promoting economic growth in the underdeveloped world. Thus, how and why national incomes grow became a prime concern.

Dean and Cole's statistical account of British economic growth demonstrated that an increased rate of growth in a developing economy could lead to a "take-off" into sustained economic growth. The concept of an economic "takeoff" was brought into the historiography of the industrial revolution in 1954 by W.W. Rostow, and later popularized in his *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960). Dean and Cole's book offers statistical data and analyzes long term trends and structural changes in the British national economy. After briefly discussing the main variables—population, the value of money, wages, and the international balance of payments—the authors go on to set out the quantitative data in a series of substantial statistical studies on such topics as the relation between industrialization and population change, the growth of occupations, industries and incomes, long term trends in national income and its composition, and changes in capital accumulation. Their key conclusions on national economic growth were that there was a long and slow build up of economic growth before the 1740s, of about 0.3% per annum, a modest increase in growth to 0.9% from 1745 to 1760, which was at first offset by rapid population growth, but quickened to 1.8% in the 1780s and outstripped population growth, producing sustained growth, which accelerated to growth of about 5% per annum from the 1820s to 1850. These conclusion provided quantitative support for the earlier and classical view that the industrial revolution should be chiefly association with the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Phyllis Deane subsequently published a popular introductory survey, *The First Industrial Revolution* (1962), which was a widely used textbook on the subject in universities into the early 1980s.

Emmer, C., *The Dutch Slave Trade, 1500-1850*, translated by Chris Emery, (New York: 2006), 166p.

Although the first overview of the Dutch slave trade in English was by J. M. Postman in 1990, *The Dutch and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815*, it is Piet Emmer, Professor of European Expansion and Migration at Leiden University, who has done more than anyone else to bring the subject to the attention of the Dutch public. Emmer PhD dissertation of 1974 was on the subject and he has published widely on the topic since then. From the 1980s until the present he has been a participant in a wide-ranging international debate on the comparative history of the European slave trade. The years before the centenary of the abolition of the British slave trade in 2007 produced a great deal of public discussion about the subject on both sides of the Atlantic. In the Netherlands it was Emmer's book aimed at a general audience, published in Dutch in 2000, that first brought the topic to public notice and, indeed, brought forth a good deal of public

controversy since Emmer's argument that the slave trade was not very profitable for the Netherlands was seen as not politically correct. Emmer's unfortunate statement that the amount of space allotted to slaves on Dutch Atlantic slave ships was similar to the space occupied by people in coach class on a 747 did not help the book's public reception. Nonetheless, the book is an excellent scholarly introduction to the Dutch slave trade rooted in archival scholarship and has the added attraction of treating the Dutch trade in a comparative perspective.

Compared to the English, French, Spanish and Portuguese slave trade, the Dutch slave trade constituted only in about 5 to 6% of the whole. The Dutch involvement in the trade began in the 1630s with the shipment of slaves to Dutch Brazil from Angola and the Guinea coast. The peak of the Dutch slave trade came in the middle of the 17th century, when the Dutch played a crucial role in the development and expansion of sugar plantations in the West Indies. From then until 1713, the Dutch concentrated on supplying the Spanish Americas with slaves through their colony in Curaçao. The Dutch played a smaller, but still significant, role in the trade until the crisis of the plantation economies in the Guyanas during the 1770s greatly diminished their participation until it nearly ended by 1800. When the Kingdom of the Netherlands was created in 1814, near the end of the Napoleonic wars, the Dutch formally agreed to end their participation in the slave trade at Britain's insistence.

Emmer systematically explains the origin of the Dutch slave trade; its impact upon Africa; the Dutch slave forts in Africa; the slave voyages and why the casualties on these voyages were almost twice as high than on English slave ships; the Dutch plantation system in Brazil, the West Indies, and in Surinam (Dutch Guyana); the Dutch slave revolts: the illegal, but small, Dutch slave trade in the 19th century; possible reasons for its late abolition in 1863; and the use of Asian contract labor in the Dutch West Indies in the late 19th century. He tackles two of the major questions about the slave trade. How profitable was it for the Dutch and how important was it to the Dutch economy. He argues that the slave trade's profitability is difficult to assess since there is very little good documentation available. There are surviving records for only one of the slave trading companies in the 18th century and this shows a modest profit of 2 to 3% per annum. He points out that the trade was on the average a loss-maker for the two Dutch West Indies companies. If the trade was not very profitable, he asks, did the Netherlands as a whole benefit economically from "this inhuman trade?" He suggests that, while it undoubtedly produced some profits for those who conducted the trade and for the planters who bought the

slaves, the entire Dutch plantation economy in the West Indies was only a small part of the Dutch economy and, in any case, most of the slaves carried by the Dutch were supplied to foreign colonies. He concludes that “for the vast majority of the Dutch enjoyed very limited benefits from the slave trade, and then only indirectly. Without it, coffee and sugar would merely have been more expensive” (p.110).

Emmer’s concluding chapter contains a fascinating and thoughtful discussion of Dutch moral guilt about its participation in the slave trade, the West Indian plantation system and its late abolition of slavery. The latter topic is particularly interesting in a comparative perspective since its slave trade had almost entirely ended by 1800, its stake in the American plantation system was comparatively rather small by that date, and yet there was virtually no abolitionist movement in the Netherlands before the Dutch government abolished slavery in its West Indian colonies in 1863. For a good earlier comparative discussion of the Dutch abolition of slavery, see Seymour Drescher, “The Long Goodbye: Dutch Capitalism and anti-slavery in a Comparative Perspective,” *American Historical Review* 99 (Feb. 1994): 44-69. See also a collection of essays on Dutch slavery edited by Emmer, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1580-1880: Trade, Slavery and Emancipation* (1998).

Findlay, Ronald and Kevin O’Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (2007), 619p.

In this ambitious survey of the world economy during the last millennium, Findlay and O’Rourke have set out to place contemporary globalization in a broad historical context of uneven economic development. Many historians have seen the first industrial revolution as the source of the “great divergence” between Western Europe and the rest of the world. This study argues that the industrial revolution “can only be understood as the outcome of a historical process with multiple causes stretching well back into the medieval period, and in which international movements of commodities, warriors, microbes, and technologies all played a leading role. Purely domestic accounts of the ‘Rise of the West,’ emphasizing Western institutions, cultural attributes, or endowments, are hopelessly inadequate, since they ignore the vast web of interrelationships between Europe and the rest of the world that had been spun for many centuries, and was crucially important for the breakthrough to modern economic growth.” While Marxists have argued that Western Europe’s economic success was primarily due to its use of power and exploitation, the authors argue that they view “inventiveness and an

incentives...as being the heart of growth” but this does not imply that European overseas expansion should be written off as irrelevant. “Plunder may not have directly fueled the industrial revolution, but mercantilism and imperialism were an important part of a global context within which it originated, expanding markets and ensuring the supply of raw materials. Violence thus undoubtedly mattered in shaping the environment in which the conventional economic forces of supply and demand operated.”

Central to their study is their view that interregional trade was the key to economic growth. Their analysis consists of describing the geopolitics of Eurasia’s and North Africa’s major regions and their interactions, which gradually brought the rest of the world into a world economy. These regions are Western Europe (the Catholic area before the Reformation), Eastern Europe (Orthodox Christian), North Africa and South-West Asia (Islamic heartland), Central or Inner Asia, South-East Asia, and East Asia. One of their key contributions is their constant reminder that economic geography and resource endowments were key factors in regional economic success. The authors point out that at the beginning of the millennium the pivotal region of the world was the Islamic world, for it was in contact with the rich areas of both the east as well as the relatively less developed western European region. The central event during this period was the *Pax Mongolica*, which knitted together most of the Eurasian landmass under the Mongol Empire, stimulating trade from Japan to the Atlantic. This also allowed the spread of the plague, the Black Death of the 14th century, which, despite its devastating immediate effects, helped create a “microbial common market” in Eurasia, which in turn allowed the expansion of population, output and prices around the world, but especially in Western Europe and Southeast Asia.

This crisis set the stage for the launching of the Iberian voyages of ‘discovery’ of the New World and the initial exploitation of its resources with the labor of African slaves under the command of Western Europeans. This was followed by a long struggle for hegemony in the emerging world economy between the Dutch Republic, Great Britain and France, while, at the other end of the world, the Russian Czarist and Chinese Manchu Qing empires struggled for hegemony in central and Far Eastern Asia. At this point the authors interrupt their narrative to take a closer look at the fundamental breakthrough of the industrial revolution in Britain and Western Europe. They argue that the industrial revolution “set in motion economic forces that determined the future course of international trade, down to our own day.” It produced a “Great Divergence” in income levels between regions as the new technologies spread unevenly across the globe and created a “Great Specialization” between “an industrial core and a primary-producing periphery. This resulted in the protection of agriculture in the core and the protection of manufacturing in the periphery and “finally a gradual unwinding of these trends as the industrial

revolution spread to encompass an ever increasing proportion of the globe.” The authors explain that this process was not a smooth evolution but “was profoundly marked by the political consequences of three major world wars, the French and Napoleonic wars that ended the age of mercantilism, World War I and World War II.” According to the authors, war, the ultimate exercise of power, which was vastly expanded by the industrial revolution, has had and continues to have a vast impact on the evolution of the world economy. The authors have successfully synthesized a vast body of economic and historical literature to produce an impressive economic history of the world economy that places the study of the European industrial revolution in a world historical context. Its extensive bibliography is an excellent guide to the contemporary debates on the history of globalization and the origin and consequences of the industrial revolution.

Floud, Roderick and Donald McCloskey, eds. *The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, Vol. 1, Industrialisation, 1700-1860*, 3rd ed. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Pp. xix, 377. 33 figs. 74 tbls.

The third edition of this important survey of industrialization in Britain takes account of recent scholarship and is considerably different from the first (1981) and second (1994) editions. Its sixteen chapters, written by recognized authorities in the field, offer a sophisticated survey of contemporary interpretations of major topics on the subject. This edition reflects the current overall consensus that early British industrialization proceeded relatively slowly between 1700 and 1860, without a dramatic industrial revolution in a relatively short period between 1780 and 1830 as depicted in many earlier treatments. Although the rate of economic growth quickened in the early 19th century, and the cumulative effects of industrialization became especially obvious in certain sectors of the economy from the 1830's, the relatively modest rates of economic growth during the period as a whole meant that industrialization left the bulk of the population with only modest gains in their standard of living by about 1850. Advances in knowledge and technological innovation over this long period remain fundamental to an explanation of cumulative economic growth within the context of a relatively open social system, political stability, an effective government, and access to natural resources. While factories and large-scale business organizations were developed in this period, most British businesses remained relatively small and a good deal of production was still done in small workshops. Changes in family structure and gender roles were important in some industries but overall these social changes were far less dramatic than has been argued in earlier historiography. In an excellent opening chapter,

“Accounting for the Industrial Revolution,” Joel Mokyr provides a useful summary on the rate of growth debate. Other chapters included are “Industrial Organization and Structure,” Pat Hudson; British population, E. A. Wrigley; agriculture, Robert Allen; technology, Kristine Bruland; “Money, finance and capital Markets,” Stephen Quinn; “Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology,” Knick Hartley; government and the economy, Ron Harris; “Household economy,” Jane Humphries; living standards, Hans-Joachim Vost; transport, Simon Ville; education, David Mitch; consumption, Maxine Berg; Scotland, T. M. Devine; extractive industries, Roger Burt; and “The industrial revolution in a global perspective,” Stanley Engerman and Patrick K. O’Brien. The volume includes an excellent set of statistical tables and suggestions for further reading.

Freeman, Michael, *Railways and the Victorian Imagination*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999. Pp. vii, 264. 279 ill.

For the Victorians, the railway symbolized the great divide between old and new. Between 1830 and 1850, the railway mania created a dense railway network in Britain and brought the experience of the industrial revolution to almost everyone in the country. Much of the published railway history is institutional, narrowly economic, technical or of the ‘trainspotting’ variety. Freeman, a geographer by training, has given us a well-written and beautifully illustrated volume that places the history of the railway in Britain in a broad cultural context. Given his training in geography, he is especially good in his descriptions and choice of illustrations of the new spaces and visual world created by the railway, such as its palatial railway stations and hotels. Britain’s new railways drew straight lines through the countryside, which seemed to defy the natural landscape. It also brought marvels of engineering. The steam locomotive became a symbol of the new power of industry. Its cuttings and tunnels revealed fossils and a geological world that prepared the Victorians for the science of evolution that undermined the doctrine of creation.

Freeman argues that both figuratively and literally the railway was the engine of ‘circulatory ferment’ that distributed people, goods and money, making everyone a member of a capitalist society. It encouraged the growth of cities and suburbs. Its speed and mobility expressed the spirit of the age. Its timetables required the standardization of time and brought a new discipline to society, including its cows since they had to be milked in the morning so that the railway could take fresh milk to the market. While it democratized travel, allowing, for example, ordinary people from all over the country to attend the Great Exhibition in 1851, it also reinforced society’s class structure through its first, second and third

class carriages. The author also discusses such traditional topics such as the economics of the railways, its finance, its corporate management, and its labor force but he is especially good at drawing out its cultural implications by using the literature of the period, such as Dickens novels and Elizabeth Barrett Browning's poetry, for example. In addition to discussing the representation of the railways in formal Victorian painting and the graphic arts, he uses less conventional sources such as cartoons, musical theater, sheet music, travel posters, board games, and toys to demonstrate that the railway was a central and pervasive feature of the Victorian imagination.

Furber, H., *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800* (1976), 408p.

Holden Furber first established his scholarly reputation in 1948 as a leading expert on European early modern trade in Asia with an account of the English East India Company, *Jan Company at Work*. He capped his career with this comprehensive large survey of the European trading companies in Asia, including the French, Danish, Swedish and Austrian Netherlands Companies, but his emphasis is on the EIC and the Dutch East India Company, the VOC. Although now dated in some respects, especially in its lack of statistical tables and quantitative data, the book remains worth reading as an excellent overview of the qualitative aspects of the subject. It offers a general outline of the trade mechanisms, which provided the initial profits that led to the eventual European dominance in the Indian Ocean, South Asia and the trade of the Far East until the mid-twentieth century. The book is divided in two parts, the "Making of Empires" and the "Structure of Empires." The first part offers a chronological narrative account of the growth and nature of the trade and the rise of European power in Asia. The second part provides a discussion of the structure of each of the companies, the trade in each of the major commodities, the inter-Asian or 'country trade,' and the social relations between Europeans and Asians. Furber explains why the more successful VOC was eventually overtaken by the EIC. In the early period the VOC had the advantage of a dynamic "imperial purpose" supported by the government of the Republic, a much larger pool of capital, and was focused on the creation of a monopoly in the supply of cloves, nutmeg, mace, and pepper to the European market. It concentrated on eliminating by force the Portuguese from Indonesian seas and then the English from the Spice Islands. While this strategy was highly successful until the 1680s, the spice trade eventually became secondary to other trades, especially textiles and later tea. Since the EIC was unable to compete successfully in the spice trade, it turned its attention to the Indian textile trade

and made this the center of its Asian and European trading system. Another fundamental difference between the two companies was organizational. The VOC attempted to create strong central control from Amsterdam and Batavia and limited private trading by its men and officials in Asia, while the EIC was more loosely structured and after 1667 allowed much more private trading by its employees. Paradoxically, despite the EIC's three Presidencies in India, Bombay, Bengal, and Madras, plus its operations in China at Canton, Furber argues that the English Company was better managed, especially in the late 17th and early 18th century than the VOC. The book also suggests that VOC's aggressive attempts to force Asians to trade with the Company on its terms were sometimes counter-productive, as can be seen in the Chinese attack and eviction of the Dutch Company from its factory in Taiwan with disastrous results for its inter-Asian trade.

One of Furber's contributions to the historiography of the subject was his argument that, despite the mercantilist and national ownership and direction of the European trading companies, they were essentially interested in profits and were reluctant to attack each other for European political national purposes if it endangered their bottom line. Indeed, they often worked together to promote their mutual interests and were not reluctant to hire foreign personnel. At the same time, they were willing to use force against their European rivals if their economic interests were seriously threatened. One of the major contributions of Furber's book was to explain to Western readers, what Asian historians had long known, that the European companies were a kind of façade under which an existing Asian trade network found a much larger market in Europe than had been possible before the European development of an ocean route to Asia. While Furber emphasizes the companies' relations with Asian traders, he does so only in generic terms and he does not provide us with a good sense of the Asian merchants. On the subject of European exploitation of Asian producers, it is important to remember that none of the European companies were able to create a monopoly of trade in Asia. They did attempt to create a monopsony--a monopoly of supply--of Asian goods in their home markets, but they were usually not even successful in this business goal. Thus, according to Furber, the primary exploitation of the European trading companies, with some dramatic exceptions as the Dutch in the Spice Islands, was of the home consumer.

Goldgar, Anne, *Tulipmania: Money, Honor and Knowledge in the Dutch Golden Age* (2007), 425p.

The dramatic speculation and crash in tulip bulb prices in the Dutch Republic during the 1630s, along with the famous South Sea Bubble of the early 18th century, have become icons of the fragility and irrationality of capitalism's of history's booms and busts. The timing of the book's publication just before the financial collapse of late 2007 was brilliant but had not been planned, since Dr. Goldgar, who teaches early modern European history at King's College London, produced a work of serious scholarship that took a long time to come to fruition. There have been many popular accounts of the feverish speculation in tulips in Holland, such as the very readable *Tulipmania* (1999) by Michael Dash. The standard account argues that the speculation that raised tulip bulb prices to absurd levels did a great deal of damage to the Dutch economy as a whole because so many ordinary people foolishly invested their money in a luxury product that had little intrinsic economic value except its rarity and the hope of selling it at a higher price. What made the whole speculation appear especially irrational was that the speculation was in future contracts to buy single bulbs that were in the ground, or a bulb that would require a year to produce an uncertain flower (the rarest bulbs were in fact special because their unusual colors were a result of disease). When the inevitable bust occurred, the standard account, immortalized in paintings, poems, stories, novels and works of history and economics, features the story of widespread bankruptcies, a freezing up of the credit markets and the personal ruin of ordinary workers as well as rich speculators. Then and now, *Tulipmania* has been held up as a classic warning of the fragility of unbridled capitalist speculation and the damage a financial collapse inevitably does to the hardworking and frugal ordinary people who never participated in the speculation. Surprisingly there has been relatively little archival research to back up the standard account until Goldgar's work. She argues from her extensive archival research that the standard account is based on several contemporary pamphlets that were polemical and offers us a persuasive revisionist interpretation.

She begins by explaining that the tulip was introduced to the Netherlands during the late 16th and early 17th century from the Ottoman Empire as a new luxury product, which was prized by those who collected new botanical specimens along with other exotic items for their 'cabinets of curiosities' and gardens, during a period when Europe developed its new world-wide contacts. Her work demonstrates that those who collected and traded bulbs were a relatively small group

of wealthy enthusiasts, the *bloemisten*, who generally knew each other and should be seen as serious amateur botanists. During 1636-37, their collecting enthusiasm got out of hand. While there were some spectacular bankruptcies among the *bloemisten*, it is not clear that these were primarily the result of tulip speculation or were caused by wider factors, such as the fall of agricultural prices and the crisis in drainage schemes during these years. It is also doubtful that the prices of bulbs ever rose to the levels stated in the standard accounts, which, she argues, are all based on a single pamphlet of 1637. Moreover, it appears that most of the very high prices paid for future bulb deliveries were in fact never actually paid. Wealthy investors with good political connections did appeal for help from city and provincial governments but these refused to intervene. She shows that the crisis did not seriously diminish the tulip trade and that the *bloemisten* continued to collect rare bulbs after the crisis. Finally, there is no evidence that Tulipmania had a serious effect on the economy of the Dutch Republic as a whole at the time (unlike major speculative crashes more recently). Goldgar's readable and well documented study provides us with a fascinating insight into the culture of wealthy collectors in the Dutch Republic and explains how Tulipmania acquired its cultural meaning at a time when the new capitalist and booming economy of Holland entered a relatively brief period of uncertainty.

Haefeli, Evan, *New Netherland and the Dutch Origins of American Religious Liberty* (2012), 355p.

This important study refutes the widespread belief that the Dutch were responsible for introducing religious toleration in colonial America. Haefeli argues convincingly in this comparative history of religious toleration in New and old Amsterdam, that it was never the intention of the Dutch to establish religious tolerance in the new world, although the practical outcome of events produced greater religious toleration than in other nations during their period of colonial rule in North America. The historiography of New Netherland has long argued that religious toleration was a characteristic of Dutch rule despite the existence of the Dutch Reformed Church as a state Church. During the late twentieth century, American historians attacked this tradition and argued that true religious toleration only emerged after the British captured the colony in 1664. However, Russell Shorto, an American journalist, revived the view that religious toleration was brought to America by the Dutch with his best selling work of 2004, *The Island at the Center of the World*. Dutch historians, especially Jaap Jacobs and Willem

Frijhoff, responded to Shorto's argument and insisted that, while freedom of conscience was guaranteed in the colonies, as it was in the Dutch Republic, it did not include equal expression of all religious denominations.

Haefeli, an historian at Columbia University, carefully reviews both the American and Dutch historiography of the subject and uses original Dutch sources to criticize the popular view that religious toleration and the ideal of personal freedom were peculiarly Dutch virtues. Instead, he argues that some religious toleration was a consequence of a peculiar dynamic of power in both the Dutch Republic and its overseas possessions. He shows that the province of Holland and the city of Amsterdam, which together were the chief centers of power in the Republic and its overseas activities, adopted some religious toleration because of its particular historical circumstances as it freed itself from Spain and positioned its economy, society, and government among Europe's great powers from the late 16th century. He argues that one of the explicit goals of colonial expansion was to strengthen the dominance of the Republic's Reformed Church. Holland and Amsterdam's economic growth, and its eighty-years war with Spain, were heavily dependent upon Lutheran immigrants from Germany and Scandinavia as well as Jews from both the east and the south. The relatively late success of the Protestant Reformation in the northern Low Countries; the lack of a strong central political authority to impose religious uniformity; the political power of merchants, bankers and industrialists; the shifting balance of power between Catholic and Protestant states in Europe; and a strong humanist intellectual tradition all combined to create a pragmatic tradition of religious toleration in Holland. Despite repeated efforts by the Dutch Reformed Church to impose its beliefs on everyone, it failed in its efforts to create its religion as the state's enforced religious uniformity.

Originally the Reformed Church in New Netherland allowed Lutherans to be baptized in the Reformed Church and this allowed them to participate and challenge the doctrines of the Reformed Church from within. This provoked an effort to push for greater Calvinist orthodoxy. When Lutherans appealed to Petrus Stuyvesant to allow them their own minster in 1654, he refused. Catholic clerics were generally banned from the colonies, while they were tolerated and operated in hidden churches in Amsterdam. Jews were also generally banned in the colonies unless they made a major contribution to the local economy, while they flourished in Amsterdam. Haefeli argues that the level of toleration in the colonies was also determined by the nature of its religious neighbors. Thus the many Catholics in Brazil were tolerated as well as

Lutherans in the conquered Scandinavian colony of Delaware. Haefeli concludes that, if there was a common Dutch religious policy in its colonies, it was to restrict religious toleration rather than to broaden it. For a fuller discussion of the toleration debate, see the review article by Hans Krabbendam, "From New Netherland to 'New Zeeland'," *BMGN Low Countries Historical Review*, Vol. 128-2 (2013): 62-70.

Hammond, J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Town Labourer: The New Civilization, 1760-1832*, Preface by

Asa Briggs, New York: Anchor Books, 1968. Pp. xviii, 298. First published, 1917.

J. L. and Barbara Hammond, often simply called 'the Hammonds', were the+ most widely read social and economic historians in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century. Neither held academic appointments but, at a time when the subjects of economic history, social history and economics had not yet been forged into clearly separate academic disciplines, their books provided a foundation of historical evidence for a 'pessimistic' interpretation of the social and cultural consequences of the Industrial Revolution, which has had an enduring influence upon both history and the public perception of economics as the 'dismal science.' Their view of the industrial revolution was of a period of massive technological change and rapid economic growth that had failed to improve the condition of the working classes before 1850 despite the economy's vast increases in economic productivity. John Hammond was a professional journalist and civil servant, while Barbara Hammond spent a great deal of time in the Public Record Office amassing evidence. They wrote well and their books became immensely popular between the wars and had a considerable impact on the development of social democracy and the labor movement in Britain.

Their best-known work is their *Labour* trilogy. *The Village Labourer, 1760-1832: A Study in the Government of England Before the Reform Bill* (1911), traced England's agrarian transformation from the enclosure movements of the eighteenth century to the rural risings of 1830. In *The Town Labourer: The New Civilization, 1760-1832* (1917) they told of the rise of a "new Civilization" that had added "the discipline of a power driven by competition that seemed as inhuman as the machines that thundered in the factory and shed" to the poverty of the old domestic system of production. They concluded that this revolution had "raised the standard of comfort of the rich," but had "depressed the standard of life for the poor." Moreover, they declared that the dislocation brought by the rise of modern industry had been made harsher by

the ruling class's fear of social and political revolution. This fear, often dressed in the gospel of evangelical religion, had added intensity to the war of the ruling classes against the workers' efforts on behalf of political and social reform.

The Town Labourer, remains especially worth reading because of its gripping accounts of child labor, government repression, and the ideology of laissez faire that prevented effective social and economic reform during the period. In *The Skilled Laborer, 1760-1832* (1919) they treated the efforts of workers, especially in the mining and textile industries, to improve their conditions, including the first well-documented account of the Luddite movement. The work of the Hammonds provided an account of the lives of the common people during the industrial revolution that was nearly as concrete as that of earlier literary critics of industrialization, such as Dickens, while their extensive documentation from printed and archival sources provided their pessimistic interpretation with the credibility of historical scholarship. While many of the particulars of their work have been seriously modified by later scholarship, their extensive use of lengthy quotations from a wealth of primary sources, and the moral power of their view, founded a vital tradition of scholarship that remains central to the subject.

Hobsbawm, E. J. *Industry and Empire, from 1750 to the Present Day*, rev. ed. New York: The New Press, 1999. Pp. xx, 412. 52 figs.

Eric J. Hobsbawm, the best-known Marxist historian in Britain, first published this one volume economic and social history of Britain in 1968. Its first five chapters provide a classic 1960's British Labour and Socialist interpretation of the industrial revolution in Britain. As its title suggests, Hobsbawm argues that the British Empire was central to British industrialization. Although he sees foreign trade as crucial to the success of British industrialization, it is not clear whether the international trade of the period was a consequence of Britain's Empire or that the expansion of the Empire in the 19th century was a consequence of Britain's industrial revolution. Regardless of the answer to this question, Hobsbawm emphasizes that Britain's industrial revolution must be seen in the context of its extensive international trade with many parts of the world and its use of imperial power. Hobsbawm is also the author of a widely read four-volume history of Europe within a worldwide historical perspective from the late 18th century to the end of the 20th century. Indeed, his treatment of the industrial revolution in *Industry and Empire* is quite similar to his discussion of industrialization in the first volume of his European history, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (1962).

Hobsbawm argues that Britain was not only the first industrial nation, but played the major role in shaping the world's capitalist economy in the 19th century. According to Hobsbawm: "There was a moment in the world's history when Britain can be described ... as its only workshop, its only massive importer and exporter, its only carrier, its only imperialist, almost its only foreign investor, and for that reason, its only naval power and the only one which had a genuine world policy." While Hobsbawm's rhetoric may be a bit too enthusiastic, his argument challenged historians to consider his argument that it was Britain's growing international trade, both outside and within the Empire, which allowed Britain to become the first industrial nation. In addition to his important argument that it was the Empire that sparked the industrial revolution in Britain during the late 18th century and sustained it in the century that followed, Hobsbawm provides classic 'new left' arguments on such topics as the development of class-consciousness among the working classes, the debates about the connections between slavery and the industrial revolution, the economic interpretation of imperialism, the standard of living debate during industrialization before 1850, and the wider revolutionary implications of the British industrial revolution upon world history. This new edition was revised and updated by Chris Wrigley but retains broadly true to its original interpretations. The book also includes more than fifty interesting statistical tables, charts and an updated bibliography. Hobsbawm himself wrote an interesting new conclusion for this edition, which places Britain's economic history in a late 20th century historical perspective.

Honeyman, Katrina, *Women, Gender and Industrialisation in England, 1700-1870*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. Pp. viii, 204.

With the exception of a few early pioneers, such as Ivy Pinchbeck and Alice Clark early in the 20th century, it was not until the 1970s that the role of gender and women in the Industrial Revolution became a serious topic of scholarly research. Katrina Honeyman's synthesis of recent scholarship is a useful and accessible introduction to the roles of women and gender during the industrial revolution. She notes that her work is "feminist history" and argues convincingly that, not only was gender central to the making of the industrial revolution, but also that "industrialization was important to the making of gender" in Britain. She begins with a survey of the historiography of the subject and demonstrates that research on women and gender has given us a much broader understanding of the process of industrialization in Britain. Her survey of the literature points out that it is now no longer possible to explain the industrial revolution in Britain without acknowledging the key role played by female labor. While industrialization also had a very significant impact upon middle class gender formation, her

treatment is almost entirely of gender issues in the working classes. She focuses upon the lives of workingwomen and upon the often-conflicting patterns of workingmen as they struggle to maintain their standing in society as machines devalue their traditional skills and they become, like many women, a source of cheap and easily replaceable labor. The result was that many trades unions actively opposed the entrance of women into formal and full-time employment in modern industries.

Her emphasis is on the classic period of industrialization from the late 18th century to the mid 19th century. Building upon the work of such contemporaries as Maxine Berg and Pat Hudson, she notes that universal conclusions about the economic experience of working-class women did not conform to one overall pattern. In addition to strong regional differences, as well as very the different experiences of workers in agriculture than in more urban environments, she notes that some women, especially young single women, benefitted by working with machines in the early factories before these jobs became much more exclusively male. Overall, she supports the conclusion in the literature that gender roles and women's subordination became more rigid during the classic period of industrialization for workingwomen. Most of the book consists of a discussion of case studies of women's work before and the changes, or lack of changes, brought by industrialization. In her final chapter she explores the impact of the growing ideals of domesticity promoted by both middle class reformers and male workers as they sought to push married women out of the formal labor force. Thus, one of the consequences of industrialization for Victorian working-class women was that there was a dramatic increase in employment for domestic labor and the growth of sweated labor as an adjunct to factory produced goods. The book contains a useful bibliography for further study.

Hoppit, Julian and E. A. Wrigley, eds. *The Industrial Revolution*, vols. 2 and 3: *The Industrial Revolution in Britain*. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1994.

This is part of a eleven volume encyclopedia on the Industrial revolution, which also includes volumes on pre-industrial Britain; the industrial revolutions in North America, Europe, and Japan; and on particular industries, such as textile, metal and engineering, coal and iron, and commercial and financial services. These volumes do not contain the usual encyclopedia style articles arranged alphabetically. Instead, these books, produced by the Economic History Society in Britain, contain important scholarly articles and chapters from volumes of essays and journals. Many of the articles included were written during the 1970s to early 1990s but there are also classic articles from earlier in the century. All are by recognized authorities in the field. The articles contain their original paginations well as continuous

volume pagination. Since very few libraries have all the journals and books from which these essays are drawn, this is a very useful collection of well- chosen important essays, which allows the student to learn from the acknowledged experts on the subject and to appreciate the changing interpretations of the British industrial revolution.

Among the most important essays included in Vol. 2 are: D. Cannadine, “The present and the past in the English industrial revolution, 1880-1980 (1984)—a very useful historiographical article on the relationship between interpretations of the British industrial revolution and contemporary concerns; R. M. Hartwell, “The rising standard of living in England, 1800-1850” (1961)—the classic optimistic view on living standards of workers; E. J. Hobsbawm, “The British standard of living, 1790-1850 (1957)—the classic pessimistic view; E. P. Thompson, “Time, work discipline and industrial capitalism (1967)—the most famous discussion of the new discipline required by industrial capitalism from a Labour perspective; E. A. Wrigley, “the Growth of population in eighteenth century England: a conundrum resolved,” (1983) — Wrigley is the most important British demographic historian for this period; and Charles Wilson, “The entrepreneur in the industrial revolution in Britain (1955). Among the important articles in Vol. 3 are: R. C. Allen, “The growth of labour productivity in early modern English Agriculture”(1988); F. M. L. Thompson, “The second agricultural revolution, 1815-1880” (1968); E. A. Wrigley, “The supply of raw materials in the industrial revolution”(1962); D. S. Landes, “Technological change and economic development in western Europe, 1750-1914” (1965); R Samuel, “Workshop of the world: steam power and hand technology” (1967); N. McKendrick, “Josiah Wedgwood: an eighteenth century entrepreneur in salesmanship and marketing techniques” (1960); and Joel Mokyr, “Demand versus supply in the industrial revolution” (1977).

Hudson, P. *The Industrial Revolution*, London: Edward Arnold, 1992. Pp. xi, 244.

During the 1980s a new consensus appeared to be emerging among economic historians that the British industrial revolution, which had previously been pictured as a revolutionary transformation of the economic landscape between 1760 and 1830, should be replaced by a much more gradual process extending over a much longer period characterized by relatively slow rates of economic growth of no more than 3% per annum before 1830. In addition, many economic historians rejected the overall importance of the ‘modern industries’ during this period, such as textiles, mining and engineering, since they remained a relatively small part of the total economy during the period. Hudson does not directly disagree with the aggregate statistical evidence for Britain but suggests an alternative argument for why

we should nonetheless see the classic period of the industrial revolution as having had a revolutionary impact. Hudson, a Professor of economic history at Liverpool University, has contributed widely to the scholarly literature on British industrialization with an emphasis on regional studies.

The first part of this very useful introductory survey of the British industrial revolution is an extensive historiographical review of the literature. The second, and larger, part argues that since industrialization, as traditionally understood, was largely confined to particular regions and industries during this period, aggregate statistics obscure the reality of dramatic change in some regions. For example, she notes that the growth of woolen textile production of 150% over the entire 18th century appears rather modest but the fact that Yorkshire's share woolen textile production rose from 20% to 60% of national production demonstrates that the consequences were indeed revolutionary for that particular region. She makes a similar argument for revolutionary change in other modern industries when studied from a regional perspective. Moreover, she insists, that these dynamic regions and industries not only witnessed their own transformation in technology, the physical environment, the scale of enterprises, the social roles of owners and workers, demographic behavior and the place of the family and child and female labor in the economy, but encouraged new social and intellectual attitudes, patterns of trade, roles for the state, forms of politics, notions of class, and changes of social relations that eventually transformed the entire society. Her emphasis upon such social issues as the demography of labor, consumption patterns, and issues of class and gender lend further substance to her argument that the British industrial revolution produced dramatic changes in Britain's economy and society during its classic period despite modest aggregate rates of growth. This is an important and readable introduction that emphasizes the social-cultural importance of the origin and consequences of the British industrial revolution.

Humphries, Jane, *Childhood and Child Labour in the British Industrial Revolution*, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xiii, 456.

This is a study of more than 600 autobiographies by men (working-class autobiographies by women do not appear to be available for the period) who lived through the British industrial revolution and later described their labor as children, childhoods, family and social connections, careers and schooling in an effort to search for historical patterns in the experience of industrialization by the workers. The study provides concrete and personal examples to demonstrate that "child labor was endemic in the early industrial economy, entrenched in both traditional and modern sectors and widespread geographically."

The evidence shows that there was a considerable upsurge of child labor during the classic era of industrialization between 1790 and 1850. However, it was not just found in the islands of modern production, such as the new factories, which provided the majority of jobs for children, but was also extensive in the more traditional sectors, with its customary methods of production in agriculture, small-scale manufacturing, and services. Indeed, the evidence shows that the increase use of child labor during the period was in large part a consequence of a deepening of the division of labor during the period, which helped sustain the traditional units and methods of production and maintained their competitiveness during the period. Examples of deskilling due to a greater division of labor come especially from trades such as shoemaking, saddle making and the toy trades. Nonetheless, she argues, since the factories were new, and thus could not draw upon an established labor force, child labor was essential to the growth of new factory based industrial production. Humphries notes that her work explicitly contradicts Kirby's work (see below) that very young children's labor was never widespread, since the rise of child labor during this period was especially a consequence of adding children under 10 years of age to the labor force, particularly in the factories.

These autobiographies support the widely held view that households in Britain were already nuclear during the period and were relatively small but growing during the period. High mortality, migration and significant celibacy meant that a large percentage of the population reached old age without kin to support them. She also shows that families were becoming increasingly dependent upon male wages well in advance of when male breadwinner wages were sufficient to support a family. Moreover, these autobiographies suggest that there were many families where the male breadwinner was not present or was not dependably present. The fact that mothers were not able to support a family by themselves was a major motivation for child labor. As Humphrey puts it: "hunger emerges in this survey as the primary motivators of children's efforts." An increase in child labor during this period of rapid population increase resulted in children shouldering "some of the increased dependency during the period and helped society evade the potentially devastating consequences of population increase." This study also shed light on the amount and quality of education during the period, in contrast to the orthodox narrative of a slow but steady improvement in education during the period, the amount and quality of education stagnated and perhaps declined. Without the growth of the new Sunday Schools, night schools and other efforts to promote adult education, literary and numeracy rates would have probably fallen further during the classic period of industrialization. The book includes many useful statistical tables. While the author is very much aware that this period was one of war and rapid

population increase, and that the evidence for this study comes from autobiographies—a category of sources that historians find problematical, the personal stories presented are fascinating and her general conclusions reinforces the widely held view that the period of classic industrialization was a difficult time for a large section of the common people and especially their children.

Huizinga, J., *Dutch Civilization in the Seventeenth Century and other essays* (1968), 288p.

Jakob Herman Huizinga (1872-1945) is probably the best-known Dutch historian internationally. His international fame, however, is not in Dutch history, but for his cultural history of late medieval Europe, first published in 1924 and republished in 1996 as *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*. In addition his pioneering theoretical essays on cultural history during the 1930s have been widely recognized as path breaking and are seen as one of the foundations of the new cultural history. He started out as a student of Indo-Germanic languages and studied comparative linguistics His 1895 PhD dissertation was on Indian literature. Subsequently he turned to European Medieval and Renaissance history and became a Professor of History at Leiden University. During the 1930s he was critical of Fascism and spoke out publicly against the Germans during their occupation of the Netherlands when they closed Leiden University's library in 1942. He was banished by the Germans to a small village in Gelderland in 1942 and died there during the hunger winter shortly before the liberation in 1945.

This volume contains a translation of his famous essay, "Dutch Civilization in the Seventeenth Century," first published in 1941, as well as "The Spirit of the Netherlands" (1935), "The Netherlands as Mediator between Western and Central Europe" (1933), "Two Wrestlers with the Angel" (1921) on Oswald Spengler and H. G. Wells, "The Aesthetic Element in Historical Thought" (1905) and "My Path to History" (1947). In these essays, and especially in his famous essay on the seventeenth century, he put forward the now widely accepted notion that the bourgeois and relatively egalitarian culture of the seventeenth century Dutch Republic was unique in Europe at the time and played a major role in shaping historical interpretation of the Republic's Golden Age. He stressed its tradition of freedom of conscience, the relative religious toleration, its Republican political culture of the 'true freedom,' and its literary, artistic, philosophical, and scientific achievements that were seen as unique in Europe and provided a new direction for European civilization. He especially contrasted the relative freedom of Dutch bourgeois society with the aristocratic and more authoritarian culture of Louis XIV's France. His

central claim was that the Republic's bourgeois culture was more ethical than the aristocratic cultures of its neighbors. Huizinga paid a great deal of attention to visual images and his art criticism has been influential in the history of art. While modern Dutch historians have become much more critical of Dutch culture in the Golden Age than Huizinga's idealistic views, which no doubt also owed something to the contrast with Nazi culture and the German occupation of the Netherlands, Huizinga's interpretation of the Dutch Golden Age remains an important influence on the national identity of the Dutch in our own time.

Inikori, Joseph E. *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xi, 576.

Inikori's study is an important contribution to a long-standing debate about the economic connections between African slavery and the British industrial revolution. Although Marx had already suggested that the profits from African slavery were a contributing factor to the development of industrial capitalism, it was Eric Williams in his *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944) who was the chief source of the modern debate. Williams suggested that profits from the slave trade were an important contributing factor to the origin of the first industrial revolution, but he did not provide a broad scholarly foundation to make the argument persuasive. While much scholarship has been published on this topic since Williams, there has also been a great deal of ideological intensity about the issue that has limited the credibility of the argument that African slavery was a crucial contributor to the industrial revolution. Inikori's substantial study has successfully placed Williams' argument on a much more secure scholarly foundation, although his conclusions remains quite controversial because they are dependent upon the argument that international trade is a key explanation for the British industrial revolution. Traditional explanations of the British industrial revolution focus on the supply side factors, such as technological innovation, population growth, agricultural change, and capital formation. By contrast, Inikori identifies international trade as a prime cause of British industrialization. Using a theoretical concept from modern international development theory, he argues that import substitution was crucial to British industrialization.

Taking a broadly Atlantic view, Inikori argues that Britain's extensive Atlantic trade system was heavily dependent upon Africa slavery during the period 1650 to 1850. It was not just the profits from the slave trade, as some have argued, that helped fuel British

industrialization. Instead, Inikori explains that slavery was fundamental to the entire trade system. Slaves produced such important raw materials as cotton, tobacco, sugar, rice, and many other products, whose production were not only profitable in themselves, but these products were processed in England, served to develop manufacturing in England, and were widely re-exported to other countries. He notes that the technical innovation and dynamic manufacturing industries in the regional economies of Lancashire, Yorkshire, and the West Midlands especially benefitted from their close connection to the Atlantic economy. For example, cotton constituted 2.9% of value added to British manufacturing in 1770 and 29.2% in 1831. In 1854-56, raw materials from Africa and the Americas constituted 43.3% of England's imports. The bulk of these raw materials were produced by slave labor. Taking a broad view, he estimates that the export commodities produced by slaves in all of the Americas amounted to 69% in the 17th century, 80% in the 18th century and 70% by the mid 19th century. The slave trade and the goods that slaves produced in America also had an important impact upon the development of Britain's shipping industries, as well as on the growth of its financial and insurance services. In addition, Inikori notes that the growing demand for British exports in the Americas was dependent upon the growing wealth of American consumers, which in turn was heavily dependent upon wealth produced by slave labor. The book includes many interesting statistical tables and an extensive bibliography.

Israel, J. I., *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740*, (1989). 462p.

Jonathan Israel is the most important and prolific Dutch historian writing in English today. This study was the first synthesis about the “the astounding ascendancy exercised by the Dutch maritime provinces—Holland, Zeeland and Friesland—over world commerce, shipping and finance from the 1590s for approximately a century and half . . . and the centrality of Dutch maritime and commercial activity for over a century in the making of the early modern world” (p. vii). These are large claims but Israel's general argument for Dutch primacy in world trade during the 17th century has not been disputed. While it was the Spanish and the Portuguese that first expanded trade with new worldwide ocean routes, it was the Dutch who from the late 16th century profited most from the new trade routes until the 1740s when they were surpassed by the British. Fernand Braudel, the great French historian of early modern Europe, argued that the

center of European trade moved from Venice to Antwerp around 1500, to Amsterdam by 1600, and then to London after 1650. Israel insists that this implies far too much continuity in form and function. He argues that when Amsterdam became the center of the European trade system in about 1590, this completed a change of function, which had already begun in Antwerp earlier in the century, that saw the centralization of trade, commerce and finance, backed by industrial production, in the Dutch Republic, and resulted in the concomitant decline of other trading centers, such those of the Hanseatic League, the southern Netherlands, and the south German and French trading emporia. During the 17th century, European commercial growth was almost entirely confined to the northern Netherlands and southern England, with Amsterdam serving as its financial and commercial capital. According to Israel, the Dutch maritime zone was not only Europe's commercial center during the early modern period but "the only true world entrepôt."

By the second half of the 15th century the Dutch already had the largest shipping fleet in Europe, which they used to carry bulk goods, such as fish, grain, timber, and salt, between European ports, while other European emporia focused on the 'rich trades,' such as spices, fancy textiles, and later sugar. Braudel argued that Dutch predominance grew out of a basic shift in European material life. As the Mediterranean food supply declined relative to its population, the Dutch began to ship Baltic grain and North Sea fish to the south. They first captured the Iberian market and then in the late 16th century became commercially dominant in the Mediterranean. Braudel thus saw Dutch pre-eminence as a fundamentally a secular, demographic and ecological shift of European wealth from the Mediterranean to northwest Europe and argued that the decline of Dutch control over the Baltic trade in the 1650s ended its primacy in European trade. Braudel did not believe that politics, mercantilism, and war played an important role in the success of the Dutch Republic. Israel's contribution was to challenge the widely held view that Amsterdam, and the Dutch Republic, were essentially in the mold of earlier leading European early modern city-state economies, such as Venice, Florence, and Genoa, and Antwerp, and thus, however precocious its merchant capitalism might have been, it would be London and Britain that would create the first modern economy.

Instead, Israel argues that the Dutch Republic, led by Amsterdam, was fundamentally different from the earlier leading city-state economies and was at the center of the first truly interdependent European economy and even the first world economy. He argues that that the 'rich trades' were crucial to Dutch success, that politics and war were of vital importance to its

economic growth, and that its economic pre-eminence lasted well into the 18th century. The rich trades greatly expanded in the 16th century with the flow of silver from the New World, spices, textiles, dyestuffs, jewels, sugar and later tea, coffee, and tobacco. In northern Europe, the market for southern European goods, such as wine and manufactured luxury goods was greatly expanded, while northern luxury products found larger markets in the south. Israel shows that the Dutch rich trades, especially those with Cadiz in Spain, Batavia in Asia, Smyrna in the Middle East, and Archangel in the North, were as important as its bulk trade to the Republic's predominance in trade and lasted longer than its bulk trade. Although Israel does not specifically discuss manufacturing, agriculture, and service industries in the Dutch Republic in this book, he argues that the Republic's strength in these areas was crucial to its trading system and provided it with a much broader industrial base than previous European economic centers. In addition to its overwhelming dominance in shipbuilding and the carrying trades, it became a major manufacturer and exporter of quality textiles. Its technical superiority provided an export market for tools and machines for cloth dyeing, linen bleaching, tobacco spinning, spirit distilling, lens grinding, printing presses, mechanical saw mills, mining equipment and medical instruments. Although the book contains many useful statistical tables, it does not contain quantitative data that allows one to assess a percentage contribution of its international trade to the overall size of its economy.

Many historians have seen the Dutch Republic as a weak medieval and decentralized state. Israel argues that in fact that "it was an exceptionally strong and efficient state compared with seventeenth-century France, Sweden or for that matter pre-1688 England" (p.411). The Republic paralyzed Antwerp's economy by blocking the Scheldt from 1585, forced Spain in 1648 to accept its continued closure and trade restrictions on the Flemish coast. It forced the Danes to keep the Sound open, which provided access to the Baltic, and to lower its tolls. When England sought to restrict Dutch trade with its Navigation Laws beginning in 1651, it fought three naval wars with England to protect its interests. It was not until the late 18th century that English mercantilism succeeded in severely restricting Dutch trade. The Republic successfully repulsed several French invasions and was not defeated until the 1790s by its much larger neighbors. Moreover, the Dutch could not have created their trade predominance in Asia, West Africa and, more sporadically, in the Caribbean and Brazil without the state's involvement in the creation of its trading companies, which had unprecedented military and political powers.

Domestically the Dutch state more successfully protected property rights and enforced contracts than the Continent's monarchies and even England before 1688. The low interest rates, about 3%, in the Dutch Republic, were about half those in England and were not just a result of economic efficiency, but were also due to its stable government that reduced lending risk. Israel's study was widely praised after its publication and played a major role in reassessing the role of the Dutch Republic in the creation of an interdependent European and world economy during the early modern period.

Israel, J. I., *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806* (1995), 1231p.

Jonathan Israel's monumental history of the early modern Dutch Republic is the standard work of the subject in English and is recognized as such even by scholars in the Netherlands. It provides a wide-ranging narrative and synthesis based on a thorough knowledge of the secondary literature in Dutch and major European languages as well as upon a great deal of original research in Dutch archives. At 1,231 pages one might think that the book is primarily a work of reference and, indeed, it is the place to begin one's reading for virtually any important topic in Dutch history for the period. Many maps and tables, an extensive bibliography, many footnotes and a good index further enhance the utility of the volume. Israel's study is, however, much more than a useful work of reference, it is also an original and persuasive interpretation. The book is organized chronologically around a political narrative in the grand manner but also contains many separate chapters on religion, intellectual and cultural history, and social and economic history. It is further organized into broad time periods. The result is a well-written book that, despite its length, holds one's interest.

He begins with a broad geographical overview of the Netherlands, the rise of the county of Holland during the late middle ages, the incorporation of the Low Countries into the Burgundian and then the Hapsburg states, and the intellectual and cultural life of the region. He then goes on to a detailed discussion of the revolt of the Low Countries against Spain. One of the major problems in the history of the Netherlands is to explain how the northern and southern Netherlands developed such separate identities. Israel agrees with the great mid-twentieth century Dutch historian of the Netherlands, Pieter Geyl, "that there was no specifically Dutch or northern Netherlands identity before 1572, nor any specifically southern Netherlands awareness." Geyl, however, argued that the division of north and south was almost entirely due

to the military advantages that the north enjoyed in being able to use the great rivers as an effective barrier to the Spanish forces to their south. While Israel agrees that geographic issues were important to the success of the revolt in the north, he also insists that “economic, and geographical factors had rendered north and south separate entities long before the ‘Revolt of 1572.’ Seen against the background of the later Middle Ages and the early sixteenth century, there is an important sense in which 1572, and the final separation of north and south, merely completed—were the logical outgrowth of—a duality which had, in reality, existed for centuries” (p.vi). During the late middle ages, the Dutch speaking provinces, which included Flanders and Brabant, constituted one cultural area. However, economically, the southern provinces were much more developed with larger trading and manufacturing towns while the north was more dependent upon agriculture, fishing, and shipping. While northern Christian humanism provided the intellectual and spiritual background for the origin of the Protestant Reformation, exemplified by the work of Erasmus, neither organized Lutheranism nor Calvinism had much institutional impact on the Netherlands during the first half of the sixteenth century. The revolt against Spain began in the wealthier and more urban south and was initially primarily a consequence of Hapsburg efforts to strengthen its central government and increase tax revenue from the wealthy Low Countries. These Hapsburg efforts came to be seen as an attack on traditional local self-government by both the local urban and aristocratic elites. The insistent Spanish efforts to eradicate Protestantism added an important religious and cultural dimension to the revolt. According to Israel one of the major reasons why the revolt succeeded in the north was that the province of Holland enjoyed greater internal cohesion and could dominate the north, while the south had two power centers, Flanders and Brabant, and each had less internal cohesion than Holland. In the north a large part of the nobility supported the revolt while this was not the case in the south. In the south there was militant support for Catholicism and the monarchy, especially in Wallonia and parts of Brabant, while there was little public support for the old religion or the crown in the north.

Israel explains that the Union of Utrecht of 1579 created an embryonic Protestant state in the north but at the cost of giving up William of Orange’s call for full religious toleration. Instead, the Dutch Republic that eventually emerged during the next decade in the north settled only for freedom of conscience in religion and became a state, which initially only allowed public worship for the Calvinist Reformed Church. From 1590 the Dutch Republic became a

great power, which succeeded in crippling the economy of Antwerp by denying it direct access to the sea and forcing the Spanish to agree to a twelve year truce in 1609. With the help of many wealthy and skilled Protestant refugees, who fled the south and settled in the north, the northern Republic added the 'rich trades' to its dominance in shipping to the bulk trades. The north also took over the south's lead in manufacturing, especially in textiles. Combined with the most modern agricultural sector in Europe, as well as its dominance in fishing, the result was that the Dutch Republic achieved the highest standard of living in Europe and was its financial, commercial and technological leader for well over a century. One of Israel's contributions was his demonstration that the economic success of the Republic did not end in the late 17th century, as many others had argued, but continued into the first third of the 18th century.

Historians have long argued that the complex federalism of the Dutch Republic may have produced a great deal of local self-government but it was less efficient than the emerging centralized monarchies, such as France and Prussia, or the Parliamentary and Monarchical partnership that emerged in England after William III's, the Prince of Orange, invasion of England in 1688. According to Israel, the success of this large-scale invasion was not only built upon Dutch economic success but upon the Republic's military revolution in organization, training and technology that arose during its revolt against Spain. Moreover, despite what many contemporary observers saw as its inefficient and chaotic system of decentralized government, the Republic's government enjoyed widespread public support and was able to persuade its citizens to pay much higher per capita taxes and borrow money at much lower rates of interest than the more centralized monarchial European states.

Since the publication of his study of the Dutch Republic, Israel has published several large volumes on the European Enlightenment. The outline of his argument on the origin of the Radical Enlightenment can be found in his general history of the Dutch Republic. He argued that the wealth and tolerant cultural environment of the Republic led to a dramatic increase in Dutch cultural, philosophical and scientific work and attracted many important writers who were forced to flee their native lands to freely express their views. Israel argues that the Republic created a new kind of European and bourgeois culture: "The culture of the north evolved into an uneasy blend of Protestant-Catholic confrontation, humanist-confessional antagonism, and Protestant anti-Calvinist dissent, which fragmented thought and education, creating a new kind of European culture fraught with powerful insoluble internal stresses. The result was a highly dynamic, if

initially unstable, culture in many ways quite unlike that to be found in neighboring Protestant as well as Catholic lands” (p. 581). During its life, the Republic became the major European publication center for controversial writers. Its new universities became the leading Protestant universities in Europe during the 17th century. The Republic also played a major role in scientific discoveries and was a major manufacturer of advanced scientific and medical instruments. The northern Netherlands produced or became the adopted home of such major cultural and intellectual figures as Erasmus, Lipsius, Scaliger, Grotius, Rembrandt, Vondel, Descartes, Huygens, Vermeer, Spinoza, and Bayle. Israel argues that the retreat from dogma, which was especially the result of the inability of Protestants and Catholics to agree, had already produced a crisis of skepticism among many intellectuals by the late 16th century and saw the rise of a mechanistic world-view in the 17th century. During the early eighteenth century, inspired by the work of Spinoza, writers in the Republic mounted a sustained offensive against divine revelation and the literal biblical basis of Christianity. Many Dutch thinkers sought to use scientific experimentation and observation to develop an empirical basis for natural science. Applying these methods to the social sciences and political philosophy, the Dutch radical enlightenment also sought to undercut aristocratic and monarchical government with a democratic critique before the better-known *philosophes* of the later eighteenth century.

Israel’s work also devotes a good deal of space to the innovative art and architecture of the republic and to the social history of the period. Israel argues that the Republic first produced what was later characterized as a bourgeois society with a diversity of churches, relatively wide participation in government dominated not by an aristocracy but by the bourgeoisie, and by the relative freedom allowed for groups such as women, servants and Jews. Although Israel’s work is nearly two decades old as this is written, it has not been surpassed as a survey of the history of the Dutch Republic and remains a major scholarly achievement of early modern European history.

Jacob, Margaret C., *Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West* (1996), 274p.

In this original and very readable book on the history of science and economic development, Margaret Jacob shows that how and why scientific knowledge became such an integral part of European, and especially English and Scottish, culture during the early modern period, and how this culture helps explain why Britain became the first industrial nation. In the

first part of her book, she summarizes her earlier study of why Newtonian science became so important in England and Scotland. In the latter part of her study, she explains that it was especially in England that a secularized and more popular version of Newtonian science became an essential part of the world-view of English entrepreneurs and inventors during the 18th century. Using the James Watt (an important developer of the steam engine) family archive in Birmingham, she shows quite concretely that scientific culture was “not a mere adjunct to the emergence of mechanized industry” but “was its essential source.” Comparative in structure, the book not only discusses Britain but also includes an analysis of the history of science and technology in France, the Netherlands, and Germany. This allows her to explain why scientific culture and mechanical innovations became more pervasive in Britain. She shows how science was applied to worldly concerns, focusing mainly on the entrepreneurs and engineers who possessed scientific insight and were eager to profit from its advantages. She argues that during the mid-seventeenth century, British science was presented within an ideological framework that encouraged material prosperity. The book includes readable summaries of the major scientific achievements of the 17th and early 18th centuries that help us understand how the central scientific innovations of the period were important to many technological inventions crucial to early industrialization.

Jones, Eric, *The European Miracle: Environment, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*, 3rd ed. (2003), 301p.

In this study, Jones sought to answer the question: "Why did modern states and economies develop first in the peripheral and late-coming culture of Europe?" Adam Smith, Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Immanuel Wallerstein and many recent historians also asked this question but Jones's book has the merit of being relatively short, well written and engaging. His study has become widely known in the debate of why Europe experienced the first industrial revolution and became so rich. First published in 1981, the third edition of 2003 includes a new preface and afterword. According to Joel Mokyr, “it seems to have attracted the most attention and has been made into the whipping boy of those who have resented what they viewed as historiographical triumphalism, eurocentricity, and even racism.” Many historians believe that Jones overemphasized the differences in economic development between Europe and the more advanced non-European areas, especially in Asia. This question has been labeled the ‘divergence

and convergence” debate. Studies show that around 1820 the richest countries had a wealth advantage of about 3:1 over poor countries, while by the 21st century, the ratio between the rich and poor was about 30:1. Why this happened remains unresolved, but what is generally agreed on is that something fundamental happened in Europe around and after 1800 that first produced a world of rich and poor countries, and since then many countries beyond Europe have joined the rich countries while the distance between the rich and poor has become greater.

Jones argues that the foundation of European success was laid between about 1400 and 1800 and must be seen in its combination of physical resources and the development of a market economy, as explained by Adam Smith and classical economics, and the interaction of these factors with geopolitics. The first section is a broad comparative discussion emphasizing agriculture and demography in the early period. He suggested that one of the key factors was that a relatively unique European pattern of nuclear families was able to keep population growth at level just below the maximum that could be supported by resources through restricting births with later marriages and by investing more capital in the skills and education of their children. Moreover, Europe was able to hold back more land for animal husbandry and woodland so that its consumption levels became higher than in Asia and this also allowed Europeans to overcome disasters more successfully. The next section is devoted to Europe. Here emphasizes three main factors: the long-term diffusion of Asian technology to Europe before 1400; European acquisition of relatively unpopulated land resources in the Americas and Oceania, which he calls ‘ghost acres’; and the successful role the European states played in promoting economic development. The latter was made possible by the existence of competing European states that promoted competition and innovation, as opposed to large central empires, While a good deal of this competition was wasted in war and violence, state competition also taught Europeans how to attract and keep entrepreneurial talent by protecting private property and enforcing contracts through civil law. He also explains the issues that inhibited economic development elsewhere, such as poor soil and disease in Africa, isolation from the rest of the World in the Americas, and how Asia used up its resources on its growing population. Finally, he has separate chapters on the Ottoman, Mughal, and Ming-Manchu empires and how each obstructed economic growth. His discussion of how China came within a “hairs breadth” of an industrial revolution in the fourteenth century but then turned to a project of internal colonization and expansion is especially interesting.

Some critics have found Jones' broad and boldly stated generalizations unconvincing. R. B. Wong, for example, argued in his important 1997 study, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*, that the dynamics of the Chinese and European economies were quite similar before 1800. Kenneth Pomeranz maintained, in his influential study, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (2000), that easily available coal in Britain, and its relative inaccessibility in China, provided Europe with a key resource that stimulated further economic innovation. More recently, historians, such as Robert Allen, have argued that it was primarily higher wages in Britain combined with cheap coal that made the first industrial revolution British. Others have accused Jones' of being not only Eurocentric but also racist. One of the interesting aspect of the debate has been that much of the focus has been on the relative availability and access to physical resources, such as coal and land, while the issues of the intellectual and institutional milieus of the 'West and the Rest' have been less prominent than in earlier years. Joel Mokyr's work emphasizes the importance of these factors through a reinterpretation of the intellectual context for Europe's technological success in his *Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy* (2002) and *The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850* (2009). The 'divergence and convergence' debate remains very much alive and Jones' contribution remains a good introduction to many of the key issues.

Kirby, Peter, *Child Labour in Britain, 1750-1870*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003. Pp. ix, 172.

1 fig. 14 tbls.

Unlike Jane Humphries' study of child labor (see above), which deals with the subject through autobiographies of working-class men of the period, Kirby's survey of child labor in Britain is an effort to provide a quantitative answer to the question of the prevalence of child labor in Britain during the period. He stresses that national statistics for child labor are quite scarce for this period. His study relies heavily upon census data and includes an interesting discussion of the classification of occupations used in the 1851 census. Based on the sources available he discusses the broader social and demographic context of child labor for the period, its role in production, and the impact of the state's effort to regulate child labor, which began in the early Victorian period. The book includes an interesting discussion of the changing nature and conception of childhood during the period. He argues that the traditional narrative that stresses child labor in the new factories is a serious distortion, for that even by the middle

of the 19th century, most child labor still occurred in traditional sectors such as agriculture, handicraft industries, and domestic service. His concludes that relatively few children under ten years old engaged regularly in child labor. This conclusion is disputed by Humphries (above) as well as many other writers who stress literary rather than statistical sources. Kirby's work includes a useful bibliography and is a useful introduction to the subject despite the fact that it rather neglects the large amount of literary evidence on the subject found in more passionate critiques of child labor during the British industrial revolution.

Klingender, Francis, *Art and the Industrial Revolution*, ed., Arthur Elton, New York: Schocken Books, 1970. Pp. 280. 117 ills.

Klingender's book is a pioneering work on the rather neglected subject by art historians of the connection between the British industrial revolution and art. Klingender was born of British parents in Germany in 1907. His father was a painter but, unable to make a living in Germany, the family returned to England in 1925 and lived in poverty. Klingender studied sociology for his BA in the evening school at the London School of Economics and subsequently received a scholarship, which allowed him to complete a PhD in 1934. Not trained as an art historian, he published books on such subjects as *The Condition of Clerical Labour in Britain* and *Money Behind the Screen*. As an avowed Marxist, he was drawn to the subject of the social conditions experienced by the common people during the industrial revolution. His *Art and the Industrial Revolution*, first published in 1947, reflects a harsh view of the social consequences of the British Industrial Revolution, which was common in the radical and socialist inspired writings on the subject, and was fairly popular among his contemporaries. An edited version was published in 1968 by Arthur Elton, which toned down some of his harsher rhetoric. Klingender, along with Marxists in general, was a proponent of a realistic art in the service of radical social reform.

Included in Klingender's study of art and industrialization are literary critiques of industrial society by 19th century writers, but his focus is on the visual arts. He explains how the new factories, canals, railroads, and other physical aspects of industrialization were first depicted in technical and engineering drawings, then appeared in graphic arts illustrating the newly built environment, and only gradually appeared in the higher forms of professional art such as painting. Thus he shows, for example how the famous iron works at Coalbrookdale were first documented by topographical artists and later immortalized by such early Romantic painters as Louthembourg, Cotman and Turner. Klingender was the first modern critic to point to the early work of James Sharples, the blacksmith-artist praised by the

great Victorian art critic, John Ruskin. Klingender was also the first to emphasize the important industrial paintings of Joseph Wright of Derby, whose heroic paintings of workingmen and iron forges, as well as his painting of Arkwright's textile mill depicted in the classic style of a great country house, have become staples in illustrations of the industrial revolution. He also demonstrated that the monumental work of John Martin was directly influenced by contemporary realistic-romantic portrayals of bridges, tunnels and railways.

Klingender was very concerned that modern machine-made goods and industrial design was primarily motivated by profit and neglected craftsmanship and good design. He noted that Wedgwood had employed many artists to design his manufactured products and that the Crystal Palace, which housed the Great Exhibition of 1851, was a brilliant work of industrial design. The work of William Morris, and the Arts and Crafts tradition he inspired, were in large part a critique of machine produced goods and a plea for new principles of design tied to traditional methods of production. Klingender was especially taken by the heroic depiction of workers in the famous murals in Manchester's neo-Gothic Town Hall by Ford Madox Brown. While a great deal of work has been done on art and the industrial revolution since Klingender, the book remains a very useful introduction to the subject.

Kossmann, E. H. and A. F. Mellink *Texts Concerning The Revolt of the Netherlands* (1974), 295p.

This is a substantial collection of translated documents on the Revolt of the Netherlands against Spain by two well-known scholars of the early modern Low Countries. The book is in a series that is devoted to the history and theory of politics and thus focuses on political, constitutional, legal and political theory topics, but also deals with religious issues since these were of great importance to both the Spanish and the Low Countries. The documents are arranged chronologically and date from the period of the origin of the revolt in 1565 through the creation of the new state in 1588. The editors begin with a fifty-page scholarly introduction and each document is preceded by a brief explanation.

The revolt of the Low Countries against Spain has long been an important subject among early modern European historians. Some have seen its motives as religious, others as primarily economic or political. More recently, historians have argued that the search for a main cause is too simple for a complex series of social and political disturbances that took place over several decades. They have noted that the opposition to the king in the 1560s was quite different from

that of the 1580s. Historians have also not found a pattern of stages in the Revolt of the Netherlands akin to those many discerned in the French and other more recent revolutions. Indeed, the very title the “Revolt of the Netherlands” is problematic, since the whole of the Netherlands did not revolt against the Spanish king nor did those who originally opposed the king think of themselves as revolutionaries. Instead, the leading opponents of the King of Spain in the Low Countries believed they were upholders of ancient liberties, which were threatened by the efforts of the Spanish crown to form an illegal form of absolutism. The editors argue that the documents show that the ‘Revolt’ “was a long drawn out process of estrangement not only between the Low Countries and the sovereign residing in Spain, between the Protestants and the established Church, between the poor and the bourgeoisie or the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy, but also between the various areas of the Netherlands. The result was anarchy, disintegration and civil war. It was to these challenges that small groups of people reacted by setting up orderly governments of their own in some provinces...They broke away from Spain as well as from their neighbours, entrenching themselves in an old-fashioned particularism that it would be far-fetched to categorise as the climax and fulfillment of revolutionary endeavor.” The authors argue that the discussion, which started in the nineteenth century, whether the revolt was revolutionary or conservative, is a dead end. Instead, they argue that a careful reading of the documents, and modern historical research, demonstrate that, while the disturbances themselves were decidedly revolutionary, the leaders who created the new state of the Dutch Republic that gradually emerged did not consciously set out to create a new form of government or a new nation. Rather, a new state and a new nation developed from their historical experiences, experiments, failures and successes. Misinterpretation of historical precedents enabled the opponents of the Spanish king to claim that their assertions of their ancient liberties were just and in harmony with traditional political doctrines, although they were in retrospect and in fact quite innovative. The leaders and spokespersons of the revolt were not political theorists who offered a map toward a new and modern theory of government or a revolutionary model for the future. The Dutch Republic was not initially revolutionary in its political theory but in its dramatic innovations in economic and social institutions. Kossmann and Mellink’s extensive collection of documents provides access in English to study the political thoughts and actions of the leaders of the successful revolt against Spain in the Low Countries during the second half of the sixteenth century.

Landes, David S. *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (1969), 566p.

This is the classic study that argues that technological innovation was a major cause of the industrial revolution. *Prometheus Unbound* is an expansion of volume six in the *Cambridge Economic History of Europe* published in 1965. Although it covers all of Europe, as well as the entire period from 1750 to the 1960s, its discussion of the British industrial revolution is a very useful account of the topic. Moreover, since it covers Europe as a whole, it provides a broad context to the wider debate on why Europe was the first region of the world to industrialize and why the West retained industrial primacy in the world right through the 20th century. With the rapid growth of Asian economies since the late 20th century, the debate on the origins of Western economic primacy, and whether or when this primacy would move to East Asia in the future, rekindled the debate. In 1998 Landes published a major contribution to this topic with his *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor* (1998). The latter book restates and updates his earlier argument within a world-historical perspective.

Prometheus Unbound remains a classic book on the role of technological innovation as an important reason for Europe's industrial revolution and Britain's premier role in its origin. Landes offers a detailed and learned study packed with fascinating details on each of the leading industries in the British industrial revolution. He draws upon a vast variety of sources in many languages, as can be seen in his extensive bibliography, which, unfortunately, is missing from this volume, but can be found in the *Cambridge Economic History* version. In addition to serving as a source of information on technological innovation, Landes' substantial discussion of Britain contains a more general explanation of the broader social and political factors that made Britain the first industrial nation. Landes does not have much faith in theoretical economic explanations of economic growth. In this respect, he remains an old school economic historian, who is firmly rooted in an empirical tradition and is suspicious of "the construction of simple explanatory models and prefers the "wholeness of reality, however complex it may be." Instead of a grand theory, he favors what he calls a "plausible" argument that finds the roots of technological innovation and economic growth in Britain's scientific culture, its representative form of government, its geographic position, and the popularity of scientific experimentation and application. Above all, he argues that Britain's industrial revolution was an outcome of the

“scope and effectiveness of private enterprise” that ensured “the rational manipulation of the human and natural environment.”

Landes definition of the industrial revolution is still widely quoted. He argues that an “interrelated succession of technological changes” was “the heart of the Industrial Revolution:” “(1) the substitution of mechanical devices for human skills (2) the substitution of inanimate power—in particular steam—for human and animal strength; and (3) the marked improvements in the getting and working of raw materials.” According to Landes, this is what “marked a major turning point in history. To that point, the advances of commerce and industry, however gratifying and impressive, were essentially superficial: more wealth, more goods, prosperous cities, merchant nabobs...In the absence of qualitative changes, of improvements in productivity, there could be no guarantee that mere quantitative gains would be consolidated. It was the Industrial Revolution that initiated a cumulative, self-sustaining advance in technology whose repercussions would be felt in all aspects of economic life.” *Prometheus Unbound* is the classic argument, told with fascinating empirical detail, that technological innovation led to a self-sustaining growth of productivity that is the chief characteristic of the industrial revolution.

Lambourne, Lionel, *Victorian Painting*, London: Phaidon Press, 1999. Pp. 512. 626 col. pls.

This is a large format art book with hundreds of excellent full color illustrations. It covers painting for the entire period of Victoria’s life, 1819-1901. Lambourne was for many years the Head of Paintings at the Victorian and Albert Museum in London. The book is arranged topically and within the topics it is largely chronological. It contains many broad generalizations but does not offer an overall thesis or a coherent argument about the nature of Victorian Art. Instead it is a brilliant tour of the subject by one who has an intimate and life-long acquaintance with these paintings. It is full of interesting anecdotes, stories, and endless interesting facts and observations, which filled his immensely popular and frequent lectures on the period. The book is especially good at analyzing narrative art, which was an important strand in Victorian painting. If there is an overarching theme, it is his observation that “we are much nearer to the Victorian than might be supposed.” By this he meant, that while we often criticize the sexism, chauvinism, racism and hypocrisy of the Victorians, our popular culture retains many of these prejudices and biases. There are chapters on the Victorian art establishment, the fresco revival and murals, portraits, landscapes, watercolor paintings, narrative and genre, the panorama as virtual painting, childhood, fairy painting (he wrote a large study of this), sport and animal works, the pre-Raphaelites,

social classes, the nude, women artists, social realism, emigration and war, the fallen woman, transatlantic exchanges, colonial painters, the aesthetic movement (about which he also wrote a major study), impressionism, and the fin de siècle. One of the striking conclusions you come away with after feasting on this volume, that there is little here that actually treats the topic of industrialization although there is much that might be seen as a reaction to mechanization and factory produced goods. If you are unfamiliar with the painting of the period, this is the place to begin. If you are well acquainted with the subject, you will thoroughly enjoy Lambourne's tour de force. For a brief and systematic scholarly study of 19th century British painting, you might begin with Kenneth Bendiner, *Introduction to Victorian Painting* (1985).

McKendrick, Neil, John Brewer, and J. H. Plumb, *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth Century England*, Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press, 1982. Pp. 345.

Traditional studies of the industrial revolution have concentrated on the supply side of production, such as technology, methods of production, capital, and labor. In recent decades there has been a great deal of research on the demand side of the British industrial revolution. This volume by three well-known Cambridge University historians played an important role in encouraging the latter approach. Although there is an effort here to explain the ultimate source for the expanded demand for goods, much of the evidence in this volume is about how producers responded to increased demand. The authors suggest that a consumer revolution of the 18th century provided the incentive for inventors and entrepreneurs to revolutionize British industry in order to meet the growing demand for all sorts of goods by a larger segment of society. Demand, of course, has to be effective demand in order to encourage entrepreneurs to provide more and different goods. The simplest way to increase demand was an increase of wealth in a society, but greater wealth need not be spent on consumer goods. It could, for example, be saved, spent on church decorations or on war. The claim here was that during the eighteenth century, and especially during the second half of the century, Britain experienced a consumer revolution, which was not just limited to a small upper class as in previous centuries, but also was broad enough to have a significant impact on economic growth and thus played an important role in the British industrial revolution.

About half the book consists of essays by McKendrick. In an opening essay he argues that the late 18th century developed a new materialistic attitude that accepted the acquisition of material goods as an honorable pursuit of pleasure and even of demonstrating sociability and virtue. He points for example

to Mandeville's praise of fashion and luxury in his famous *Fable of the Bees* and to Adam Smith's support for the proposition that the pursuit of profit by an individual provides for the economic growth that produces benefits for all. His other essays are on the growth of advertising, the role of fashion in stimulating demand, and on Josiah Wedgwood's sales and marketing techniques. John Brewer's section shows how pottery makers, printers, graphic artists, and pub owners used the growth of popular politics and agitation for reform in the late 18th century to increase their business. Finally, there are three chapters by Plumb on the commercialization of leisure in such areas as theater, spas, and horse racing. In an interesting chapter on the changing attitudes toward children during the period, he notes that the dramatic increase in the purchase of children's books, toys, and fashionable clothes produced a whole new category of consumption. In "Acceptance of Modernity," Plumb argues that the 18th century enthusiasm for manipulating nature, rooted in the popularization of ideas produced by the scientific revolution, led to a passion for the breeding and collection of decorative animals, the hybridization of plants, the popularization of gardening, and the assemblage of cabinets of curiosities. Plumb argues that the search for novelty, the exotic, the latest fashions and the acceptance of luxury and materialism all contributed to the creation of a consumer culture. What made these 18th century developments so important for economic growth was that its consumer culture was no longer confined to a small upper class, but was now prevalent among the growing middle ranks of society so that it became a major source of economic growth in the economy without which the industrial revolution would not have occurred in Britain.

Marshall, P. J. ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xxii, 639.

This is the second of a five volume multi-author work on the history of the British Empire. This volume contains twenty-six useful essays by major historians on such topics as Empire politics, economics, war, culture, particular regions, on the Empire's growth in the 18th century, its experience during and the consequences of the American Revolution, and its expansion, especially in Asia, during the wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. It was a series of wars throughout the 18th century against native peoples, the French and the Spanish that established Britain as the major colonial power in North America during the 18th century. The turning point in the conflict was the British victory in the Seven Years war, which left Britain, a latecomer to colonization, as by far the most important imperial power in North America. In an important chapter, Patrick O'Brien argues that, while the merchants,

manufacturers and skilled British labor force were the key forces, both in the colonies and the home country, in developing the economy of the early empire, its success in the 18th century also owed a great deal to the mercantilist policies and military efforts of the state. A coalition of merchants, manufacturers, and military and political leaders was able to use the fiscal and military power of the state to support their economic interests in British imperial expansion. Nonetheless, as these essays point out, and as the American Revolution demonstrated, there was no coherent and effective central state authority in Britain that was able to create a unified and effective imperial governing structure. Political authority remained largely in the hands of British citizens and their representatives in the colonies. Economic decisions and trade, despite the effort of the Navigation Acts to control them, were made by networks of entrepreneurs on both sides of the Atlantic in pursuit of profits.

Central to the economy of the British Atlantic Empire were plantation commodities, such as sugar and tobacco. David Richardson, Philip Morgan and Richard Sheridan have excellent chapters on the plantation complex while Daniel Richter treats the experience of Native Americans. The old argument that the profits from slavery and the plantation economy underwrote the industrial revolution Britain, first popularized by Eric Williams in 1944, is not supported in these essays. Instead, some of the essays lend support to the argument that Britain's success in international trade during this period was an important contributing factor in Britain's industrialization. While most of the volume deals with the Western Hemisphere, there are four excellent chapters on British expansion in Asia, especially the transformation of the East Indian Company's monopoly trading system into a territorial empire in India during the latter half of the 18th century. In addition there are interesting chapters on the role of religion in a commercial empire, the growth of the British Navy and the importance of Sea Power, the black experience in the Empire, the birth of the abolition of slavery movement, and the crisis of the American Revolution. The volume concludes with an excellent essay by P. J. Marshall noting that, although the wars with France between 1793 to 1815, as well as the East India Company's wars in India, vastly expanded the world-wide reach of the British Empire, the early 19th century Empire still lacked a coherent vision, was largely a consequence of opportunities seized on the spot, and did not result in the building of a central political and military imperial structure or a coherent set of economic policies during the period. The volume contains a useful chronology and each chapter includes a selected list of further reading on its topic.

Mathias, Peter. *The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914*, 2nd ed., London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Pp. xxii, 493. 26 figs. 11 tpls.

First published in 1969, this is a classic text on the British Industrial Revolution, which was widely used by university students well into 1990s. The 2001 edition, although fundamentally similar to the earlier edition, contains an interesting new preface by the author on the historiography of the subject. When Mathias first published this volume, the ‘new economic history,’ which uses theoretical mathematical economic models and complex statistical tools to explain economic history, was already challenging the more traditional analytical approach to the subject. This mathematical complexity produced a growing divide between economic historians who were primarily economists and those who were primarily historians. The result for the non-mathematically trained reader was that the econometric approach to economic history made the subject inaccessible. Mathias notes in his 2001 preface that, more recently, economic history has once again become more institutional in its approach while many of the conclusions of the new economic history have now been reintegrated into general accounts of the industrial revolution in a fashion that makes them more accessible to students. While very much an economic history, Mathias’ volume remains a sophisticated and excellent overview of the classic interpretation of the British Industrial Revolution that combines the literary tradition with quantitative economic analysis. When the book was first written, economists were searching for a model to help guide underdeveloped countries toward development. Mathias begins with a Prologue in which he warns that the search for the single most important cause for the Industrial Revolution, as in a mathematical equation, is impossible for such a deep and complex human phenomenon as the Industrial Revolution. Part I covers the period from 1700 to the early 19th century. Mathias argues that the Industrial Revolution built upon a long and complex development of the British economy, which accelerated and deepened during the late 18th and early 19th century to produce the first ‘industrial nation.’ While he mentions political, sociological, demographic, geographical and cultural factors, his emphasis is upon specifically economic factors. The book is organized topically with chapters on agriculture; economic policy, trade and transport; industrial growth and finance; working conditions; and the standard of living controversy. He argues that there is no consensus on the standard of living for the workers between 1790 and 1850, but that it improved after 1850. In Part II, he continues the story through the 19th century, with chapters on the railways, free trade, industrial organization, finance, the rising standard of living and labor organization. Overall, Mathias’ explanation of the British Industrial

Revolution is one that emphasizes the interdependence of many factors with special praise for the entrepreneurs. The book contains 39 useful statistical tables and charts.

Mokyr, Joel, *The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850* (2009), 564p.

Every generation rewrites history to reflect contemporary concerns. Mokyr's substantial study mirrors our fascination with information technology and sees ideas expressed in technology as the "lever of riches" in the British and European industrial revolution. This study is a comprehensive description of economic change and includes all the major topics that one would expect—technology, trade, agriculture, transport, mining, finance and credit, coinage, health and medicine, population, consumption, the labor movement, productivity, capital accumulation, patents, gender and family structure, poor relief, business and factory organization, political and economic institutions, social norms, living standards, social structure, slavery and its abolition, the move from protection to free trade, the growth of the national debt and taxation, the dramatic growth of cities and social unrest, the creation of parliamentary government, the growth of output in numerous sectors, and the development of new ones, such as railroads, steam power, and gas lighting. The book is, however, much more than an up to date and excellent description of all that changed during the period, and why we still call this the industrial *revolution* even though it took place over a century and a half. It is also a major modern reinterpretation.

Although he discusses traditional explanations of the industrial revolution, such as a favorable geography and easy access to natural resources, as well as an effective government and the prior existence of a middle class that promoted consumption, he insists that alongside these we must add the fundamental driving force behind all these changes, which for Mokyr is the intellectual environment of the Enlightenment.

During the last third of the 20th century, the periodization of the classic industrial revolution, approximately between about 1770 and 1830, has been dethroned by econometric research that showed economic growth was modest during this period. Mokyr, whose academic appointment is in an economics department, and whose early work owed a good deal to econometric research, accepts the lengthening of the period in which we should place the industrial revolution took place to include the entire 18th century. Most historians now agree that substantial economic growth did not occur until after 1820, and its impact was not felt

dramatically everywhere until the spread of the railways in the 1840s. Thus, the main problem for economic historians of the industrial revolution has become how to explain why the 18th century provided the preparation that made the more dramatic and widespread changes of the early 19th century possible. Mokyr argues that the key development was the Enlightenment's fascination with "useful knowledge." He explains how a "Baconian program" of empirical research expanded scientific knowledge, applied knowledge to practical problems, and then its diffusion that spread it throughout society.

Along with many other writers on the origin of the industrial revolution in Britain, he emphasizes that the consequences of the Revolution of 1688 made property more secure and established a stable and effective form of government that encouraged scientific experimentation, free communication, and a relatively open form of government, all of which encouraged the private pursuit of wealth. It established patent law and intellectual property rights, which seeded further innovation. From an economic perspective, better government was important in limiting the ability of "rent seekers" --an economist's euphemism for predators, pirates and parasites, and including many monarchs, aristocrats and foreign invaders--to inhibit economic growth. In 18th century Britain, the rent seeking activities of monopolists, combinations and restrictive regulations, which later was called "mercantilism," came under attack and were gradually replaced with what came to be called "economic liberty" and resulted in free trade and a relatively laissez faire government friendly to business interests by the early Victorian period. For Mokyr, however, having the 'right' institutions was not sufficient for sustained economic growth.

Mokyr argues that most economic historians, including free market economists, share Marx's materialist view that beliefs adjust themselves to economic interests, which themselves are essentially consequences of deeper forces, such as technology, demography, geography and other materialist forces. Others argue that ideas determine history. Mokyr insists that in reality the two forces work together in complex ways and, under the right circumstances, such as in 18th century Britain, this produces a "positive feedback loop" that was able to create the industrial revolution in Britain. His argument is not deterministic. Ultimately, he sees the British industrial revolution as contingent upon a fortuitous confluence of events. He notes that it is often argued that policy makers and rulers determine historical development, "but in the Industrial revolution the beliefs of intellectuals, scientists and skilled mechanics, inventors and entrepreneurs may

have mattered more.” Mokyr explains that economic growth, such as it was, before the mid-18th century was what we now call, after Adam Smith who described it, “Smithian growth,” chiefly consisting of the expansion of commerce, the growth of markets, and improvements in the allocation of resources. These economic gains were largely due to specialization and the division of labor. Such improvements were often also associated with industrial and technological improvements, but before the industrial revolution progress was primarily driven by institutional improvements and commerce. Its chief early beneficiaries were northern Italy, the Low Countries, southern Germany and England. What distinguished the Industrial revolution, according to Mokyr, was that it “placed technology as the main engine of economic change.” He acknowledges that 18th century entrepreneurs did not build directly upon great scientific breakthroughs or even dramatic technological advances, but many in business furthered what was often incremental “useful knowledge” out of their own curiosity and encouraged institutions that spread intellectual and technological innovations to a wider educated public. He explains that many of the “wave of gadgets,” which we associate with the classical industrial revolution, could have been achieved with the knowledge available around 1600. Much of the technological innovation that Mokyr discusses in detail in many sectors of the economy were not a result of what we would describe as science, but as useful knowledge and innovation. However, the relative importance of science to the productive economy kept growing during the late 18th century and became indispensable by the period of the second industrial revolution during the 1870s.

In an earlier study, *The Gift of Athena: The Historical Origin of the Knowledge Economy* (2002), Mokyr explained that the Enlightenment was a European phenomenon and that this was a key factor in the “great divergence,” or why Europe rather than Asia, had the first industrial revolution, but it does not explain why Britain, as opposed to the Dutch Republic or France, had the first industrial revolution. In *The Enlightened Economy* he makes the case of why the first industrial revolution took place in Britain, but also suggests that different circumstances might have produced the first industrial revolution on the continent. He describes “Britain’s position as the lead car in the Occident Express that gathered steam in the nineteenth century and drove away from the rest of the world,” but then admits that his explanation does not fully explain the source of the locomotive’s power. Mokyr’s study is at its best when he explains the linkage between ideas, invention, and the role of technology in slowly, unevenly, and in fits and starts

laid the groundwork for the industrial revolution. His book pays much less attention to how the workers experienced industrialization or to the growth of class conflict and social unrest. He does argue that the standard of living and the quality of life for the common people before 1850 supports a moderately pessimistic interpretation. Critics have argued that Mokyr's book is another example of Western triumphalism and an ultimately unproven assertion of the triumph of ideas and a hymn to Western exceptionalism in science and technology. Mokyr, however, is very aware of this criticism and has provided a learned, masterful and well-written analysis with fascinating detail that provides a persuasive modern argument for his thesis.

Morgan, Kenneth, *The Birth of Industrial Britain: Social Change, 1750-1850*, Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2004. Pp. vi, 171.

This is a volume in the well-regarded "Seminar Studies in History" series. The purpose of these is to provide a scholarly but relatively brief introduction to the state of knowledge on an important subject written by an expert in the field. The volumes include suggestions for further reading and a selection of primary documents. The focus of this volume is on the social changes brought about by the industrial revolution. There are chapters on work and leisure, living and health standards, religion and society, popular education, the old and new poor law, popular protest, and crime, justice and punishment. The documents are well chosen and provide a handy collection of primary sources for teaching. Morgan concludes that by the early nineteenth century factories were prominent in the Midlands, north of England and lowland Scotland but relatively uncommon in other industrializing parts of the country. At the same time, the period also saw major changes in cottage and handicraft industries in other parts of the country. On the standard of living question, Morgan concludes that "a fair case could be made for a deterioration in the environmental and epidemiological context of most people's lives during early industrialization...but there is no evidence of wholesale deterioration in wages for the entire working population in the first half of the nineteenth century." He argues that increased population, social and geographical mobility, combined with periodic agricultural and industrial slumps, brought increased insecurity for most workers. At the same time, the New Poor Law saw a decreased expenditure on poor relief and stricter regulations made public assistance more difficult to obtain. Despite the social unrest of the early nineteenth century, he argues that there was never a serious threat of a radical revolution. He notes that it was during the early Victorian period, despite the fact that workers were excluded from the franchise, that the state began to lay the foundation of a system of state regulation of industry and public

improvements which, combined with the growth of labor unions and economic growth, began to improve the living and working conditions of the people.

Morgan, Kenneth, *The Birth of Industrial Britain: Economic Change 1750-1850*, London and New York: Longman, 1999. Pp. vi, 147.

This is a volume in the well-regarded “Seminar studies in History” series. The purpose of which is to provide a scholarly but relatively brief introduction to the state of knowledge on an important subject written by an expert in the field. The volumes include suggestions for further reading and a selection of primary documents. The focus of this volume is on the economics of the classic period of the British industrial revolution. The major topics covered are population growth; agriculture; domestic industry and proto-industrialization; factory production and the textile industries; coal and iron; entrepreneurs, capital, and business enterprises; foreign trade; and internal transport. Instead of favoring a particular factor as the key to the origin of the British industrial revolution, he stresses that British industrialization was built on an advanced organic pre-industrial economy with a productive agriculture, which experienced an increase of population through earlier marriages and greater fertility. Demographic growth provided for greater labor mobility, which allowed for the expansion of both factory and handicraft industries. The transition from an organic economy to a mineral fueled economy gave Britain an advantage over its rivals, such as the Low Countries and France, especially during the period of war and revolution between 1780 and 1815. Morgan does not see the state as having played a significant role in promoting economic growth other than in its military defense of the country, the provision of a stable functioning government and a framework in which entrepreneurs could develop their businesses. The country’s infrastructure, such as the turnpikes, canals and railways, were built with private money within the context of Parliamentary right of way regulation. He also does not assign a leading role to British exports as a major cause of the industrial revolution. Despite the fact that economic growth rates were modest for most of this period, and that only some regions of the country experienced rapid economic growth and fundamental physical changes during the period, Morgan argues that the cumulative effects of economic growth during the period were sufficiently large and original to be labeled a revolution. The book contains suggestions for further reading and an excellent section of documents useful for teaching.

O'Brien, Patrick and Roland Quinault, eds., *The Industrial Revolution and British Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. ix, 295.

This volume of essays was published to honor the career of Max Hartwell, whose 1971 study, *The Industrial Revolution and Economic Growth*, helped reinvigorate the study of Britain's industrial revolution by focusing on the economics of growth rather than emphasizing its social consequences or the development of particular industries and their organization. Ironically, a good deal of the economic history of the industrial revolution written between 1970 and 1990 came to the conclusion that Britain's overall economic growth rates during the classic period of industrialization were relatively low. This led many to argue that we should abandon the very idea of a British industrial revolution for this period. Hartwell, however, was also a social historian and he continued to argue that the industrial revolution had an enormous impact on British society during the period. The topics of these essays support this view and can serve as a good introduction to its broad social context. In addition to excellent historiographical essays by Patrick K. O'Brien and Gary Hawke on interpretations of the industrial revolution, there are chapters on women in the workforce, the role of religion in the preservation of political stability, on sex and desire during the period, the political preconditions for the industrial revolution, the industrial revolution and parliamentary reform, technological and organizational change in industry, and the impact of industrialization on the more economically marginal regions of Britain. During the last twenty years, it is these broader social topics, plus the subjects of gender, consumption, and a renewed interest in why the first industrial revolution was British, which have seen the most interest and research.

Ormrod, David, *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650-1770* (2003), 400p.

Ormrod argues that the British industrial revolution should no longer be regarded as the critical moment in European economic history. Instead, he suggests that the great divergence, as historians have called Europe's emergence as the world's most dynamic economy between *ca.* 1600 and 1850, took place not in one country or all of Europe, but in the region around the North Sea. Within this region, it was the Dutch Republic, which was the most dynamic, enjoyed the highest standard of living, and dominated the European and international trade system for most of the 17th century. As de Vries and de Woude (see this bibliography below) have shown, it was the first 'modern economy.' While the Dutch retained their high standard of living, the British caught up with the Dutch standard of living, took over Dutch leadership in international trade during the early 18th century, and then went on to create the first industrial economy based not on

organic but on the mineral resources of coal and iron by the early 19th century. The latter was Britain's real innovation but, according to Ormrod, England, especially the southeast of England, laid the economic foundation for this during the early modern period by an 'apprenticeship,' as a prominent economic historian, Charles Wilson, argued a generation earlier. For Ormrod, international trade was a key factor in the origin of the industrial revolution and it was Britain's success in trade that made possible the British industrial revolution. His book seeks to explain in considerable detail that Britain's success in international trade was not won by peaceful competition alone but through mercantilist practices and coercion.

England's growth before 1750 was especially centered in the southern and eastern part of the country, especially London and the Home Counties, all of which were dependent upon the markets of the Low Countries and Europe. Early in the 17th century, English-Dutch competition involved localized issues. It was not until the war with Spain ended in 1647-48 that competition between England and the Republic became central. Cromwell's Navigation Act of 1651 marked the beginning of England's effort to free it from Amsterdam's control of international trade. Subsequent legislation prohibited the indirect supply of Baltic goods to England and, according to Ormrod, from 1670 Amsterdam was no longer an entrepôt for Baltic goods for England. The Navigation Acts placed a greater emphasis on the colonial trade and the Anglo-Dutch naval wars saw the theater of naval operations extended to the West Indies and New Netherland. After the Dutch loss of its colonies in Brazil and the taking of New Amsterdam by the English, Dutch trade across the Atlantic, while still important, was reduced as Dutch merchants found themselves increasingly dependent on British commercial networks.

The Dutch trade in Asia had always been more important than its Atlantic trade but British mercantilist legislation, rather than simply economic competition, reduced Dutch access to the growing wealth of the Atlantic world. Ormrod concluded: "The Europeanization of America and its incorporation into the world economy marks one of the great discontinuities in global history, and it was England's role to complete what the older colonial powers had had initiated." Ormrod emphasizes that the purpose of Britain's three 17th century naval wars with the Dutch was not just to achieve dominance in trade but to shift the processing and re-export of international trade goods from Amsterdam to London, for this produced a much greater and a more fundamental expansion of manufacturing, employment and finance. When William of Orange successfully invaded England in 1688, his purpose was not just to win the English crown

for himself and his wife, Mary, but also to use English resources in his wars with France. One of the ironic consequences of this was that the English created a financial system based upon the Dutch model and that a great deal of capital moved to London after 1694. Ormrod's book tells the story of English-Dutch trade competition in considerable detail but he never loses sight of his larger argument that it was power that helped plenty come to England: "It was the mercantilist state which decisively shifted the balance of power and influence towards London, through the creation of a *national* entrepôt within an imperial trading network."

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Parthasarathi, Prasannan, *Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia did not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600-1850* (2011), 365p.

The main contribution of this book to the ‘Great Divergence’ debate of why Europe, which had long been relatively backward compared to the most developed parts of Asia, became so much richer than Asia is its emphasis on India, since most of the debate has focused on comparing China with Britain during the period. While Parthasarathi is also a critic of the Eurocentric interpretation, which argues that there was something profoundly different about Europe that explains its divergence from Asia--such as the scientific revolution, the Protestant ethic, its system of government, its economic institutions, or its natural resources—his analysis is less focused on materialist factors, such as geography and natural resources, which is associated with the California School’s approach to the topic. Parthasarathi uses his earlier study, *The Transition to a Colonial Economy: Weavers, Merchants and kings in South India, 1720-1800* (2001), to argue that during the early modern period there was a prosperous and competitive textile industry in India that exported fine manufactured cotton products to the Ottoman Empire, China, Africa and Europe until it was destroyed by European mercantilist measures. He argued that Indian textile workers had a high standard of living and enjoyed better working conditions than textile workers in Britain. In this study he expands this argument to other industries. He also devotes a good deal of space to showing that India was not backward in science and technology during the period, but had a vibrant culture that valued science, scholarship and technology, was open to ideas from elsewhere, and made important scientific and technological contributions during the period. A crucial part of his argument is that there were many similarities between Europe and Asia in terms of resources and economic institutions. However, Europe and Asia faced different challenges. One of these was Asia’s very large population and its preoccupation with dealing with famines. Even when they faced similar challenges, Europe and Asia responded to these in dissimilar ways and thus their economies diverged. Parthasarathi spends a great deal of time on Britain and argues that it faced two fundamental challenges during the period, competition from India in textiles and a shortage of wood. He sees the response of the British state to these challenges as fundamental.

The author’s assumes that coal, steam power and textiles were fundamental to the industrial revolution in Britain and has less to say about other industries and Britain’s long early modern economic development before steam power and textiles became such a large part of the economy. He argues that the shortage of wood in Britain led it to develop its easily accessible and abundant coal supplies and this switch from an organic to a mineral based energy source was

not only more efficient, but led to the development of steam power, which was developed initially primarily to drain mines. He explains that the British state was crucial in keeping the domestic price of coal relatively low through such devices as export taxes, encouraging infrastructure for its transportation, and providing legal and economic incentives for its exploitation. In addition to the fact that Asian coal was not located as conveniently to population and production centers as in Britain, he explains why the Chinese and Japanese did not emphasize the development of underground coalmines to solve their energy problems. Parthasarathi argues that Britain's international trade system became heavily dependent upon textiles in the eighteenth century and had to face the fact that India was the most important and innovative textile producer in the world at the time. He suggests that the Britain developed its own textile industry by learning from India, especially in cotton, and that the state made possible British dominance in the industry by first protecting it as an infant industry, and then by aiding the manufacturers to discipline the labor force that worked in the new textile factories. He goes on to argue that the protection of this industry also led to a diffusion of skills, technology, and factory organization to other industries. Moreover, the British state also aided the development of other industries, such as iron, through mercantilist measures. For Parthasarathi the contrast between the British state's active role in promoting industry with the failure of the Mughal Empire to protect its important textile industry is central to his argument. Parthasarathi concludes that when the British textile industry became highly competitive during the nineteenth century, Britain adopted free trade while at the same time it systematically subjugated the Indian economy to prevent its industrialization. The book's thesis is controversial but it is a well-written contribution to the Great Divergence debate and it places Indian data at the center of the debate.

Pomeranz, Kenneth, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (2000), 382p.

This study provided the title of "Great Divergence" for the contemporary debate about why Europe rather than highly developed areas of Asia experienced the first industrial revolution and why the West as a whole became so rich. It rejects the Eurocentric argument that Europe's economic precociousness was a consequence of exceptional factors such as its scientific and technological superiority, a particular demographic pattern of nuclear families with later marriages, superior economic and political institutions, or an especially aggressive and

imperialist disposition to exploit the rest of the world. Pomeranz acknowledges the vital role of “internally driven European growth but emphasizes how similar these processes were to processes at work elsewhere, especially in East Asia until almost 1800.” However, internal growth factors could only have achieved Europe’s success in the context of “Europe’s privileged access to overseas resources.” He notes that much of the existing literature on the subject has been either about why European growth was largely internal, what economists call *endogenous* growth, or especially from outside force, called *exogenous* growth. Pomeranz offers a comparative general economic history of both internal and external developments that emphasizes ecological and geographical factors. His comparisons are not just between Europe and Asia, or between countries, since such comparisons are merely averages that obscure developments in unusual areas. Instead, he compares regions in Asia with comparable regions in Europe.

In recent decades the origin of Europe’s modern economic growth, especially for northwestern Europe has been pushed further and further back into the seventeenth and even the medieval period. Pomeranz points out, however, that it was large-scale industrial capitalism that created the great divergence and this was not fully developed until the mid-nineteenth century. He doubts that the Europe’s earlier essentially proto-industrial economy and its commercial and economic institutions were more likely by themselves to produce an industrial revolution than comparable regions in Asia. Moreover, he holds that European industrialization in the early 19th century was still almost entirely limited to Britain and should not be seen as dependent upon general European conditions. According to Pomeranz, Europe did not have an advantage in physical capital over many other large Asian economies. It was not freer from Malthusian population pressures and important areas in Asia were at least as successful in limiting fertility. He also rejects the notion that Europe was technologically more innovative and sophisticated than leading Asian economic regions. He argues that before about 1800 European markets, including its labor markets, were probably less competitive than those of China. He also discusses the role of women and children in the labor market and suggests that Chinese families appear to have used similar strategies that Europeans to maximize their labor and income, The latter has been described by Jan de Vries for Europe as an “industrious revolution” (see the bibliographical entry below). He concludes that “core regions in China and Japan circa 1750 seem to resemble the most advanced parts of Western Europe,

combining sophisticated agriculture, commerce and mechanized industry in similar, arguably even more fully realized, ways.”

In Part II, he discusses the role of consumer demand in promoting economic growth. He argues that Europe, China and Japan may have been quite different in the level of consumption from the rest of the world but that they were not very different from each other. In all three areas increased consumer demand was able to increase the supply and production of consumer goods. However, Europeans did have the advantage of extra-European supplies, such as New World plantations that produced sugar and tobacco and New World silver, for which there was great demand in Asia. These products allowed Europeans to consume many Asian luxury goods. Although he concedes that parts of Europe, especially northwest Europe, had an advantage in the security of property and capital, and that it may have enjoyed lower interest rates, he does not see a significant advantage in either available capital or the forms of business organizations between Europe and Asia. Pomeranz argues that during the early modern period neither capital nor labor were particularly scarce. The real restraint was land and natural resources. To some extent capital and labor could produce more land, through reclamation and fertilization for example, and resources, but before the extensive use of fossil fuels the ability of capital and labor to substitute for land and resources could not by itself solve the ecological bottlenecks faced by the most developed pre-industrialized regions. According to Pomeranz, “only in overseas colonization and *armed* trading did Europe’s financial institutions” and business organizations enjoy an advantage over Asia.” Europe’s long distance trading companies, backed by government sanctioned monopolies, could afford large-scale investment overseas backed by armed force.

In Part III, Pomeranz examines the ecological restraints on further economic development in each of the most developed proto-industrial economies. These constraints were not serious enough to produce food famines, but were especially felt in wood for fuel, building supplies, fiber and threats to soil fertility. For the more advanced economies long distance trade only supplied a partial solution to these problems because the political economies of less developed regions were too poor to provide enough effective demand for the exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials. Moreover, the cost of transport before steam power was too high to move enough bulky primary products to solve the problem. The solution for Europe, according to Pomeranz, was to solve its resource constraints by switching from wood to coal as its primary source of energy and by its capture of the resources of the Western Hemisphere. Moreover,

another critical aspect of early modern European economic growth was its use of African slaves in the early economic development of the New World. Slavery in other developed regions of the world was more limited and had fewer economic benefits. Since the European plantation economies bought slaves in Africa with manufactured goods, and the plantations in the Caribbean bought grain and timber from North America, which in turn bought manufactured goods from Europe, the Europeans were able to expand their markets for manufactured goods. He argues that the flow of resources to Europe from both free and slave labor during the colonial provided a framework “that accelerated throughout the nineteenth century despite independence and emancipation.” By contrast, other highly developed regions in Asia, especially in China, which had at least eight of these regions that were each as large as European states, became stuck in a proto-industrial trap during the nineteenth century.

One of Pomeranz’ crucial assumptions is that proto-industrialization can lead to a Malthusian trap. Proto-industrialization is the non-mechanized production of goods by rural labor organized by merchant-manufacturers for distant markets. Pomeranz explains that rapid population growth was associated with Asian proto-industrialization. It produced a vicious circle of very low piece-rate wages, which forced workers to increase production in order to survive, and which in turn lowered wages. An increase in food prices because of population growth, a decline of product prices due to lower product demand, or a shortage of land and industrial resources increased misery and inhibited further economic growth. In short, according to Pomeranz, for Europe, the New World, combined with Europe’s switch to coal, made possible the rise of the West to economic pre-eminence in the nineteenth century.

Prak, Maarten, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century* (2005), 317p.

This is the best brief history of the Dutch Republic during its Golden Age available in English. It was first published in 2002 Dutch as *Gouden Eeuw: Het Raadsel van de Republiek* (*Golden Century: The Enigma of the Republic*). Diane Webb ably translated the book and Prak added material for the English edition, including an excellent section on Dutch philosophy and science. The subtitle, which was only retained for the opening chapter, is important because it says a great deal about Prak’s approach. How a Republic of about two million people became a leading European economic, political, military, and cultural power with a worldwide trading empire was a source of wonder to contemporaries. Historians have failed to agree on a common

explanation for the Republic's spectacular success. Some historians, especially social science oriented historians who sought an overall theory of Dutch precociousness, emphasized the modernity of the Dutch achievement in economic, social and cultural terms. They especially focus on the modernity of its religious toleration, financial and economic sophistication, the professionalism and organization of its army and navy, its path-breaking inductive contributions to science and innovations in philosophy and the understanding of religion that laid the groundwork for a radical Enlightenment. Prak, on the other hand argues that these achievements were not radical breakthroughs that would inevitably lead to modernity but were by-products of a society that was a mixture of the old and the new. He sees these achievements as unplanned and as accidental consequences of particular historical and social contexts.

Prak begins with an historical account of the late Medieval Netherlands as a bundle of loosely organized provinces tied to the Holy Roman Empire, an emerging Burgundian state that fails to survive because of the accidents of inheritance, and then as a wealthy Northern portion of the Hapsburg Empire. During the sixteenth century the latter sought to extract revenue from the region, while attempting to exert more bureaucratic control over a traditionally loosely and locally governed region, while at the same time it attempted to beat back the forces of Protestant dissent. After a brief discussion of the Dutch Revolt, the major part of the book is a description of developments in four key areas. He explains how the Dutch Republic was created through "war without end" and emphasizes that, while the decentralized nature of the Republic was a consequence of the eighty years of military and political conflict with Spain, the new state nonetheless was able to create effective modern military and financial systems and an innovative federal government structure that at crucial times of crisis allowed the province of Holland to impose its will upon the other provinces. The second major section discusses the creation of a market economy and the forging of a dominant worldwide trading network. The third section discusses the unity and discord that characterized its largely urban and burgher dominated society, which provided a hospitable environment for the growth of a market economy and social peace, despite a strong tradition of urban riot. Strong corporate social institutions, such as guilds, citizen militias, independent social organization, and the churches provided order and discipline. The final section of the book deals with religious pluralism, innovations in science and philosophy, and the development of a remarkable Dutch school of painting, urban planning and design. Prak's writing is enlivened by his use of many well-chosen anecdotes that illustrate

his major points. The book contains a good discussion of further reading instead of a traditional bibliography. Prak's study succeeds in being an excellent introduction to the subject for those without much background knowledge of the topic and is solidly rooted in modern scholarship.

Price, J. L., *Dutch Society, 1588-1713* (2000), 306p.

This is the fourth book by J. L. Price, who is now an emeritus Reader in History at the University of Hull, on Dutch history and culture during its Golden Age. His books are good places to start for those without a great deal of background in the subject and are widely used as required reading in university courses in early modern European history. The first was *Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic during the Seventeenth Century* (1974) and concentrated on seventeenth Dutch cultural, linguistic and artistic achievements. *Dutch Culture in the Golden Age*, published in 2011, also focused on culture and includes more material on science. *Holland and the Dutch Republic: The Politics of Particularism* (1994) discussed the novel political system of the Republic. *Dutch Society, 1588-1713* emphasizes Dutch social history of the period. It is in excellent synthesis of contemporary scholarship on the subject. Price writes well and he does not burden his work with the social jargon and theories of social history that is regrettably common in contemporary social history. A good deal has been published recently about the economic success of the Republic, which, despite its modest population of about two million, was the pre-eminent European economy and the world's leading trading nation during the seventeenth century. As many writers have acknowledged, it was the first 'modern economy' in the sense that it was first to achieve sustained economic growth and its citizens to this day enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world. There has also been a good deal of recent writing on Dutch naval and military success during its Golden Age and the English seem finally to have acknowledge that William of Orange and Mary Stuart's seizure of the English crown in 1689 was a result of a huge and successful invasion of England.

Much less, however, has been written in English about Dutch seventeenth century social history. Contemporary Dutch society is often labeled today as one of the world's most liberal societies. While the latter is highly debatable, and Dutch society did not have this liberal reputation during the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, there was wide European agreement during the seventeenth century that the Dutch Republic had a remarkable level of religious toleration and was dominated not by an aristocracy but what later came to be called the

bourgeoisie. Price argues that the Republic's society, although a mixture of old and new institutions and customs, can rightly be categorized as an early European capitalist society that provided a model for the future. He argues that modern research contests one of the key historiographical traditions of Dutch history, which saw the seventeenth century as its Golden Age and relegates all that came after to an anti-climax. In terms of the standard of living and the quality of life, however, the real Dutch golden age of the Dutch has been the period of prosperity and peace since WW II.

What was golden about its earlier Golden Age was its precociousness. Moreover, Price argues that this preceded the seventeenth century and the period of its revolt against Spain. Already at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the maritime-provinces, and especially Holland, had a population that was 50% urban, a percentage not reached in England until 1850 and later elsewhere in Europe. Holland's rural areas were already a market society in 1600 with a capitalist agriculture and a good deal of rural industry. The inland areas of the north and east saw the bulk of the disruption from the eighty years war with Spain and remained relatively more rural and traditional compared to Holland, although quite prosperous by general European standards. Price argues that Holland's economic and social pre-eminence should be dated from about 1590 to 1670. From the latter date, economic leadership gradually passed to England, although the average Dutch standard of living was not surpassed by Britain until at least the very late eighteenth century. Price notes that despite Dutch wealth, the lower levels of the working classes remained relatively poor and real poverty increased in the second half of the seventeenth century. He also points out society made little progress against disease during its Golden Age and in this sense it was fundamentally different from modern society. It was, however, modern in the sense that it was an urbanized capitalist society with a modern class structure two hundred years earlier than the rest of Western Europe. It was also modern in the sense that independent craftsmen and small landholders lost their independence and became employees of capitalist industrialists and farmers. While other Europeans marveled at the role of women in the economy, many were, for example, active in retail trade, most women worked at menial jobs with low pay. Daughters were dependent on their fathers and legally married women were second-class citizens. In the upper levels of society women were already retreating into the domestic sphere, a characteristic that was 'modern' until the second-half of the twentieth century. Two areas in which society was also much more modern than the rest of Europe was the relative religious

toleration prevalent in the Republic and the size of the art market that catered to a wide segment of society. Price concludes that this ‘bourgeois society’ was an island of relative modernity in a much more traditional Europe and this was especially so in the maritime regions and in Holland.

Rowen, H., ed., *The Low Countries in Early Modern Times: A Documentary History* (1972), 291p.

Herbert H. Rowen was a leading scholar of the history of the Early Modern Low Countries in the United States and spent most of his career as a Professor of Early Modern European History at Rutgers University. This volume of selected and edited primary documents on the early modern history of the Low Countries is the only work available in English that treats the entire period (there is also a collection of documents that deals exclusively with the revolt against Spain, *Texts Concerning The Revolt of the Netherlands* (1974), by E.H. Kossmann and A. F. Mellink). Most of the documents range in size from a page or two to more substantial selections from larger sources. Most of the selections were translated from the Dutch or French by Rowen. The documents include personal letters from archives and published sources, official state papers, selections from contemporary and early historical accounts, and selections from literature and pamphlets from the period. He arranged the edited selections in sections on land and people, the reign of Charles V, the origins of the “Troubles” (as the revolt of the Netherlands was called in the period), demands for religious and political liberty, the creation of the Dutch Republic, political and religious conflict during the early Republic, economic and international issues, the tensions between Dutch Republicanism and the Princes of Orange in the life of the Republic, the decline of the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century, and the growing separation between the Republic and the Southern provinces that remained under Hapsburg control and eventually became the state of Belgium. The book begins with an excellent brief introduction to the subject as a whole and includes short essays before each section as well as brief introductions for each document. The result of Rowen’s careful scholarship is a volume that can be read by non-specialists and provides an excellent source for documents on the history of the Low Countries. The material is well suited to teaching about this important subject in early modern European history.

Schama, S., *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (1987), 698p.

This substantial and richly illustrated book (with 314 black and white illustrations) began as Schama's lectures at Harvard. The book was widely reviewed in the popular press and sold an unusually large number of copies for a scholarly work on the seventeenth century cultural history of a small but historically very important European country. During the seventeenth century the English and the French, who were jealous of the spectacular economic success of the Dutch Republic, worried about its naval power, and feared that its burgher dominated Republican form of government might be contagious, lampooned the Dutch with a caricature of being stingy, stodgy, plodding, and single-minded accumulators of money. Schama's lively and entertaining book dispels those myths. His title suggests that the Dutch of the Golden Age were a bit embarrassed about their wealth and did not display it conspicuously as the wealthy did in other European countries. They did, however, enjoy it and created a distinctive 'burgerlijk' culture that did not fit the stereotype of the popular interpretations of Max Weber's thesis about the connections between the growth of Protestantism and Capitalism offers. Schama, Influenced by the French Annales School of historiography and the work of anthropologists on social relations, believes that societies are defined by ideas and perceptions. He argues that national identities are real and can be identified. He observes that are formed "by an array of beliefs locked together in relational patterns." He admits that his method is "shameless eclecticism." He uses a wealth of images and objects—especially paintings, drawings, etchings, woodcuts, decorative arts, and architecture—as well as many literary sources, published letters and diaries, a modest number of archival sources, and many obscure nineteenth century secondary sources to explore the social and cultural history of the period through a wealth of fascinating and unusual stories. His interpretation of Dutch culture is not especially about the theater, music or literature of the elite. Nor is it about ideology, or economic and political culture. Instead, he emphasizes such topics as how they raised and educated their children, the lives of domestic servants and prostitutes, relations between masters and servants, the domestic roles of women, care of the old, and attitudes toward the sick, orphans and the poor. Some of his chapter section and chapter headings demonstrate the range of his topics: "Feast, Fasting and Timely Atonement," "Whales on the Beach," "Between Mars and Mercury," "In the realm of Queen Money," "Housewives and Hussies," "In the Republic of Children," "Inside, Outside," "Doors; and "Worms." Schama

believes that ethical and prudential conventions define Dutch life more than material and economic conditions. He argues that a broad section of the population did well out of capitalism and that society was unified by common customs and conventions. He does discuss outsiders, such as gypsies and homosexuals, but insists that the majority of the poor and less fortunate were accepted in as part of Dutch society and shared its national identity.

The central argument of the book is that the chief characteristic of Golden Age Dutch culture was moderation, a balance between social contradictions and between excess and abstention. Schama seeks to explain “how cultural norms that the Dutch community took as their rule book was generated from their encounter between apparently irreconcilable imperatives.” In other words, they sought to live both ethically and well. He argues that “the Dutch economy in its prime did not then turn on the habit of thrift, observing “that there is as much reason to describe it as a spend-and-prosper economy as a save-and-prosper economy.” The Dutch often used the symbolism of water to explain moderation and balance. On the one hand, the sea and their location on Europe’s most important delta gave them an opportunity to prosper, while at the same time they had to constantly protect themselves from floods. Ostentatious display of wealth was seen as an *overvloed* (a flood). While one can point to some large, luxurious and richly decorated houses, such as on hose on the *Gouden Bocht* of the *Heerengracht* (the Golden Bend of the Gentlemen’s canal) in Amsterdam, and to the country houses on the river Vecht outside of the city, the houses and estates of most wealthy Dutch burghers were modest in size and ornamentation compared to those of the rich in neighboring countries. Inside their houses the Dutch displayed their wealth with an abundance of furniture, carpets, paintings, maps, silver, books and cabinets of curiosities from all over the world.

Schama goes to some length to explain that “Dutch moralists (exclusively male) seemed insistent that this commonwealth stood or fell by the untarnished virtue of women.” Reviewers have noted that this was not unique to Dutch society and similar sentiments were expressed in England and other European societies. This, and his many other generalizations about Dutch culture and identity, points to a general problem with his argument. Are his conclusions about Dutch culture uniquely Dutch, and are they representative of Dutch culture as a whole? He states that “Dutch culture was the property of all sorts and social conditions” and describes it as the culture of “a *brede middenstand*,” or what the English call the ‘middling sort.’ Although he concedes that it was the burghers who “gave shape, perspective and meaning to the rush of

historical experience with which the Netherlands were beset,” he concludes, that Golden Age Dutch culture was a unified and shared culture that was tied together with a common patriotism and shared by almost everyone in society. He does not label it a ‘bourgeois’ culture or a ‘middle class culture, as is commonly done, and does not explicitly consider the possibility that material and economic differences created fairly distinct elite and popular cultures. Critics have noted that Schama ignored a great deal of Dutch scholarship that pointed out that there were serious social tensions between the comfortable burghers and the poor, that there were indeed many who did not share in the benefits of Dutch capitalism, and, as non-citizens, did not share in the famous charity institutions of the Republic. As one critic noted, Schama tends to discuss the iconography of Dutch art and literature, and then conclude that these perceptions about Dutch culture reflect social reality. To put it another way, Schama takes the perceptions of social relations held by the well to do as the reality of Dutch social relations and culture.

Many historians use works of art as illustrations and read them at face value. Schama, however, has read widely in the art history of the Dutch Golden Age and is well aware of the debate among Dutch art historians about the balance between precise observation and symbolic connotation in Dutch iconographic studies. He subscribes to the theory of the dominance of symbols in Dutch art rather than to the view that the iconic contribution of Dutch art of the period is realistic description, or what has been called “the art of describing.” He argues that the representation of the poor, the miserable, and those that misbehave in Dutch pictures shows that the unfortunate are not outcasts in society. Others might argue that presence of the losers of Dutch capitalism in art represents the propensity of the prosperous Dutch bourgeoisie to use the poor to demonstrate their own virtue and success.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Schama’s thesis that Dutch culture of the *brede middenstand* dominated society and constituted a balanced moderation between virtue and the acquisition of wealth, this book is worth reading. Schama is a marvelous, entertaining and enlightening storyteller. The value of the book lies in the details and the stories. He has a wonderful ability to choose interesting and often surprising things and people to examine the customs of everyday life, the perceptions of fascinating characters, and his always thought provoking reading of the meaning of artistic works. The book includes a valuable bibliographical guide for further exploration of the mentality of the Dutch Golden Age.

Smith, Woodruff, *Consumption and the Making of Respectability, 1600-1800* (2002), 339p.

This is a good introduction to the burgeoning literature on the connection between consumption and the origin of the industrial revolution in northwestern Europe. Today we are painfully aware that the consumption of consumer goods, rather than just necessities, drives the economy. However, if we look at the early modern European economy, we see a world where there was relatively little economic surplus after satisfying the basic needs of the population. In order to explain the industrial revolution, economic historians have emphasized advances in the production of goods, which increased income and subsequently increased the consumption of goods. Smith boldly proclaims in this study what few of the many studies on consumption only implied: that the increased consumption of goods between 1600 and 1800 was the primary reason for the economic growth that resulted in the industrial revolution. His book aims to provide an overall theoretical framework for this claim. Unlike economic historians, who can tie their history to a well-developed framework of economic growth theory, there is no comparable set of social theories that describes social and cultural motivation upon which most social historians can agree. Smith does point us to social theories about the consumption of luxury and status goods, but in the end his evidence is chiefly based upon the large body secondary works on the 'consumer revolution.' Most of his primary sources are writers from the period, such as Defoe, Franklin, Pepys and many others. He also uses a number of Dutch and French sources. This makes this study particularly useful, since the increase in consumption was not just an English but also a northwestern European phenomenon. Moreover, many of the new consumption goods that he discusses were internationally traded goods.

Central to the idea of a consumer revolution between 1600 and 1800 is the notion that increased prosperity was producing a new elite, such as merchants, manufacturers, traders, professionals and prosperous farmers. He does not call this a middle class, since this is a 19th century formulation inappropriate for the earlier period, but these social groups did have surplus income to spend on luxuries. Smith does not agree with those who have argued that their increased consumption was largely a matter of imitating the life styles and consumption of the aristocracy. Instead, he argues that they created new cultural contexts in which the motivation for the consumption of luxury goods was the conferring of respectability upon the consumer. This new elite did not just rely on the assertion of power and status and conspicuous consumption to drive home their power, but sought to become respected and respectable through endowing their pursuit of profit with moral value and demonstrating their status with respectable forms of consumption. The author, who has also written about international trade, discusses the consumption of such new luxury goods as tea, coffee, sugar, spices, tobacco, cotton

textiles, and ceramics. His chapters explain how the consumption of particular kinds of goods were endowed with characteristics that promoted gentility, luxury, rational masculinity, domestic femininity, and above all respectability. Central to Smith's argument is his claim that the consumption of goods must be seen in specific social contexts. The consumption of these goods did not just take place in the home, but also in public places such as coffee houses, theaters, shops, churches and city squares. The consumption of these luxuries gave their consumers an opportunity to forge a new identity for themselves, which not only distinguished them from the vast majority of the public below them, but also from the old elite above them who still governed their societies. While Smith does not succeed in providing a new theoretical framework for the patterns of consumption he describes, this is an informative and interesting introduction to the research on the consumer revolution as an important component in an explanation for the origin of the industrial revolution.

Tilly, Louise A. and Joan W. Scott, *Women, Work and Family*, (1987), 274p.

Originally published in 1978, this is one of the seminal works on the role of women during the transition from a pre-industrial to a modern economy. Tilly and Scott were trained as social historians and have made major contributions to both women's and social history. This is a comparative study of the work experience of women in England and France from the early 18th century to the 1960s. Its main focus is on paid work rather than the many unpaid tasks performed by women for their families. The study relies heavily upon the statistics and methods of demography and historical sociology. The book is clearly written, free of jargon and provides many interesting life stories to enliven the social science data. It is also relatively short so that it makes an excellent and accessible introduction for students on the topic. Although this is a survey of a large subject over a long period and two countries, and thus relies heavily upon many specialized local studies, the book also draws upon their own archival research in both France and England. Their identification of three major phases in the relationship between women, work and family has been widely adopted by later scholars of the subject.

According to Tilly and Scott, the first and preindustrial period, between 1700 and the late 18th century, was characterized by a *family economy*. The family was essentially a cooperative economic unit within which women combined tasks of economic production with domestic activity within the household. The authors emphasize that the work performed by women during this period was essential to the survival of families and that almost all women in society did economically productive work. The second period—the period of industrialization—is characterized as the *family wage economy*. During

this period many areas of economic production were removed from the household and this created serious problems for women who sought to combine domestic tasks with economically productive employment. The authors show that during the early phase of industrialization, the work of women, especially in the textile industry, was essential to the success of the nascent factory system. They note, however, that it was especially young and unmarried women who worked in these factories. Relatively few women, whether single or married, found work in the metal, mining, machinery and other expanding industries. Instead, industrialization relegated paid women's work to the margins of most of modern industry in sweatshops and to a dramatic expansion of domestic service. The final phase, from the late 19th century to the mid 20th century, is characterized as the *family consumer society*. During this period, women were drawn into the service economy, specialized in dealing with children, worked education and health care, and managed the family's consumption.

The overall conclusion of this pioneering study is that most women's employment did not benefit them directly during the period of the industrial revolution. Instead, it diminished their opportunities for productive and paid employment. Families adopted to the new wage economy by sending their children, including the girls, out for paid employment while the male head of household sought to obtain a 'family wage' and most married women earned whatever was possible in supplementary work inside or near the home. They suggest that, despite the suffering that the industrial revolution inflicted upon the lives of many women and children, both women and men were able to pursue family strategies that permitted a remarkable continuity in family life. At the same time, industrialization helped create ideals of domesticity, laws that controlled the working lives of women, new patterns of fertility and work, and the rise of the male demand for a "family wage." It was these basic factors that combined to construct the classic gender roles of 19th century industrial society and which retain a powerful influence in our own time. Tilly and Scott's framework has been amplified, developed and made much more nuanced by a great deal of subsequent research but this early framework on women, work and family remains highly influential in more recent interpretations and remains an excellent introduction to this topic.

Thompson, E. P. *The Making of the English Working Class*, London; Victor Gollancz, 1963). Pp. 848.

E. P. Thompson's study of the English working class between c. 1780 to 1832 remains the most important product of the influential British School of Marxist history. However, to label the book Marxist in order to dismiss it would be a serious error, since it is the most important example of a large, passionate, romantic and literary tradition of New Left history that flourished in the 1960s and 1970s,

which itself has its root in the earlier work of the Hammonds, the Webbs and R.H. Tawney. Thompson's explicit aim to recast this tradition in a Marxist framework in order to provide the British working class with a revolutionary tradition. His central argument is that the experience of the industrial revolution, combined with the example and English consequences of the French revolution, led to insurrectionary movements among the British working classes. According to Thompson, England's government, led by an unreformed landed and bourgeois elite, staged a counter-revolution, which brutally repressed the insurrectionists in order to forestall a revolution in England. For Thompson, it was this repression that created a revolutionary working-class consciousness among England's common people by 1832 (the date of the first Parliamentary Reform Bill). The problem with his thesis is that the subsequent history of the working-class in Britain, including during social unrest of the Chartist 1830s and 1840s, or the turbulent 1960s, has never been revolutionary. Despite his over-enthusiastic thesis, this is a very valuable work of social history because of its detailed narratives of the various insurrectionary movements during the period, as well as his broader picture of the lives and experience of the common people during the period. This is a substantial work of 848 pages in its first edition and over 900 in its second 1968 edition. Thompson is a master of an immense number and variety of literary sources. His method is to use working-class voices to tell their stories whenever possible and to quote the most outrageous middle and upper class voices, which sought to control the workers and to repress their efforts to improve their living conditions through organization, a great deal of rhetoric and sometimes revolutionary actions. This is the real value of the book.

In Part I, he explains the tradition of liberty, or 'the rights of free-born Englishmen,' as it existed in England during the 1780s. In Part II, he discusses the working lives of workers, including field laborers, artisans, and domestic industrial workers. He emphasizes that the goal of the English working classes was to maintain their traditional, regulated and "moral economy" in the face of the growing competition from new technology and new forms of capitalist business organization. He describes in great and sympathetic detail their leisure and personal relations, their rituals of communality, the role of religion, and their standard of living. In Part III, he explains how the political repression in England that followed the French Revolution, and during the more than two decades of war with France, led to the curbing of the liberties of the English people. He describes in great detail the many insurrectionary movements of the period between 1790 and 1820, such insurrectionary movements as the Black Lamp, the Cato Street Conspiracy, and many others. His extensive study of Luddism is especially valuable. He places the massacre at Peterloo in this broad revolutionary context

and provides a fascinating discussion of the radical culture that produced revolutionaries but also the peaceful utopian socialism of Owenism. Thompson's work helped revive the debate on the standard of living controversy during the 1960s by shifting its focus from the efforts of economic historians, who attempted to demonstrate statistically that the wages of workers in the new industrial order had improved during the period, to the issue of the quality of life of the workers, which Thompson argued, seriously deteriorated during the period and was further aggravated by political repression and the new discipline of machinery and the factory. Secondly, Thompson rejected the argument of many earlier Labour historians that the workers suffered passively under the new regime of laissez faire. Instead, he argued persuasively that there were indeed working class revolutionaries who sought to overthrow the government during the period. Thirdly, Thompson revived an important debate about the role of religion in British popular culture. One of the most valuable sections of the book is his use of the insights of sociology and social psychology to argue that Methodism sought to create a docile working class for the new industrial order. Whether one agrees with his overall thesis that a revolutionary working-class consciousness was created by 1832 or not, one can not deny that he has given a voice to the common people during a period of profound industrial and political change. As Thompson explained, he set out "to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' handloom-weaver, and even the deluded follower of Joanne Southcott [a millenarian Primitive Methodist], from the enormous condescension of posterity."

Tracy, J. D., ed., *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750* (1990), 442p. and *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750* (1991), 504p.

These two substantial volumes are a result of a 1987 conference at the University of Minnesota's respected Center of Early Modern History on long distance trade and state power in the shaping of the early modern global economy and trade. According to Tracy, these volumes, which contain twenty-four chapters produced by a broad range of experts in the field, are in part a response to the single author synthesis of Fernand Braudel's three volume *Commerce and Civilization* (1967-79, English translations 1981-84)) and Immanuel Wallerstein's four volume, *The Modern World System* (1974-2011). The *Merchant Empire* volumes provide well-written and accessible introductory chapters with a variety of perspectives on the major topics and

questions about Europe's rise to pre-eminence in world trade during the period. The *Rise of Merchant Empire: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World* volume concentrates on explaining the composition and growth of world-trade during the period and the merchants, both European and indigenous, who conducted it. Herman van der Wee explains the structural changes in Europe's long-distance trade from the south, especially around the Mediterranean, to the north, along the Atlantic coast, the Baltic and especially the North Sea, between 1350-1750. There are chapters on the growth and composition of trade, by Carla Rahn Phillips on the Iberian empires, 1450-1750; by Niels Steengard on the English and Dutch Republic before 1750; and by Paul Butel on the French. There is a useful chapter by Larry Neal comparing the Dutch and English East India Companies and a more specialized chapter by the leading expert on the competitiveness and profitability of Dutch shipping. It has often been said that the European and Asian trade networks were united by the flow of silver from the New World. Ward Barrett provides a chapter on world bullion flows from 1450 to 1800. The second part of this volume deals with merchant communities, with a chapter on the sociology of merchant communities in both Europe and Asia, and individual chapters on merchants in India, China, the caravan trade of central Asia and the Atlantic slave trade.

The second volume, *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, concentrates on "whether the eventual triumph of the Europeans can best be understood in terms of superior forms of business organization or superior weaponry." The editor's introduction begins with a quotation from Jan Pieterszoon Coen's letter of 1614 from Bantam (in what is now Indonesia) to the Directors of the Dutch East India Company: "From experience, your lordships ought to know very well that in India trade is driven and maintained under the protection and favor of your weapons, just as the weapons are furnished from the profits of trade, in such wise that trade cannot be maintained without war, nor war without trade." One can argue that Europeans had better transportation, business organization, or business methods. By contrast, one could argue that Asian business methods were not inferior and that Europeans triumphed largely because of their superior armaments. One can also insist, as Steensgaard does, that Europeans succeeded because they formed organizations in which "the use of violence was subordinated to the rational pursuit of profits." These essays show that one of the chief differences between European and indigenous trade networks was that Europeans organized their overseas commercial ventures as an extension of the state, such as Portugal and Spain, or as autonomous trading companies, such

as the Dutch and English East India companies, which had the right to act like states and to use war to further their interests. Douglas North, who is one of the founders of institutional economics, argues that institutions play a crucial role in determining the rate of economic growth and emphasizes the role of European governments in enforcing property rights in a chapter on Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires. M.N. Pearson provides a useful overview of the roles European and Asian governments played in economic development in a chapter on Merchants and States, in which he argues that long distance trade during the period did not play a major role in Europe's economic development. He explains why Asian governments were less interventionist in promoting economic development than European states but that European states' role in long distance trade "was at best facilitative, helpful but not determining or interventionist, at least not on the basis of any coherent body of doctrine" (p.115). Thomas A. Brady provides a counterpoint and argues that European "warrior merchants," whose property was secured by the state in Europe but that those states also limited the freedom of he merchants. In the East they managed to escape these limitations from custom, law and obligation and they acted like "the lords of human kind" and forged merchant empires with both military power and the greater efficiency of economies of scale. Geoffrey Parker, a well-known military historian, contributed a chapter on Empire and the Wider World, 1500-1700. There are chapters on transport costs by Russell Menard and transaction costs, such as credit and private trade, by Jacob Price. There are also chapters on the Portuguese empire in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century and the Luso-Brazilian Empire from 1500 to 1808. The importance of silver is discussed in an interesting chapter that compares the Tokugowa Shogunate with Hapsburg Spain. Finally, K. N. Chaudhuri's "Reflections on the organizing principle of pre-modern trade" reminds us that trade, and the social status of merchants, were seen very differently during the early modern period in the territorial states of Asia than the city-states of Europe, such as Venice, or the precocious Dutch Republic. He provides a useful introduction to major theoretical explanations of the origin and nature of trade and provides interesting examples from the period to suggest why merchants had a much higher status, and why trade was considered more valued, in Europe's most developed economies than in Asia's territorial empires. There are useful maps in the first volume and an annotated bibliography for both books in the second volume.

Trinder, Barry, *The Making of the Industrial Landscape*, London: J. M. Dent, 1982. Pp. xii, 276. 71 ills.

This is an excellent introduction to the subject of the impact of industrialization upon the industrial landscape. Trinder points out that during the late 18th century, tourists, artists and writers “marveled at the discipline and order of Richard Arkwright’s mills at Cromford or Josiah Wedgwood’s pottery at Etruria, and were fascinated and awestruck by the terrifying dramatic sights of Coalbrookdale.” He notes that it was not until the 1830s and 1840s that industry came to be regarded with disgust, “as something unworthy of the attention of cultivated people, as awareness spread of the squalor of working class districts in large industrial towns, and of the degrading conditions in which women and children were forced to work in mills and mines.” Most of the drama, squalor and even most of the early factories and factory communities (but not Cromford) have now been erased from the landscape or made into interesting and sanitized historical monuments. Through a lively text with many contemporary quotations and illustrations, Trinder has brought the 18th and 19th century English landscapes of industrialization back to life. He approaches his subject not by region or place, but provides a chronological treatment divided into five periods: the early 18th century landscape of “business,” or what we might call proto-industry; the landscape of economic growth between 1750-1790; the heroic age, 1790 to 1810; the age of the engineer, 1810-1850; and the palaces of industry, 1850-1890. He describes the busy early 18th century English landscape of mostly domestic and small-scale industry and notes that travelers from across the North Sea would not have found this landscape of early industry unusual. It was not until the classic period of the industrial revolution during the late and early nineteenth century that factories, railways, and large iron works brought a new industrial landscape. This larger scale also brought much more and visible pollution. As a visitor noted about the hills above Swansea’s copper works there was not “a blade of grass, a green bush, nor any form of vegetation” but only “volumes of smoke, thick and pestilential.” Trinder especially uses Manchester to demonstrate the congestion, pollution, and squalor brought by urban factories and working class housing before order was restored by sanitation and urban reformers later in the century. The age of the engineer brought fantastic engineering achievements, such as iron and then steel bridges, railway viaducts, the Great Exhibition of 1851, urban parks, and the fantastic palaces of industry and impressive civic buildings during the second half of the 19th century. Trinder includes an excellent bibliography for further reading and an interesting list of descriptive literature from the period.

Uglow, Jenny, *The Lunar Men: Five friends Whose Curiosity Changed the World*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002. Pp. xx, 588. 15 ills.

This is the story of a group of amateur scientists, inventors and entrepreneurs in the English Midlands who met from the 1760s to the 1790s to discuss natural science, philosophy, and technology. Known as the Lunar Society, they met on the evenings of a full moon to exchange ideas and experiments. Historians have credited this remarkable group of individuals, as well as other similar and lesser-known voluntary and local groups, as being one of the chief sources of technological and entrepreneurial innovation during the British industrial revolution. Jenny Uglow, who has written biographies of the novelists Henry Fielding, George Eliot and Elizabeth Gaskell, has constructed this popularly acclaimed study of the Lunar Society as a collective biography. The American title of the book emphasizes the central five personalities in its title, while the English versions' subtitle is *The Friends who Made the Future*. Among the leaders of Lunar Society were Mathew Boulton and James Watt, partners in the famous Soho works in Birmingham, which produced ornamental metal work as well as steam engines; Josiah Wedgwood, the founder of the Wedgwood pottery factories at Etruria in Staffordshire and canal entrepreneur; Erasmus Darwin, a well-known physician, inventor and theorist of evolution who later became the grandfather of Charles Darwin; and Joseph Priestly of Birmingham, a chemist, philosopher and discoverer of oxygen who was also a well-known political radical. All five were outsiders to England's aristocratic establishment. They were religious non-conformists from relatively humble backgrounds and lived in provincial but industrially dynamic cities and towns. They shared a common interest in science and challenged the intellectual, political, and social orthodoxies of the period. They were joined in their meetings by such other important figures as James Keir, a chemist; John Whithurst, a clockmaker; the physicians William Small and William Withering; and two proponents of Rousseau's philosophy, Richard Lovell Edgeworth and Thomas Day. At their monthly meetings they not only shared ideas about science, technology, politics, and philosophy but also applied their findings in efforts to solve practical problems, including joint ventures in canal building and factory production.

Individually and collectively, they were responsible for such innovations as steel fusion plating, hard paper mache, innovative textile production at Northampton that became the inspiration of Richard Arkwright's factory at Cromford, and industrial chemical experiments that served as the foundation of England's innovative pottery industry. New products required new marketing techniques. Both Wedgwood and Boulton developed innovative marketing schemes, such as showrooms for their wares and networks of agents to sell and promote their products in both Britain and abroad. Almost all the Lunar Society members invested in the new canal industry. Boulton, Watt and Wedgwood were

particularly important in the founding of the Joint Stock Company that developed the Grand Junction Canal, linking London to the Midlands and Northern canal systems. In an age when specialization was not yet fully developed in science and technology, the amateurs of the Lunar Society contributed many inventions outside their main area of expertise. Darwin, for example invented a new kind of canal lift while Watt developed surveying levels and telemeter instruments. The Lunar Society's members were important participants in debates about the American Revolution, Parliamentary reform in England, and the important questions being raised about free trade and protection during the period. Ten members of the Lunar Society members were named Fellows of the Royal Society. By the early 19th century, Lunar Society members had become part of a new establishment that they helped create--an entrepreneurial and intellectually curious middle class, which would play a leading role in creating the new industrial England of the 19th century. Uglow's work is based upon extensive secondary and sources and upon original research at the Birmingham City Archives and the collections at the University of Keele. The book consists of forty chapters on particular innovations, which together make for an impressive, very well written, and exiting story of scientific, technological, philosophical and political innovation combined with entrepreneurial action that was central to Britain's industrial revolution. The book includes many illustrations and contains extensive documentation for further reading. Histories of science and technology rarely win popular acclaim but this volume won several book of the year awards and was widely reviewed in the popular press.

Valenze, Deborah, *The First Industrial Woman*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Pp. ix, 251.

Valenze's central question in this well written and engaging study of women and work during Britain's industrial revolution is: how did women's work become so devalued in industrial society? Her answer is that it was chiefly ideology, rather than technology or economic necessity, which associated women's work with domesticity. This is primarily a work of cultural history. There are few statistics in the book; it is, however, rooted in a wealth of interesting literary sources. Valenze states that her book "has aimed to dislodge the 'Whig history' of industrialization—an unbroken narrative of progress—from its dictatorial role." She argues that during the crucial early stages of the industrial revolution, important precedents were set about "who would work, how well they performed, and how they were to be remunerated." She argues that both women and men were seen as industrious during the early 18th century but that new attitudes to the poor from the 1760s, as well as growing unemployment and the

increased cost of poor relief, began to erode this attitude. While early 18th century society was paternalistic, looser attitudes toward property and poverty within a traditional agricultural and artisan society allowed women greater employment opportunities and status in society. The modernization of agriculture introduced new values of specialization and more clearly defined property rights, which increasingly consigned women to seasonal and unskilled. This was especially so in cereal producing regions and in the dairy industry, which women had once dominated.

Spinning, which had once been primarily the work of women and had boosted their status as economically productive, was largely taken over by men with the industrialization of the textile industry. Even those, mostly unmarried women, who found work in the growing textile industry were derided by the Victorians as the “factory girl” and characterized as spending their money frivolously and were suspected of having loose morals. Women were excluded from the labor unions that began to develop in the 1830s. During the 1840s legislation was enacted forbidding women to work in certain industries and thus institutionalized their inequality. Valenze also chronicles the decline of cottage industries in which women had previously played major roles and the rise of what would later be called sweated labor, which was supplementary to factory production.

One of the major contributions of this study is that it integrates the study of ideology with a discussion of the actual work performed by women during the period. As women were increasingly relegated to handwork, marginal and seasonal modes of production, political economists and middle class attitudes increasingly found women to be naturally less productive than men. According to Valenze, traditional wage differentials between male and female labor became more generalized in the industrial economy. Her chapter on the role of the new political economy, especially the ideas of Malthus, is an interesting discussion of the development of harsher attitudes toward the poor and its increasing association with what she calls the “feminization of the female worker.” At the same time the development of a middle class ideology of domesticity created a domestic identity for women that focused on the family and the raising of children. While these ideals were largely irrelevant to the reality of working-class women’s lives, they helped associate women who worked for wages with poverty. Valenze goes on to show that middle class philanthropy encouraged the need to reform working-class women but found the best solution for their problems as employment in the rapid growth of domestic service, the largest employer of women in Victorian Britain. Valenze concludes: “the spell cast by domestic service over the fate of working-class women would not be broken until society addressed the larger question of their rightful place within the life of the first industrial nation.” This is a beautifully

written book based upon a wide variety of sources and is an excellent introduction to the important topic of the place of women workers in England's industrial revolution and its long-term consequences for gender roles in modern industrial society.

Vries, J. de and A. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (1997), 776p.

This study is the standard work on the economic history of the Dutch economy during the early modern period. Moreover, the book's thesis that, the Dutch economy was the world's first modern economy—i.e. it was the first to develop long-term sustained growth of per capita output-- posed a major challenge to the widely held historical view that sustained modern economic growth was first achieved by Britain during its industrial revolution between about 1760 and 1830 and gradually spread to other modern industrial societies. De Vries and van der Woude do not deny that the industrial revolution in Britain was of great historical importance. However, they conclude that, "it contributed to the achievement of modern economic growth as part of a larger process. That larger process of economic modernization involved more than industrial production, unfolded in a European zone larger than England, and began well before the eighteenth century" (p. 716).

It has long been argued that some early modern, pre-industrial economies enjoyed periods of economic growth, but that growth was halted through diminishing returns caused by population growth, energy constraints, or ecological factors. While many economic historians had pointed to the remarkable economic success of the Dutch Republic during the seventeenth century, its Golden Age, the assumption was that its success was largely built upon Amsterdam's commercial success and upon an old pattern of successful city-states akin to the prosperity of the Southern Netherlands or Northern Italy of an earlier period. Adam Smith noted in 1776 that the Dutch Republic was the best example of "a country that had acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of its soils and climate and its situation with respect to other countries allowed it to acquire"(p.1). The standard explanation for Britain's industrial revolution had been that it was a result of a dramatic spurt of economic growth, known as the 'take-off,' between 1760 and 1830. During the last third of the twentieth century, research using national income data downgraded growth during this period by half. The result was that Britain's economic growth must have taken place over a much longer period and had begun much earlier. Unfortunately the

statistical data necessary for producing national income data for the seventeenth century is not available. However, good data exists from the early nineteenth century and this shows that the Dutch economy had a relatively modern structure. Only Britain had such a small percentage of its labor force in an efficient agricultural sector as the Netherlands. The authors conclude that the Dutch had a diversified economy capable of economic growth before its industrial revolution, which did not take place until the late nineteenth century, and yet it had a per capita national income that was still higher than Britain's. Already in 1973, the well-known institutional economic historians, Douglas North and Paul Thomas, argued that the Netherlands was "the first country to achieve modern economic growth as we have defined it..." Angus Madison argued in 1991 that "during the last four centuries there were only three 'lead' countries [defined as the country which operates nearest to the technical frontier, with the highest average labor productivity]. The Netherlands was the top performer until the Napoleonic Wars, when the UK took over. The British lead lasted until 1890 when the USA took over" (p. 2). In this study de Vries and van der Woude have supplied the data and analysis for the argument that the Dutch Republic was the first modern economy.

This substantial book is based upon a wealth of scholarship and offers a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the Dutch economy between 1500 and 1815. It includes many statistical tables, figures and maps. It is divided into three parts. Part I, Structure, begins with geography, including the little ice age, land reclamation, energy supplies, especially peat. It goes on with chapters on demography; money, taxes, borrowing and lending; commercial finance; and ends with such interesting questions as whether it was a Calvinist economy and if it can be described as an integrated 'national' economy. The second section has detailed chapters on agriculture, fishing, industry, and foreign trade. The third section is an analysis of the dynamics of the economy, with chapters on the city and the rural areas, the social structure of a modern economy, the standard of living and the labor market, a macro-economic analysis of the economy over time, and an analytical discussion of the prevailing interpretations of an advanced preindustrial economy. The authors argue that neither the Malthusian model, nor the model of merchant capitalism and its *Stapelmarkt* (literally the clearing house of Europe's surplus goods), are adequate to describe the Republic's economic model. Instead, they argue that the Republic was the first example of a modern economy.

Much of the detail of the book hammers home the argument that this was a national well-integrated market economy that allocated resources efficiently through a free market in capital, land and labor. Wages for skilled workers, for which the data is best, increased in purchasing power although the country absorbed many immigrant workers. The authors include an impressive amount of data on the specialization of labor. Both agricultural and industrial prices were unusually market dependent and sensitive to changes of inputs. Modern market economies show a high level of uniformity in prices of basic commodities and this was a characteristic of the Republic's economy, as demonstrated for example by grain prices, despite the fact that there was a great deal of difference between the commercial and industrial maritime zones and the more agricultural inland areas. One of the most important characteristics of the Dutch Republic was its pre-eminence in foreign trade. This study includes a thorough explanation of the Republic's foreign trade, including a great deal of statistical data, but it concludes that foreign trade did not "act as the engine of growth" for the Republic. Instead, they emphasize the role of an efficient agriculture, the fisheries and industrial production.

They define a modern economy as "one with features that assist in the process of institutional, organizational, and technological change that improve the efficiency of production and distribution" (p. 713). For the Dutch Republic, urbanization, social mobility, and political and legal development were key factors in the creation of a modern economy. The rate of urbanization achieved in the Dutch Republic by the mid-seventeenth century was not realized anywhere else in Europe until the nineteenth century. This high level of urbanization provided everyone in the country with access to economic and market information. The Dutch also had a higher rate of literacy, had greater access to secondary and higher education, and had the highest per capita book publication. The Republic's public passenger barge system was the most effective public transportation and communication system in Europe. It attracted the most skilled workers, some of which brought a good deal of capital with them, and it employed many foreign unskilled workers. There is less known about social mobility but the increasing specialization of workers suggests the existence of a modern labor market. The Republic was a highly monetized economy and its banking, stock market and insurance industries were highly developed. The Republic's decentralized state has often been seen as backward looking in a period characterized by the growth of centralized national monarchies. The authors argue that the United Provinces, however chaotic it might look to us, functioned quite well. It "was a well-ordered government'

capable of protecting the security of its citizens in a hostile world, nurturing the economic interests of its merchants and fishermen, establishing vigorous institutions to advance its colonial ambitions, and maintaining domestic tranquility” (p. 714). It developed a program of poor relief that was the most comprehensive in its time. It developed a tax system that was able to raise more revenue per capita than any other state in Europe and did so in a fairly progressive manner. These and other factors, according to the authors, placed its economic actors “in a dynamic setting conducive to innovation.”

In addition to these modern economic features, the authors explain that the Republic also had social characteristics that we consider modern. These included religious toleration, a household structure consisting primarily of nuclear families with few nonfamily residents, a relatively open and complex social structure, and a political system that, although it can not be characterized as open to broad public participation, was “ideologically anti-absolutist and in practice sensitive to the interests of its citizens.” They conclude that the Dutch Republic “pursued an sociopolitical path that appeared reactionary to the conventional wisdom of absolutist Europe in order to establish a precocious modernity” (p. 715). Despite its very decentralized constitution, the Republic was capable of taking forceful action, especially in the international arena. During the seventeenth century there was little criticism within the Republic of its complex constitution and the only persistent problem was the role of House of Orange within its constitution. It was not until the eighteenth century, when the increasing burden of a large and growing national debt, produced more serious internal dissension. Except for the replacement of tax farming with directly collected excise taxes, vested interests rejected major reform. As a result the Republic developed a reputation that blamed both its relative stagnation and the failure of its Batavian Revolution of the 1790s on its tradition of what was seen as an archaic system of decentralized government. In a comment that has some resonance to the political gridlock of our own time, the authors argue that the problems of the Netherlands in the late eighteenth century “may be understood most fruitfully as an early version of a ‘distributional coalition’ problem common to rich, mature societies” (p. 715).

The book ends with a fascinating ‘Postlude’ chapter that discusses the implications of their work for the concepts of modernization, the industrial revolution and modern economic growth. The broadest implication of their work is the notion that modern society did not originate with the French and industrial revolutions. Secondly, in an increasingly post-industrial

world, the view that all modern economies have to go through a traditional industrial revolution in order to be considered modern has to be rejected by the experience of the Netherlands during the early modern period. De Vries and van der Woude argue that many economists and social theorists have defined a modern society, as Max Weber suggested, as consisting of modern humans who are by nature rational, “calculating instead of magical, individual instead of communal, and generally demystifying...[which leads us to] economic man, the rational actor seeking to maximize economic well-being.” The authors remind us that historical context matters and such a model is too simplistic, since that what is rational to those in earlier times may seem puzzling to us.

Another thought provoking implication of de Vries and van der Woude’s book is their questioning of the assumption that modern economic growth is self-sustaining and essentially limitless. The classical economists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century had argued that population growth and energy and resource supplies would eventually produce diminishing returns that would eventually halt growth in a developed economy and lead to a stationary state. This was not an unreasonable assumption in an essentially organic economy in which the supplies of food, raw materials and fuel all competed with each other for the use of a limited supply of land within the context of a growing population. The industrial revolution fundamentally changed this age-old system when it began to use the vast supplies of mineral resources stored in the earth. The invention of the steam engine and the use of coal-based iron smelting had a revolutionary impact upon the economy and helped produce what we know as the nineteenth-century age of progress. The authors argue that the Dutch Republic had already freed itself from the pre-industrial energy restraints during the early modern period through its intensive use of organic and kinetic energy. Its economy was largely based upon its abundant peat supplies, which were far from exhausted during the period. During the eighteenth century this was supplemented with coal from Newcastle at a price similar to what London paid. The relative decline of the Dutch economy during the eighteenth century was not a result of energy supplies. In fact, they show that the Dutch were early adopters of steam engines, especially for pumping water from their polders. They did not, however, use steam-power for industrial production until much later in the nineteenth century because their industrial production was already too costly and could not be lowered sufficiently through the use of steam. The main reason why they did not adopt steam power early, according to the authors, was not a supply

constraint issue, but a “demand-delayed transition from a first to a second stage of modern economic growth” (p. 720). The recent experience of mature industrial economies has demonstrated that their economic growth has been much slower than the high rates of economic growth of developing economies. The authors note that supply restrains upon economic growth look now much more seriously today than they did during the boom years after World War II. In addition, they note, that the demographics of modern economies will mean that there will be far fewer younger workers and many more older and retired people in the near future. De Vries and van der Woude suggest that the Dutch economy was also modern in the sense that it pioneered long-term growth and then entered a period of relative stagnation, and that this pattern may be a much more characteristic of modern growth than an endless age of progress.

Vries, J. de, *The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present* (2008), 327p.

De Vries, one of the most prominent economic historians of early modern Europe, introduced the concept of an ‘industrious revolution’ as a fundamental cause of the industrial revolution in a much noticed journal article in 1994. This book expands and generalizes the concept and broadens its applicability to our understanding of modern economic growth from the early 17th century to the present. The concept, and even the phrase, has been well received and widely discussed by historians. He argues that “the industrious revolution...unfolded gradually after 1650 linked an intensification of market labor by the household to new consumer aspirations—what contemporaries called an ‘awakening of the appetites of the mind.’ Many of these new aspirations reflected individual appetites, and, over time, the multiple voices within the household put pressure on its integrity, but under the conditions of the times the execution of new patterns of consumer demand required household strategies.” For de Vries, one of the key foundations of economic growth in North-Western Europe was its peculiar (in world-wide terms) marriage pattern of relatively late marriages and households consisting of independent nuclear families. These households responded both to market conditions and consumer aspirations. During the early modern period, households combined purchased goods with household labor to produce commodities for final consumption using available technologies. De Vries argues that consumption itself is dynamic. It reflects both the changing desires of the households and the changing opportunities available in the marketplace and often involves the pursuit of clusters of commodities which constitute “lifestyles.” He argues that from the mid-17th century both consumer demand and the supply of labor

grew by the reallocation of the productive resources of households, resulting in a rise of household production sold to others and of consumption purchased from others. This economic growth produced market integration, such as agricultural specialization, proto-industrial production, increased wage labor, more commercial participation in a growing market economy, but especially a greater supply of labor. During the period leading up to the industrial revolution, de Vries argued, “household members worked harder and longer in order to consume more and consume different and new products.” An important part of the argument is that it was especially women and children who played a greater role in market production and consumption.

De Vries does not claim that the “industrious revolution” is the ultimate cause of the first industrial revolution, but he suggests that the concept, which he acknowledges was first used by Akira Hayami to describe Japan’s labor intensive path to industrialization, seeks to provide a fuller account of the context in which the new technologies and organizational changes that characterize the industrial revolution should be seen. According to de Vries, “the industrious revolution that began in the late seventeenth century...formed the context in which the Industrial Revolution unfolded rather than being itself a creation of that sequence of events.” The essential argument in de Vries’ framework is that the industrious revolution was not a response to economic factors, such as changes in prices and incomes, or the scientific revolution but an autonomous rise in the “goods aspirations” of households, which produced an enlarged supply of labor. De Vries admits that “the record of real wages...does not on the face of it, offer much scope for innovative consumer behavior or an expansive material culture.” However, he notes that that the North-Western European marriage patterns of independent nuclear family households encouraged not just an increase in male head of household labor but also the increased participation of women and children in market labor. De Vries’ argument that the industrious revolution should be seen as a major factor in explaining the first industrial revolution has produced a great deal of discussion and will no doubt be tested empirically, assuming the data is available. See, for example, the important work of Jan Luiten van Zanden (in this bibliography below).

Westermann, Mariët, *A Wordly Art: The Dutch Republic, 1585-1718* (1996).

Westermann’s study of Dutch painting of its Golden Age is the best introduction to the subject available in English. Originally published in England, Yale University Press, a premier publisher of work in art history, reissued the book in 2007 to keep it in print for classroom use. An academic reviewer described this attractive short text as “magisterial” (a rare use of the word

in discussing a textbook). The book is richly illustrated with color photographs to which she refers specifically in the text as if she were teaching a class. Except for discussing a few prints, the book is almost entirely about paintings. After an introduction that uses several well-known Dutch paintings to suggest how we might begin to interpret Dutch painting, the book's six chapters are organized thematically. She attempts to show how Dutch painters portrayed their land and society by developing an innovative "reality effect." She discusses the technical means by which they achieved what is now called "realism" and interprets why the Dutch were attracted to this new style of painting. She also explains that, despite the realistic look of their pictures, they were never direct transcriptions of reality but carried a great deal of symbolism that tells us much about their society. The first chapter provides a sketch of the political and economic history of the Republic and explains the unprecedented size of the Dutch market for art, the vast number of paintings produced and the impact of this on the choices of subjects and the careers of artists. In chapter two she discusses the complex relationship of images and words in Dutch art. Texts were important in Dutch art given the relatively freedom of speech in the Republic and its diversity of religious, political, cultural, and religious literature. In the third chapter, she studies how painters made their pictures look "virtually real" and how they provided a specifically local, national, and even patriotic identity for the new state and society created in the Northern Netherlands. Their art played an important role in making this area known as 'Dutch' and was the most successful Republic in early modern times. Chapter four examines the political use of historical painting and the ideological significance of relatively plain landscapes as well as the many works that portrayed the family and social relationships of ordinary people. The next chapter discusses the roles of portraiture and architecture in forging national and local identities. The sixth and final chapter treats the professional guilds created by artists and architects and examines their writings about their own status and social relations. Unfortunately, Westermann was not able to update her bibliography for the Yale 2007 reprint. However, in 2002 she published an overview of the historiography of Dutch art history, which remains a good place to begin further study of the subject, "After Iconography and Iconoclasm: Current Research in Netherlandish Art, 1566-1700," *Art Bulletin* 84 (2002): 351-72.

Wilson, C. H., *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (1957), 169p.

This short study, written by a young scholar who went on to become a major contributor to English economic history and the history of early modern European expansion, provides a handy introduction to the causes and strategy of three naval wars fought between the Dutch and the English during the seventeenth century, 1652-54, 1665-67, and 1672-74. There was a fourth war in 1780-84, which is not discussed. Even the 1672 war is not treated in detail because it was very much a personal decision of Charles II to support Louis XIV's invasion of the Dutch Republic because Charles needed money and the French King was willing to pay him for his support. Wilson argues, as its title suggests, that from the perspective of England, the chief causes of the seventeenth century Anglo-Dutch wars were fought for both profit and power.

The book is largely based on secondary sources and its scholarly value lies in its relatively brief but clearly written account of a classic mercantilist conflict between two naval powers. Wilson's book was heavily influenced by Britain's experience during the first half of the twentieth century when its strategy was largely determined by its need to protect its trade routes from an overbearing European power. He explains that in the seventeenth century England's economic wellbeing was seriously threatened by Dutch economic competition in areas such as shipping, textiles, fishing, and trade with Europe and the new world-wide markets. The Dutch and the English were competitors on three continents during the period. He makes it clear, however, that the specific outbreak of war in 1652 was a result of disputes about the right of search on the high seas. In his discussion of the second war, he concentrates on the period 1660-1667 and emphasizes the importance of political factors and, in particular, the fomenting of anti-Dutch opinion by the English Ambassador to the Dutch Republic, Sir George Downing.

In his account of the wars themselves, Wilson concentrates on the strategic factors rather than the actual fighting. England could best use her naval power to harass the large Dutch shipping fleets that were vital to its worldwide trade. This left the Dutch with the choice of using convoys, which harmed the efficiency of its trade, or by striking directly at English naval power. The English assumed that during the 1660s the latter would not be a major threat since they had achieved a victory over the Dutch battle fleet in their first naval war using their larger ships of the line. However, the English attempt to blockade Dutch shipping failed and between 1665 and 1667 the Dutch scored major victories against the English home fleet, including their successful assault upon Chatham in the Medway, which included the burning of English capital ships and the capture of the English flagship, the *Royal Charles*.

Wilson's clear exposition of mercantilist writing of the period is an excellent introduction to the complexity of mercantilist thought. He points out that England's Thomas Mun's *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade* (1664) and the Dutch work by Pieter de la Court, *Het interest van Holland* (1662) demonstrate that England and the Dutch Republic articulated very different interpretations of mercantilism and strategies for pursuit of profit and power. Given the extent and importance of their trade in Europe, Dutch republicans pursued a basically pacific outlook in Europe, while it tempted the English to break Dutch pre-eminence in trade by force and protective legislation, such as the English Navigation Acts, which attempted to reserve all English trade and fishing for English ships. As a reviewer noted, these fundamentally different strategies pursued by the two most advanced economies in Europe, who were both neighbors and rival naval powers, it might be necessary to explain why there were only three naval wars during the period, and why they were not fought more tenaciously. In total there were only six or seven large-scale battles fought during their seventeenth century wars. Part of the reason may be, as Wilson explains, that the Dutch had little to gain for fighting a war with England, since it was situated directly across from its trade routes. Moreover, England's financial and political situation was never sufficient to engage in sustained and serious naval conflicts with the Dutch during the period. England's support, from 1670 to 1672, of Louis XIV's invasion of the Low Countries was half-hearted and soon produced a backlash in England, since French hegemony across the North Sea would present Britain with a much larger rival across their trade routes to Europe. Ironically, the story of the Dutch Republic's huge and successful amphibious invasion of England in 1688, and William of Orange and Mary's assumption's of the British crown, is rarely labeled as one of the Anglo-Dutch Wars in British historiography.

Wrightson, Keith, *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. ii, 372.

This is a very readable and beautifully written survey of British social and economic history between c. 1450 and 1750. Although the book relies upon a good deal of quantitative data, especially the research of demographic historians, the volume emphasizes the lives of people from all social groups and how they were effected by the gradual development of a market economy in Britain. Wrightson is quite skeptical of the use of neo-classical economic theory as useful tools for explaining early modern European economic history. His opening chapter provides a useful discussion of the historiography of

British economic history, which reminds us of the pioneering interpretations of the Scottish Enlightenment's economic writers and of the late nineteenth century work of the English historical economists as well as more recent work in economic history. Wrightson's approach to economic history does not use social science jargon or complex theoretical models. Instead, he offers us an appealing model for a revitalized humanistic and readable social and economic history. He also eschews the old overarching explanations of social history, which placed early modern Britain's social history within a Marx inspired framework of a transition from feudalism to capitalism. In harmony with the many specialized and local studies of the last generation of social historians, who recognized that the old order and its values persisted for a long time, Wrightson tells the story of a slow and complex evolution of society over three centuries, which prepared the way, but did not guarantee that Britain would subsequently experience the first industrial revolution. He argues that an integrated national economy was created during this long period in which market forces "became not just a means of exchanging goods, but a mechanism for sustaining and maintaining an entire society." This society was closely linked to the emerging world-economy and saw the extension and 'ideological sanctification' of private property rights, a vast expansion in the market for labor power as a "commodity to be bought and sold," and a redistribution of power in the hands of those who were able to profit from the increase of productive power. All this involved modest but long-term increases in output and per capita income and consumption, especially for the 'middling sort,' but also a diminished wellbeing for those left behind by economic growth.

Instead of most economic histories of the period, which proceed by treating each of the chief economic sectors--such as agriculture, trade, industry, labor—separately, Wrightson organized his book chronologically around major changes in social organization and the economy. He divides up his story into three main periods. In the first part, *Households in a landscape, c. 1450-1550*, he explains the structure of society and economic life of a largely traditional society. He emphasizes the limited role of the market during this period for the vast majority of people. Most spent their lives within a local neighborhood. For them "Countries" meant not a nation but a local county. Only the elite operated in a larger context. Nonetheless, even in this traditional society, he stresses the interdependencies of people in their communities. In part two, which concentrates on the sixteenth century, he explains the major changes brought by economic and social change. The principal agents of change, according to Wrightson, were the growth of population and the rise of prices during the period. These forces resulted in greater competition within society and brought important changes in property ownership, domestic

and international commerce, taxation for waging war, and urbanization. In Part three, *Living with the market, c. 1660-1750*, he chronicles the growing role of the market in society and discusses the changing lives of the landed interest--nobleman, gentlemen, and yeoman; the 'middle sort of people, whose lives revolved around capital credit, trade, commerce, and new patterns of consumption; and the laboring people. In his treatment of the latter, he discusses both those who became more independent during the period and those who became more dependent. Throughout the book, he emphasizes the complexity of society and rejects simple categorizations. This can especially be seen in his excellent chapters on the 'middling sort,' and in his treatment of the common people. He constantly reminds us of the different social and economic lives experienced by, for example, a Scottish crofter, a London tradesman, or an East Anglian weaver. Unlike many other surveys that claim to discuss all of Britain and then focus almost entirely on England, Wrightson provides an extensive treatment of Scotland's social and economic history. The book includes an excellent list of suggestions for further reading, arranged by topic and with many brief but useful annotations. One shortcoming of the book is that it does not include footnotes to his many interesting quotations from a wide variety of interesting sources.

Wrigley, E. A. *Continuity, Chance and Change: The Character of the Industrial Revolution in England*, (1988, 146p.

This short book began as Wrigley's interpretive lectures at Cambridge University and was developed further into an excellent introduction to the chief causes of the industrial revolution in Britain and suggests why the Dutch Republic, despite its earlier and sustained economic growth, did not experience what we commonly think of as an industrial revolution until the 1870s. His explanation of the origin of the British industrial revolution is on the supply rather than the demand side. Wrigley is the most important British historical demographer. In his demographic studies, he emphasized the role of population growth in the origin of the industrial revolution but here he stresses the role of natural resources, especially coal. His explanation splits the origin of the industrial revolution into two periods. The first, which Wrigley sees as a long period of preparation from Elizabethan times to the early 19th century, saw the development of an "advanced organic economy," in which power was primarily based upon human, animal and water resources. While there was long-term economic growth in the organic phase, based on specialization and the division of labor as explained by Adam Smith, it was restrained by limits on land and organic resources. The second, and more spectacular, phase, which began during

the second quarter of the 19th century, was based upon the ample and conveniently situated supplies of coal in England and Scotland. Its exploitation saw the development of increasingly more efficient steam engines, the making of iron using coal, and the application of steam engines to provide power for railways, ships and factories. According to Wrigley, while the copper, iron, and tin industries were developed earlier using charcoal for fuel, the increased cost of wood grown on a limited supply of land set limits on the increased production of metals essential for economic growth. Wrigley argues that organic resources were also less efficient in producing energy than the mineral resource of coal. In an interesting discussion of the Dutch economy, which experienced long-term economic growth in the 17th century and developed an impressive manufacturing capacity, he asked why it was unable to breakthrough to an industrial revolution until much later than Britain. His answer is its reliance upon peat and wind for power. One might ask why the Dutch did not import more coal from the coal-fields in England's Northeast across the North Sea, or why the English could not have imported charcoal from the abundant forests in North America. Wrigley also notes that it was during the early 19th century that discoveries in inorganic chemistry allowed the development of new and productive manufacturing processes in a variety of industries using industrial chemistry.

Wrigley's analysis has essentially divided the industrial revolution into two distinctive phases: a long "advanced organic economy" and the rapid development of a mineral based economy during the 19th century. This division of the industrial revolution into two stages, and thus its extension over a long period of time, fits in with much of modern scholarship. His demographic research was fundamental to the idea of the development of an advanced organic economy during the early modern period. This short book serves to remind us of the importance of mineral resources in Britain's industrial revolution. Moreover, the convenient location of Britain's coal resources made it easier than its rivals to build a modern industrial economy. A good example of this is Lancashire's world-leading textile industry, which was built on top of the county's coalfield. Wrigley's argument implies that technological innovation was central to the industrial revolution in Britain but he does not develop this connection explicitly in this book. In a later book, *Energy and the English Industrial Revolution* (2010), Wrigley further developed his ideas about the importance of Britain's mineral resources to the development of the first industrial revolution for which the way had been prepared by a long period of slow but cumulative the economic progress within an organic economy,

Wrigley, E. A. and R. S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541-1871: A Reconstruction*, London: Edward Arnold, 1981. Pp. xv, 779.

This study, along with a subsequent companion volume, *English Population History from Family Reconstruction, 1580-1837* (1997), produced by the authors and other collaborators at Cambridge University, produced a revolution in English demographic history. These studies are based upon samples from the millions of entries in surviving English parish registers of births, marriages, deaths and burials. Using sophisticated statistical techniques, the data was aggregated and analyzed to discover trends in the size of the population, trends in the rates of population growth and decline, and such important demographic variables as the age of marriage, age-specific mortality and fertility rates, gross reproduction and others. Before the publication of this volume, the common assumption had been that preindustrial England balanced its population by way of nearly universal and early marriage with high mortality through periodic Malthusian crisis, in which a growing population encountered diminishing economic returns due to limited natural resources, especially land. Instead, their empirical evidence shows that an “accommodation between population and resources was secured not by sudden, sharp mortality spasms, but by wide quiet fluctuations in fertility.” These broad changes in fertility were a consequence of changes in the age of marriage and of the proportion of the population that married. Thus, in Malthusian terms, a preventive check on excessive population growth in relation to the resources available was predominant. The work of Wrigley, Schofield and his collaborators underpins the argument for long-term economic growth in early modern England, which provided a hospitable context for the industrial revolution in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Critics have warned that the argument might be circular. If population growth determined the rise of real wages, and then the growth of real wages determined nuptiality, which in turn determined fertility and population growth. Some have complained that Wrigley and Schofield’s demography used a Malthusian model of male wages as the key determinant of the age of marriage, while others see structural changes in the economy as crucial in altering family incomes and acting as the primary influence upon changes in the marriage age. More recently, the very impressive research of Wrigley and his colleagues has led to the articulation of alternative models that focus on the demand side and the changing consumer aspirations of households. Despite some criticism, these substantial volumes contain the statistics, tables, methodological discussions and the conclusions derived from these. Their work is essential to an understanding of English demographic history for the period.

A good introduction and summary of Wrigley's work can be found in a much less technical volume, a collection of his essays published as *Poverty, Progress and Population* (2004). Here he discusses the wider issue of the relationship of England's demographic pattern to the origin of the industrial revolution. For Wrigley, England's agricultural productivity and the fastest rate of population growth in Europe during the 18th century also allowed the growth of urbanization and the increased specialization of labor. As he explains: "It is mistaken to suppose that it was the industrial revolution which set England apart for a time from the continent of Europe. Almost the reverse was the case. Once the industrial revolution had started to transform English society and economy, the days of its distinctiveness were numbered and its economic dominance was doomed... But for about two centuries before this transition took place, England had been growing steadily apart from the continent, acquiring in the process increased political and economic power." England's demographic pattern was thus essential to its economic growth during the early modern period but other factors, including its coal resources, were essential to its industrial revolution.

Zanden, Jan Luiten van, *The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution: The European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000-1800* (2009), 341p.

For many years economic historians have been debating what has been called the 'Great Divergence,' or when and how Western European economic growth increased relative to that of advanced economic regions in China and Japan. Their focus was originally on the period of the industrial revolution in Europe. More recently, evidence has mounted that the divergence of economic growth between Europe and Asia occurred during the early modern period, well before the industrial revolution of the late 18th century. In this important study, based upon many quantitative indices of economic growth from the 10th to the 19th centuries, van Zanden, who has been a major contributor to this debate, has shifted the focus on the beginning of European economic growth to the medieval period. He argues that the first industrial revolution should be seen as a "long runway" of preparation before the industrial revolution could "take off" during the late 18th century. Van Zanden argues that for most of Europe the medieval period was more dynamic than the period from 1500 to 1800. The growth of the European economy from 900 to 1300 took place on a pan-European scale and consisted of strong population growth and an increase in per capita real income. From ca. 1500 to 1800 growth was restricted to the North Sea region—and especially to Flanders in the 16th century, the Netherlands during its Golden Age in the late 16th to mid 17th centuries, and Britain after the early 17th century. By contrast, per capita income in the rest of

Western Europe stagnated and even declined between 1500 and 1800. The emergence of different growth paths in Western Europe has been labeled as the ‘Little Divergence.’

Van Zanden seeks to solve this problem by providing new sets of statistical data that show the growth of European investment in human capital. In cooperation with a team of historians, he documents the development of a European ‘knowledge economy’ with statistics that show the growth of manuscript and book publishing during the medieval period from the Carolingian period to the Renaissance, well before the invention of the printing press. These indices of education and literacy begin to show a divergence between the North Sea region and the rest of Europe from c. 1400. The fact that wage levels in the North Sea region were also significantly higher in this region than in the rest of Europe from the 15th century provides further evidence of greater investment in human capital during this period in the this region. Van Zanden goes on to develop indices that suggest relatively greater citizen participation in government in the North Sea area than in the rest of Europe. This greater participation in government can be seen in the successful revolt of the Netherlands, the creation of the Dutch Republic, the English Revolution, and the establishment of a balance of power between the Crown and Parliament in England after 1688. According to van Zanden, it was in these two countries that political and economic institutions were developed that produced greater economic efficiency, which allowed them to win the greatest economic benefits from the creation of a world-wide trade network and reap the economic dividends from the immense resources of the Western Hemisphere.

Greater participation in government also allowed the Dutch Republic and Britain to collect more taxes from its citizens and to use this revenue to protect its territory from absolutist states, such as Spain and France, and to wage war to expand its mercantilist economies. Combining these long-term developments with other crucial factors, such as Britain’s greater size and its convenient coal resources, allowed Britain to take the lead from the Dutch Republic and to achieve the first industrial revolution.

Van Zanden also uses his statistical data to compare the North Sea region with advanced economic areas in Asia in order to provide a broad comparative explanation for the “Great Divergence.” His book is based upon his many articles in scholarly journals and the collaboration of other scholars. It constitutes an important contribution in the debate about the long-term origin of the industrial revolution, which, van Zanden argues, was rooted in a ‘million mutinies’ of ordinary people. At the beginning of his book, van Zanden quotes Robert Lucas, an important economic growth theorist: “For income growth to occur in a society, a large fraction of people must experience changes in the possible lives they imagine for themselves and their children, and these new visions of a possible futures must

have enough force to lead them to change the way they behave, the number of children they have, and the hopes they invest in these children: the way they allocate their time. In other words...economic development requires *a million mutinies*.” Van Zanden’s book includes over fifty statistical tables, graphs and figures and an extensive bibliography.